to repeat my original point, Logical absolutes are conceptual by nature, but I don't see how they are dependent on space, time, physical properties, or human nature etc

It is important to remember that Descartes meditation is a project of radical skepticism. After establishing certainty of his own existence Descartes then finds his way to the certainty of God's existence and then the truth of laws like A and not A cannot both be true. Kant took a different second step and did not feel the need to establish the existence of God but rather he bracketed* off all experience as phenomenal and conditioned by the subjective mind. For Kant, the law "A and not A cannot both be true" is something the subjective mind brings with it, something that is impossible to escape and yet nevertheless phenomenal. So for Kant it is a difference between saying "it is impossible to think otherwise" and "it is absolutely true".

"Nominalism is true" and "A and not A cannot both be true" are both true statements but only insofar and only because this is the way our subjective minds structure and condition reality. They can never be true in the universal and absolute sense without this phenomenological caveat. For Kant, these statements are not necessarily true (though it may be) outside of phenomenal experience.

I'm not sure why Peirce said that Kant's philosophy would have been more straightforward had he been a realist.

As I am writing this I am wondering that there must be a profound connection between the subjective/objective and nominalism/realism. Starting from the subjective truth of the cogito one has the opportunity to be a nominalist. Starting from A and not A cannot both be true one can only be a realist. It is almost as if the one reduces to the other. Again it is a matter of where one begins to philosophize. Descartes radical skepticism or some other alternative such as Plato's or Aristotle's.


*The term "bracketing" I think traces back to Husserl so I am a little worried that I am conflating Kant with Husserl but the term seems to fit.

you ought to look up Graham Priest and Dialetheism (that there are true contradictions.)

Also for what it is worth, I don't think it makes any sense to say that maths is 'subjective' or 'arbitrary'. Ugaibhu keeps saying that math is arbitrary and then produces these incomprehensible (to me anyway) arguments in support of it. But I think there are some`very heavy hitting scientists, mathematicians and philosophers who are mathematical and even platonist realists.

That's very useful - thanks.

Also, I like yr sig - perhaps if I end every statment I make with "Thus spoke Spiltteeth" I'll start getting more respect at work! :bigsmile:

The thing is Decarte presupposes the laws of logic as true because he uses them to prove he exists - "I think therefor I am"

If the laws of logic weren't true he couldn't make that statement.

The thing is, IF the laws of logic are just subjective and from the mind etc then they are not absolute, but just a subjective preference for thinking.

First, to prove that they are subjective etc you need to USE the laws of logic.

...much of the debate over whether the cogito involves inference, or is instead a simple intuition (roughly, self-evident), is preempted by three observations. One observation concerns the absence of an express 'ergo' ('therefore') in the Second Meditation account. It seems a mistake to emphasize this absence, as if suggesting that Descartes denies any role for inference. For the Second Meditation passage is the one place (of his various published treatments ) where Descartes explicitly details a line of inferential reflection leading up to the conclusion that I am, I exist. His other treatments merely say the 'therefore'; the Meditations treatment unpacks it. A second observation is that it seems a mistake to assume that the cogito must either involve inference, or intuition, but not both. There is no inconsistency in the view that the meditator comes to appreciate the persuasive force of the cogito by means of inferential reflection, while also holding that his eventual conviction is not grounded in inference. A third observation is that what one intuits might well include an inference: it is widely held among philosophers today that modus ponens is self-evident, and yet it contains an inference. There is no inconsistency in claiming a self-evident grasp of a proposition with inferential structure-a fact applicable to the cogito. As Descartes writes:[INDENT] When someone says "I am thinking, therefore I am, or I exist," he does not deduce existence from thought by means of a syllogism, but recognizes it as something self-evident by a simple intuition of the mind. (Replies 2, AT 7:140) [/INDENT]

How do nominalists account for the laws of logic?

I'm no expert, but it seems to me the laws of logic are universal; and they are certainly not material.
So if you don't believe in abstract objects how do you account for them?

Well, like I say, I'm no expert but Logical absolutes are conceptual by nature, but I don't see how they are dependent on space, time, physical properties, or human nature etc
They are not the product of the physical universe (space, time, matter), because if the physical universe were to disappear, logical absolutes would still be true.

But logics are designed by human beings, and dont have any "absolutes".

I would add that space, time, substance, nature, etc., are all made out of concept

'Made out of concept' is a most peculiar expression, I think. 'Given form by the manner in which they are perceived'...now that is a line that I have been tinkering with the last few months....It is just that when you phrase it like this, it seriously sounds like 'concept' is this massive all-purpose plastic out of which things are actually formed...

Actually I have been reading up on Descartes, Newton and Galileo again. It was the latter who said the book of nature was written in mathematics. This is such a profound observation although nowadays I am sure many people take it for granted.

. I suppose, moving down the track a little, these in turn give rise to the possibility of algorithms. But to take a step back, the fact that these mathematical insights do have such universal applicability, and reveal things about the workings of nature that could never be ascertained by mere observation, is still amazing.

Penrose presents the argument that human consciousness is non-algorithmic, and thus is not capable of being modeled by a conventional Turing machine-type of digital computer. Penrose hypothesizes that quantum mechanics plays an essential role in the understanding of human consciousness. The collapse of the quantum wavefunction is seen as playing an important role in brain function.

It's interesting writing and I guess suited to this medium (which is after all kind of a universal interactive whiteboard). I think you're in the process of defining your own approach to many of the big questions, put it that way, and I am OK with it, but I can see that many people would take it completely the wrong way.

(AND I have a rule never to engage in a conversation that involves the use of 'qualia'...).

I don't know if you have read any abstracts of Roger Penrose's The Emporer's New Mind, yet another monster volume of densely packed arguments that i will never have the remotest chance of reading or absorbing......not enough time in the world for all this stuff....

No, I think you're pretty right, on the first point, although I think i see where you're going with it.

Needs to be road tested, though.

The only reason I hate 'qualia' is because it crops up in so many conversations with uber materialist Dennett.

A meta-comment. You are smart enough to read Hegel via Kojeve and extract a lot of meaning from it. But you have to realize that Hegel almost singlehandedly brought The Grand Tradition to a complete halt through his immense complexities. I was reflecting the other day that after Kant, Hegel and Schopenhauer, brilliant though they were, there was a tremendous reaction against that kind of ornate intellectualism and philosophical idealism generally. The rejection of all this was one of the things which drove the movement to science and secularism.