What a peculiar question! You are not saying that the evidence for God is anything like the evidence for the Holocaust, are you? Have you anything else to say? No complaints, though.

No, because the Jews did a much better job at persuading me than the church did.

You have a funny way of making things sound completely absurd. Do you call yourself rational? I think your "rationality" lies more in your persuasion. All the short posts you do that are blunt and try to undermine someone's sentence. It's persuasive for your argument. See what I mean?
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No, because the Jews did a much better job at persuading me than the church did.

I can testify to this. A local wit has dubbed him the "I-don't-get-it troll."

---------- Post added 02-20-2010 at 10:12 PM ----------



Good response. Another note: those who believe in God believe he is as real or more real than the holocaust. For believers the "proof" in God is no more metaphysic than the proof for the Holocaust.

And isn't it revealing that some hyper-emotional subject like the holocaust is brought in? Rhetoric! And rhetoric in the name of pure reason. Oh brother!

Yes, I'm shining a light on this animal known as "proof" and trying to see whether there's really any difference between it and that less respectable animal "persuasion."

Of course I know the standard supposed differences between the two, but I wonder if "proof" is just ideal of "perfect" persuasion. Geometrical proofs are perhaps that most persuasive statements after tautologies. But do we see them as proofs only because we find them utterly persuasive? What if half of the population didn't find Euclid's "proofs" persuasive? Can someone prove to me that proof is functionally different than persuasion without persuading me?...

It's only an example that came to mind. I could have used the example that the Earth is a sphere rather than a trapezoid. Don't make such a big deal out of it. That some people think that the proof of God is greater than the proof that there was a Holocaust shows only that there are are some silly people in the world. And, of course, to think that such a fact shows anything about argument as being only persuasion is also silly.

Many people are not persuaded by proofs like in geometry, so no, they are not "ideal" or perfect persuasion. If they were perfect persuasion, then everyone, without exception, would be persuaded by them. I have personally met people who believe contradictory things, and they do not care that they are contradictory. Perfect proof is no guarantee of being persuasive.

What is persuasive is, by definition, dependent upon who one is talking about, and what is a proof is not. Persuasion is a matter of psychology, and proof is something altogether different. Proof is persuasive to rational people, which, by the way, is merely a tautology, not an observation about the world. But proof is irrelevant to very irrational people. Yet they can be persuaded of some things.

Your last question involves two things that it may be useful to comment on. First, "prove to" is often used to mean "persuade", so your question amounts to:
[INDENT][INDENT]Can someone persuade me that proof is functionally different than persuasion without persuading me?
[/INDENT][/INDENT]The answer is obviously "no".

The other thing is that talking about the function of something is a different matter than its meaning. In this case, however, it does not matter, because they do not serve the same function, as the example of people believing contradictory things proves. A proof that does not persuade is not performing the same function as persuasion.

Persuasion is a matter of psychology, and proof is something altogether different.

What is persuasive is, by definition, dependent upon who one is talking about, and what is a proof is not.

Proof is persuasive to rational people, which, by the way, is merely a tautology, not an observation about the world.

Give me an example of a proof that is not meant to persuade, even if it fails to do so.

Sorry, but I have no idea what you are saying. Otherwise I would reply. Who assumes knowledge, and who assumes proof? And what is my formulization, and what does it mean to make a logical proof of a formulization? Baffled, I am afraid.

Should persuade if you were rational. But some people do not want to be, or just cannot be, persuaded by rational argument. They may not understand it, or they may be committed to the opposite conclusion.

Give me an example of a proof that is not meant to persuade, even if it fails to do so.

You assume an argument is rational and should therefore be persuasive.

1. That argument persuades me therefore it is rational
2. That argument is rational therefore it is persuasive

You take the time to call people "silly" as if you were the god of rationality. That is why this comes back to the distinction between certainty and knowledge, no matter how certain you are that your ideas are rational, do try and keep an open mind or you look the fool by calling others "silly".

I agree. "Rational" is generally used as a term of praise for positions we find persuasive. The rational and the persuasive seem to be one. Just as "reason" (mysterious faculty) seems to be just an abstraction that refers to our many many reasons.

Fred wrote a book that proved the existence of God. Jack wrote a book that proved that God was not provable. Fred wrote a book that what was provable or not could not be proven.
Both had their motives. One liked the idea of God and the other did not. From there, it was rationalization/rationality.
Both were right in their own minds.
Who is high enough above the rest of us to tell us the real truth? Well, I'll you.

Whoever can convince us of this. To the degree that we believe an idea, this idea is our reality. It's part of our experience, our interpretation of the world.

"Objective" reality is a socially necessary concept. Also, our survival depends on prioritizing some ideas about others. But "objective" reality remains a concept created by man, however useful. Our courtrooms need it. Our engineers need it. God bless it!

But philosophy doesn't need to drop to its knees and worship it. Perhaps the ultimate quest of "Reason" is its own self-investigation.

The idea that rationality is something different than rationalization can itself be described as a foundational rationalization. "Universal reason" may be a convenient fiction as the self may be a convenient fiction.
I'm not attacking the use of these concepts, but only scrutinizing them closely. After all, "proof" and "rationality" serve as foundations. Is the neutral-standpoint just another God-like fiction used for control? For self-congratulation? For self-esteem? Does formal logic serve, for some, the way rosary beads might for others?

I'm going to try to articulate a position that differs from my previous position on this matter.

Can we list some other things that are considered to be persuasive? Perhaps through observing other things we consider to be persuasive we can better understand how persuasion and proof is related.

Appeals to the emotions (e.g. compassion, outrage, pride) can be persuasive.
Appeals to the reputation of a source (e.g. the authoritativeness of a text, an ad hominem attack, the honesty of a witness) can be persuasive.
Appeals to logic (e.g. pointing out fallacious reasoning, the soundness of a proof?)

Consider then the following:

Emotions (sadness, anger) exist independent of persuasion exists even if it is not used to persuade someone.
Reputation (e.g. honesty) exists even if it is not used to persuade someone.
Logic (e.g. sound or fallacious reasoning, a proof) exists even if it is not used to persuade someone.

Logic (e.g. sound or fallacious reasoning, a proof) exists even if it is not used to persuade someone.