We are only using the Inquiry Concerning Human Understanding
. I think everything is in sections four and five. Four is the Skeptical Doubts Concerning the Operations of the Understanding, and Five is the SKeptical Solutions of These Doubts.
My main problem is the first question on what is Hume's skeptical problem about matters of fact. Is this his main problem "When we reason a priori and consider merely any object or cause as it appears to the mind, independent of all observation, it never could suggest to us the notion of any distinct object, such as its effect, much less show us the inseparable and inviolable connection between them."
Is this a problem that we need to worry about? Well only if we want to make our lives very difficult. We rely on our ability to base decisions in the future, on what happened in the past. If we deny ourselves this possibility, and turn it into a major problem, then life would be rather complicated.
Well, Hume's skeptical solution is custom and belief. Custom is what gives us the ability to infer that one thing will cause another, and belief is the feeling that moderates between one thing and its opposite. This part is easy and I am pretty sure that I only need to discuss those two parts.
Is Hume's account of custom and belief a solution to the problem? Well that assumes that there is actually a skeptical problem. To me, this whole issue is rather stupid and obvious, but I understand its importance to empiracism. Why would any one be worried that dropping an object will cause it to levitate or shoot off into the sky just because it is possible. Obviously, a skeptical solution only eases the concern that a skeptical problem seems to undermine commonly held beliefs and practices, but to me, only an insane person would find a major problem with inductive reasoning. Sure, humans can be wrong about causal inferences, but why should we suspect otherwise.
It's a skepticalsolution because it's compatible with saying that we don't have any reason for drawing these inferences. The skepticism is skepticism about our reasons for drawing causal inferences. Considering this last statement, I am having problems finding his problem that suggests that we have no reason for drawing these inferences. Wait, after typing that last line, I think what I quoted for the problem is exactly what I needed.