...wherein I suggested that if they did, then man (with proper training) would be able to alter objective reality to his will, something we cannot do, which too led to dismissal.

Okay, I recently did a paper refuting Leibniz's monads. On what was, however, otherwise an "A+" paper, my teacher left me the following comment:

Where I asked, since monads are mental, ideal elements, in whose mind they would exist in, my teacher commented "They are minds themselves. Each monad is a mind." Since I'm going to present, and I know he'll bring that up, I'd like to know, since I've asked some of the other professors in the philosophy department here (and they've got no idea), one, how he came up with this, and two, how I can refute this notion, because what he is effectively challenging me to do is engage and dismiss the concept that a monad is its own mind.

BTW, what I posited in my paper: that monads exist in the mind of God, wherein I discovered that if they do, then the Universe and all in it would too exist in the mind of God (following Leibniz's definition of monads), which led me to connect Leibniz's God with Spinoza's (which of course led, after a little reflection of ramifications, to dismissal), and that they exist in the mind of man, wherein I suggested that if they did, then man (with proper training) would be able to alter objective reality to his will, something we cannot do, which too led to dismissal.

So, according to you, you did not refute Leibniz on monads, since your objections were dismissed. "To refute" is to prove false. Unless you think despite what your instructor said, Leibniz is wrong, and you did refute Leibniz.

While I am unable to answer your question directly, I think the above is something we do everyday to a certain extent and continue to do unknowingly and unaware of it.

There can be no mental construct (of concept) or perception of a 'monad' as all 'that' is context.

I'm only saying "refute" because the paper's name was "A Refutation of Monads." (Besides, I have another argument that refutes it more directly elsewhere in the thing.) What I want to know is why the teacher said what he did!

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Okay, I recently did a paper refuting Leibniz's monads. On what was, however, otherwise an "A+" paper, my teacher left me the following comment:

Where I asked, since monads are mental, ideal elements, in whose mind they would exist in, my teacher commented "They are minds themselves. Each monad is a mind." Since I'm going to present, and I know he'll bring that up, I'd like to know, since I've asked some of the other professors in the philosophy department here (and they've got no idea), one, how he came up with this, and two, how I can refute this notion, because what he is effectively challenging me to do is engage and dismiss the concept that a monad is its own mind.

BTW, what I posited in my paper: that monads exist in the mind of God, wherein I discovered that if they do, then the Universe and all in it would too exist in the mind of God (following Leibniz's definition of monads), which led me to connect Leibniz's God with Spinoza's (which of course led, after a little reflection of ramifications, to dismissal), and that they exist in the mind of man, wherein I suggested that if they did, then man (with proper training) would be able to alter objective reality to his will, something we cannot do, which too led to dismissal.

Isn't that statement self-refuting? In order to talk of a 'monad', as you have done, it is necessary to have some concept of one.

Otherwise, 'monad' would just be a nonsense-word without any meaning,

and you would not be saying anything at all (even negatively) by using it.

As soon as you refer to something, you are creating a relation between yourself and it, and hence 'context'.

This is how I understand Leibniz and Monads.
Now when the teacher said "They are minds themselves. Each monad is a mind," what I think he may be driving at is that there is clear division from the monad and the conception of the monad. It may be the way you phrased the point from which you noted the teachers response, but it seems as though you say that a monad is a conception of the mind, rather than a metaphysical substance or in fact a "soul." Berkeley is one of the few people in your period of modern philosophy who conceives the world esse est percippi (to be is to be perceived) but not Leibniz. Like what was previously said about monads, it is its own constitution within a plurality of substances. So a monad is essentially its own mind (think of the filmstrip analogy, attribute of monads, etc).

What one can say, (as, ultimately, words themselves are dualistic in nature and incapable of 'wording' that which is not dual in nature and 'wordable') is what monism is not. There is nothing to have a concept of. It is like the word 'infinity'. Yes, it exists as a word, and in that context, but there can be no attendant concept or construct, no mental image, no 'meaning'... A monism is not 'this' and a monism is not that, etc...

Some 'things' exist as no more than a pile of letters forming what is commonly called a word; some have necessarily vague and nebulous definitions.. such as 'infinity' and 'eternity' and 'Consciousness' and 'monad'...

I have no problem with the idea that 'monad' has only a vague and nebulous definition,

but I would dispute the idea that it has no definition/meaning at all. If the words 'monad' and 'infinity' had no meaning at all, they would be interchangeable (since nothing = nothing), which they clearly are not. Since they havedifferent meanings, they must mean something.

While I would entirely agree that the idea of 'infinity' as an actual number or completed thing is incoherent, the word has a legitimate use to denote the absence of an intrinsic or mathematical limit.

What can we say about 'monad'?

Well, for a start, I would be interested to hear your response to VideCorSpoon's post above.

...So a monad is essentially its own mind

I understand that a monad is essentially the physical embodiment of the complete notion (which, by the way, entails determinism, which I built my main disproof, not being discussed here, on), and that they are infinitesimal particles that the physical world is built on (Monadology 2, remember). If I remember right, though, they are physically unextended, although all extended objects are built on them...essentially, Leibniz seems to be saying that our physical world is built on ideal particles. And since unextended particles can't extend sine qua non in the extended universe, they still have to exist in something (that is able to contain an idea?) in the extended universe...thus my teacher's comment seems to imply that the monad exists, essentially, in its own mind--but wouldn't that mean that the essentiality of the unextended monad exists within an extended monad? And isn't that statement self-contradictory?

Nothing can be said abut a 'monad' other than what it is not (as per Sikh scripture).

Well, Leibniz seems to have said a great deal about what it is (see VideCorSpoon's posts).

And you don't disagree with the idea that 'a monad is essentially its own mind'

- but that's a positive attribute, is it not?

How can something unknowable (perhaps even meaningless?) be the subject of detailed Leibnizian analysis?