Both of your comments were helpful.
Firstly, I would like to address jgweed's questions; Kant changed metaphysics because the traditional metaphysics dealt with reality and its structure where as Kant's metaphysics (post Critique of Pure Reason of course) was concerned with the a priori structures through which we perceive this reality, like you said, the conditions of knowledge. As Kant himself puts it; before, metaphysics assumed that our senses conform to the objects [of reality], now [Kant proposes] it shall concern itself with whether the objects conform to our senses.
Some would say that what Kant is suggesting is not "proper" metaphysics because the definition of metaphysics is closer to that which is explained formerly and not latterly. The latter, Kant's metaphysics, is therefore some different branch deserving of a different title. What do you think?
To kennethamy, what you said is interesting because that is his main method (I think?) of saving metaphysics. What I cannot grasp is how is showing that metaphysical claims are synthetic a priori claims have anything to do with what he said above, that we must start dealing with objects conforming to our senses.
Filling in on these areas would be much appreciated.