Now that I see what you mean, I can say that no I don't think it depends only on terminology. Yes, the facts are quite important indeed. I meant the terminology of the thread title. I still don't think you will find many who assert that the truth of historical statements has only to do with terminology. The word "knowledge" is used in different ways. As you know. So I think the confusion is resolved. I hope.

both of you are looking at this , I think , different from my self

both of you are thinking in terms of history I think

whereas I'm thinking in terms of a physical object

What is important is to see that although the answers to philosophical questions may depend in part on terminology, that does not mean that they depend entirely on terminology.

Well, I generally agree. But the more abstract one gets, the more interpretation is required to even participate in either the question or the answer. For instance, Derrida. You say, to oversimplify, that he is neither true not false. Perhaps because you consider his language too vague. Others however clearly find him impressive. I have read Bennington's book, and some of it is good. He, incidentally, writes pretty clearly. So you see the problem here. What does one make of such clashing opinions?

Yes, certainly some have found Derrida impressive. Whether that is supposed to show something about Derrida, or whether about those people, is another question. I wasn't oversimplifying when I pointed out that most of what he said was (as the physicist Von Pauli remarked about a colleague) was not only not true, but that it was not even false. "Vague" is just about the nicest thing you can say about what he writes.

Well, Spurs is not so vague. In fact, he actually gets to the point. Of course you probably still wouldn't like it. But you might at least find it false. The White Mythology is good, but mostly because it quotes Anatole France's The Garden of Epicurus, and that's actually something you would like, if you don't already know it. Of course I'm guessing.

I wouldn't know about Spurs. This is the very first time I have heard the name (if it is a name). I am at least as cautious about whom I read, as I am about what I download from the Web.

Well, let's look at the physical object. What is it that "cuts" an object from everything that touches it? What separates the tree from the ground or the nose from the rest of the face? Our mind finds certain convenient visual changes of color or shape, and automatically clips an object from the visual field.

of course but so what really

this " cuts " and/or " clips " means nothing at all to the object its self

when looked deeper , nothing is missing from the object

Well, the object is only an object, in my view, because it is considered as a unity.

But when it comes to abstractions, it's harder to tell. This sub-issue is a good example of that.

regards

Of course it is. With one kind of exception every truth is partly a matter of terminology. But that does not mean it is only a matter of terminology. It is not, for instance, only a matter of terminology whether a necessary condition of knowing is the impossibility or whether it is merely the inactuality of error. For clearly I can know that Quito is the capital Ecuador although it is possible for me to be mistaken about it as long as I am not mistaken about it.

The distinction between being (partly) a matter of terminology, and being only a matter of terminology, is a very important distinction, and we should make that distinction. Most people fail to do so.

Hi kenneth - this is a typical time i would get confused while studying philosophy - i guess i'm a simple soul (disclaimer - soul here is metaphor not metaphysics :-)

i know that Paris is the capital of France - and should I be feeling a bit unsure - (unlikely till Mr Alzheimer starts knocking on my door) - I can look it up

Moreover, cos i've been there a few times - can even remember a few things from being in Paris

But along come those fiendish Cartesians/epistemologists/sceptics etc etc

and start asking me how do i know that i know, might you not be mistaken?

well yes i may - and if they won't accept the common methods of verification - trouble is indeed a-calling for me

but can someone please explain to me in very simple terms, why the normal 'common sense ideas' regarding verifying knowledge, and the distinctions we are able to make between different types of knowledge, is not sufficient.

I understand that, as usual, the truth can be blurred at the edges.

Once we knew the sun went round the earth, now it's vice-versa

But again, science, everyday language etc helps us to grasp this, do we need to wander down the tortuous paths of Cartesianism, epistemology etc?-

i understand that it's possible for me to be mistaken that Paris is the capital of France

but are you saying that in the empirical world there is no possibility of knowledge, because mistakes are always possible

No, I am saying exactly the contrary. I am saying that it does not follow from the fact that mistakes are always possible that empirical knowledge is impossible. In the case of Paris is the capital of France, I know that Paris is the capital of France even though it is true that I might be mistaken that it is. That that is because, as I explained earlier, knowledge implies the inactuality of error, not the impossibility of error. What does imply the impossibility of error is certainty (not knowledge), so, to think that knowledge implies the impossibility of error is to confuse knowledge with certainty.

I find it striking that you believe that I said exactly the contrary of what I did say. That is really miscommunication. As the famous line in that Paul Newman film went, "What we have here is a failure to communicate".

so you agree it's fine to say that 'I know the capital of France is Paris'