Why isn't true belief enough for knowledge? Because that wouldn't rule out lucky guesses. True beliefs have to be obtained in the right way. What is the right way? Any way that gives true beliefs. But guessing does give true beliefs sometimes. So it has to be better than 50%. But that includes 51% which is almost as bad as chance. Is that knowledge? At what point does it tip the scale and become knowledge? Why is it that whatever you say will seem arbitrary? If there is no clear line then why hold to the distinction that there is even such a thing as knowledge rather than various degrees of probably true beliefs?

Though the line is not clear, (and particularly, it is not clear concerning the acquisition of justifiction, that is, at what point in time in the "knowing process" is one considered justified), it doesn't make much sense to me to consider lucky true beliefs, knowledge.

Even if you find justification problematic, I think most reasonable people will admit that not every belief is the same. It is obviously clear to me that sometimes people believe things for bad reasons, while sometimes people believe things for good reasons.

I agree. I have a problem with 50%. That's why I also have a problem with 51%. I was asking you at what point should I start to feel comfortable but you didn't answer.

The British philosopher, Harry Prichard, was known for never saying he knew and saying, instead, "I strongly believe", just as he would never say, "I promise (to do so-and-so)" and saying instead, "I fully intend (to do so-and-so". And for the same reason. He did not think he could be certain that he knew, and he did not think he could be certain that he would perform his promise. But, of course, it made no difference, since people would just translate, "I strongly believe" into "I know", and "I fully intend" into, "I promise", and indulge Prichard in his little curlicues.

What does that have to do with what we call knowledge though? I already agree that empirical evidence is better than random guessing but why must I call such beliefs knowledge rather than precisely what they are?

since people would just translate, "I strongly believe" into "I know"

Though the line is not clear, (and particularly, it is not clear concerning the acquisition of justifiction, that is, at what point in time in the "knowing process" is one considered justified), it doesn't make much sense to me to consider lucky true beliefs, knowledge. This is because if we were to consider lucky true beliefs knowledge, we would be dismissing reason entirely; an educated guess would be no different than a lucky guess, and an educated person in X field would have the same understanding as an uneducated person who speaks about X field. If we deny reason in this matter, we are denying that some people are more knowledgable at certain things than others, and we are denying that the learning process is valuable.

Even if you find justification problematic, I think most reasonable people will admit that not every belief is the same. It is obviously clear to me that sometimes people believe things for bad reasons, while sometimes people believe things for good reasons. If we say there is no connector piece between truth and belief, we are essentially saying logic and reason have no bearing on why we should hold beliefs, and that, I think, would be being unreasonable.

Are you saying that physical impossibility is a matter of personal belief?

But when I finally say "I know" and mean it, what will you translate that into? I know 1 + 1 = 2. I don't just "strongly believe" it.

It seems you would erase this distinction completely.

If you will allow a homely analogy, when one gets enough justification is a bit like when one gets enough dirt to have a mountain. It is not a precisely measured amount, but that does not mean that there is no difference between a mountain and a mole hill.

What distinction am I erasing completely?

What distinction am I erasing completely?

The distinction I just made. The distinction between "I know" and "I strongly believe". I asked you a question. You didn't answer. What will you translate "I know" into when I say it?

Your analogy introduces too many terms. I'm interested in the difference between being a mountain and not being a mountain. If you insist that there is a difference between mountain and not-mountain but can't give objective grounds for it, what am I supposed to take that to mean? That mountains are subjective? Is that what justification is as well?

Just because we cannot precisely describe what a mountain is, does not mean mountains do not exist.

I'm interested in the difference between being a mountain and not being a mountain.

I'm still waiting for you to answer my previous question.

What question did I not answer? :listening:

Quote:

Originally Posted by kennethamy
The British philosopher, Harry Prichard, was known for never saying he knew and saying, instead, "I strongly believe", just as he would never say, "I promise (to do so-and-so)" and saying instead, "I fully intend (to do so-and-so". And for the same reason. He did not think he could be certain that he knew, and he did not think he could be certain that he would perform his promise. But, of course, it made no difference, since people would just translate, "I strongly believe" into "I know", and "I fully intend" into, "I promise", and indulge Prichard in his little curlicues.

It depends on your own personal comfortability regarding this matter.

But when I finally say "I know" and mean it, what will you translate that into?

Your answer?

I would translate that to: You are certain about what you think you know.

Alright, so you're not disagreeing with me? You're just translating everything I say into different words that mean the same thing?

ughaibu;136295 wrote:

Are you saying that physical impossibility is a matter of personal belief?

No, why do you think that?

Because you have given no general account of how to recognise physical impossibility and the specific example, introduced by you, apparently rests on your belief.