What Distance Must An Object Be For Its Appearance To Equal Its Real Size?

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Pythagorean
 
Reply Sun 14 Feb, 2010 01:07 am
@Krumple,
Krumple;128060 wrote:
Because perspective can not be measured by itself, you MUST use a tool. That tool dictates a length and that length will always be determined by the tool, and not perspective.


But the tool does not, cannot, philosophically speaking, dictate a length. I'm not discussing perspective per se, but the unavoidable epistemological problems of perceptual relativism.

How does a ruler dictate a length? You are using a mere convention, which is a standardized metric. But how do we arrive at the standard, how can your ruler be proven to posess universal validity? It is only via intersubjective agreement, which brings us back full circle. Simply because everyone involved agrees to use a certain type of ruler does not mean that the ruler is somehow a metaphysical object. Not matter what form of measurement you devise and no matter when you devise it you can never prove that it exists or posesses any value outside of the mind. You cannot not solve the epistemological problems of perceputal relativism by applying systems of measurement.

It should be obvious that any axiomatic system rests upon mere subjective validity. Even if you are a philosophical pragmatist, you still cannot prove, beyond doubt that your pragmatism is the one true philosophy.



Krumple;128060 wrote:
Hold up a ruler near one eye and close the other eye so you can only see the face of the ruler with the open eye and make out atleast four inches in your view perspective. Now place an apple at the distance where the apple stretches across the ruler the whole four inches. I bet you'll have to get pretty close to the apple before it stretches the whole four inches. However; if you move the ruler farther away, the apple can be farther away before it fills the distance between the four inches of the ruler. This proves that perspective is not based on any unit of measure and because of this we can use any arbitrary tool to measure distances. It is also why there is special training involved in teaching people how to judge distances professionally.


I understand that we can use any arbitrary 'tool' to measure distances, but this does not endow those 'tools' with objective validity. Unless you can use God's tool, the same old epistemological problems will persist. You have merely shifted the focus away from the epistemological problem of perception and toward questions regarding the objective status of axiomatic systems. Of course, there is no such thing as an objective axiomatic system.
 
Scottydamion
 
Reply Sun 14 Feb, 2010 01:17 am
@Pythagorean,
Pythagorean;128098 wrote:
But the tool does not, cannot, philosophically speaking, dictate a length. I'm not discussing perspective per se, but the unavoidable epistemological problems of perceptual relativism.

How does a ruler dictate a length? You are using a mere convention, which is a standardized metric. But how do we arrive at the standard, how can your ruler be proven to posess universal validity? It is only via intersubjective agreement, which brings us back full circle. Simply because everyone involved agrees to use a certain type of ruler does not mean that the ruler is somehow a metaphysical object. Not matter what form of measurement you devise and no matter when you devise it you can never prove that it exists or posesses any value outside of the mind. You cannot not solve the epistemological problems of perceputal relativism by applying systems of measurement.

It should be obvious that any axiomatic system rests upon mere subjective validity. Even if you are a philosophical pragmatist, you still cannot prove, beyond doubt that your pragmatism is the one true philosophy.





I understand that we can use any arbitrary 'tool' to measure distances, but this does not endow those 'tools' with objective validity. Unless you can use God's tool, the same old epistemological problems will persist. You have merely shifted the focus away from the epistemological problem of perception and toward questions regarding the objective status of axiomatic systems. Of course, there is no such thing as an objective axiomatic system.


What if the first axiom was "this is an objective axiomatic system"... could you prove beyond a doubt that it wasn't objective?

A better view, one which I can say I understand that is, is how can you say there isn't an objective viewpoint? Isn't it possible that one of us possesses the objective view of reality even if they don't know it?
 
Pythagorean
 
Reply Sun 14 Feb, 2010 01:50 am
@Scottydamion,
Scottydamion;128103 wrote:
What if the first axiom was "this is an objective axiomatic system"... could you prove beyond a doubt that it wasn't objective?


It is the implicit assumption of all axiomatic systems to attempt to provide objectivity. Euclid's system was an attempt to demonstrate the ontological structure of physical nature. It was overtly abstract; it was not pragmatic in nature or intent. The study of math originally was to describe or attempt to account for the true nature of physical existence. Objectivity, or rather truth, has always been the goal.

Scottydamion;128103 wrote:
A better view, one which I can say I understand that is, is how can you say there isn't an objective viewpoint?


I can only say that there doesn't exist any proof that such an objective viewpoint has been reached.

Scottydamion;128103 wrote:
Isn't it possible that one of us possesses the objective view of reality even if they don't know it?


I don't think an objective view of reality could be reached without sustained conscious philosophical and scientific effort. In my view, great achievements don't usually happen by sheer accident. So, I would say no, we could not reach a great achievement in life or history and not be aware of it; it doesn't make any sense, in my opinion.

--
 
Scottydamion
 
Reply Sun 14 Feb, 2010 02:04 am
@Pythagorean,
Pythagorean;128125 wrote:
It is the implicit assumption of all axiomatic systems to attempt to provide objectivity. Euclid's system was an attempt to demonstrate the ontological structure of physical nature. It was overtly abstract; it was not pragmatic in nature or intent. The study of math originally was to describe or attempt to account for the true nature of physical existence. Objectivity, or rather truth, has always been the goal.



I can only say that there doesn't exist any proof that such an objective viewpoint has been reached.



I don't think an objective view of reality could be reached without sustained conscious philosophical and scientific effort. In my view, great achievements don't usually happen by sheer accident. So, I would say no, we could not reach a great achievement in life or history and not be aware of it; it doesn't make any sense, in my opinion.

--


Well, yes, we agree on the large scale about objective views. However, I meant for it to be applied to the example at hand. Would it not be possible that his ruler matched exactly the true size of the standard ruler, therefore making his ruler an objective view of measurement in inches?

Obviously the same objections would apply, that there is no "proof that such an objective viewpoint has been reached". But would not the same concession also apply? That it is possible?
 
Pythagorean
 
Reply Sun 14 Feb, 2010 02:44 am
@Scottydamion,
Scottydamion;128131 wrote:
Well, yes, we agree on the large scale about objective views. However, I meant for it to be applied to the example at hand. Would it not be possible that his ruler matched exactly the true size of the standard ruler, therefore making his ruler an objective view of measurement in inches?

Obviously the same objections would apply, that there is no "proof that such an objective viewpoint has been reached". But would not the same concession also apply? That it is possible?


Do you have any specific 'possibilities' in mind here?

When it comes to man-made conventions they are more or less worthless, in my opinion. How do you expect to ground such a convention in a metaphysical certitude?

As I see it, there is great and profound merit in the quest, especially as it relates to a quest via the study of philosophy and the sciences.


We must develop a meaningful form of metaphysical relativism in such a way that places the human self in the absolute highest and most advantageous position. This seems to me the best that can be hoped for. And I think it will be the greatest thing that any man can ever do.

--
 
Scottydamion
 
Reply Sun 14 Feb, 2010 02:50 am
@Pythagorean,
Pythagorean;128140 wrote:
Do you have any specific 'possibilities' in mind here?

When it comes to man-made conventions they are more or less worthless, in my opinion. How do you expect to ground such a convention in a metaphysical certitude?

As I see it, there is great and profound merit in the quest, especially as it relates to a quest via the study of philosophy and the sciences.


We must develop a meaningful form of metaphysical relativism in such a way that places the human self in the absolute highest and most advantageous position. This seems to me the best that can be hoped for. And I think it will be the greatest thing that any man can ever do.

--


It would not have to be grounded in a metaphysical certitude, just a physical one. That the ruler is indeed the same size as the standard ruler.

I agree with you on everything else you said, and the above is most likely a debate stemming from misinterpretation from one or both of us concerning the other's view.

I too agree that relativism would be a great help in constructing a new way forward. But I have less of a concern for the idea of metaphysical relativism, because I have little care for metaphysics in the first place.
 
Pythagorean
 
Reply Sun 14 Feb, 2010 03:11 am
@Scottydamion,
Scottydamion;128142 wrote:
It would not have to be grounded in a metaphysical certitude, just a physical one. That the ruler is indeed the same size as the standard ruler.


But the standard ruler remains in an unproven, existential position. If you are an Existentialist, for example, then there may be no point in following the epistemological line of reasoning in a thorough manner. I'm not sure what the goal would be if epistemological inquiry were to proceed without any relationiship to first philosophy (metaphysics). In a sense, you have already reached your conclusions and you can point to the work of other Existentialists and simply subscribe to their well known, and very popular, points of view and you're all done.




Scottydamion;128142 wrote:
I too agree that relativism would be a great help in constructing a new way forward. But I have less of a concern for the idea of metaphysical relativism, because I have little care for metaphysics in the first place.


I think you may be referring to the political and social development of relativism, which is so widespread today. This is more of a moral debate, in my opinion. I am not interested in morals or social thought here (see my thread on American Identity). This is basically epistemological inquiry (or that was my plan at the beginning).
 
Krumple
 
Reply Sun 14 Feb, 2010 03:11 am
@Pythagorean,
Pythagorean;128098 wrote:
But the tool does not, cannot, philosophically speaking, dictate a length.


Philosophically speaking? I wasn't aware that there are two types of talking or discussion. If there is two types then tell me the one that actually bases itself in reality. Because I would rather speak of reality rather than non-reality. Sure non reality has it's place but not very useful for a discussion.

Why do flying pink elephants fly?

Pythagorean;128098 wrote:

I'm not discussing perspective per se, but the unavoidable epistemological problems of perceptual relativism.


It just seems to me you are trying to place a bump where there really isn't one. I find it interesting how you never even mention the question you pose but instead go into this whole defensive position without even telling me specifically what epistemology would do in a case where perspective and real size would clash if at all.

Pythagorean;128098 wrote:

How does a ruler dictate a length? You are using a mere convention, which is a standardized metric.


Well the ruler dictates length because it defines what a certain distance is. You can not arbitrarily accept a distance then go and change it to be something else and refer to it as being true. For instance if I have and apple and I measure it and say it is four inches tall, what I am saying is according to the measuring tool I used, it is four inches tall. I can not honestly tell someone, hey this apple is five inches tall. If I ask anyone to measure it with the same tool I used there is no way they could possibly get my statement to be true if the apple is only four inches tall. This is why the ruler dictates length. I am not saying the ruler is right, I am saying that distance must be something, what ever it is, is an agreed upon arbitrary unit of measure.

Pythagorean;128098 wrote:

But how do we arrive at the standard, how can your ruler be proven to posess universal validity?


This is the most absurd question ever because the validity is only valid if the people in question give it validity. If they don't care what the tool units are they won't care about using the units of measure. Case being, Americans refuse to use the metric system. They don't care to learn the metric system because they are fine without it. Does that make the metric system less valid? No, it just means they haven't accepted it as the standard by which they want to use for measuring. That's all. A measuring device does not need to be subjective and measuring is not subjective. However distance is something. How you want to label that distance is completely arbitrary just like your question.

Pythagorean;128098 wrote:

It is only via intersubjective agreement, which brings us back full circle. Simply because everyone involved agrees to use a certain type of ruler does not mean that the ruler is somehow a metaphysical object.


Who ever said anything about metaphysical object? I'm getting my palm and forehead ready because this is starting to sound like they should meet soon.

Pythagorean;128098 wrote:

It should be obvious that any axiomatic system rests upon mere subjective validity. Even if you are a philosophical pragmatist, you still cannot prove, beyond doubt that your pragmatism is the one true philosophy.


I think you don't want philosophy to have any answers. It almost sounds like you want truth to be arbitrary because the truths you accept are arbitrary but to be honest, not all truths are arbitrary.

Pythagorean;128098 wrote:

I understand that we can use any arbitrary 'tool' to measure distances, but this does not endow those 'tools' with objective validity.


You have to agree on it if you want to communicate something to someone else. Just like math. Numbers are units that mean nothing by themselves. It is only when they are placed into a context that they become useful. The number one is useless by itself. It means nothing and can mean a great many things. It is only when one is placed into a context that it has meaning. So if you want to communicate then you must have a standard that people will agree upon. That agreement makes a unit of measure objective. If I start to talk about one inch or one yard, or a meter people can relate in some way to what I am referring to. That makes it objective. However the definition of the unit of measure is arbitrary.

Pythagorean;128098 wrote:

Unless you can use God's tool, the same old epistemological problems will persist.


Yeah I had a feeling this was about to come up. And palm meets forehead. I like how you take something that is completely subjective and try to define something objective from it. The only reason why the problems persist is because god isn't real.

Pythagorean;128098 wrote:

You have merely shifted the focus away from the epistemological problem of perception and toward questions regarding the objective status of axiomatic systems. Of course, there is no such thing as an objective axiomatic system.


Hmm I wonder why you won't attribute this argument to your god idea? Seems illogical to me that you will use it here but not there. Why is that?
 
Pythagorean
 
Reply Wed 17 Feb, 2010 01:05 am
@Krumple,
Naive realism is the common sense theory of perception. Most people, until they starting thinking philosophically, are naive realists. ...

Properly speaking, naive realism is supposed to be the view of 'naive' (that is, not philosophically trained) common sense. ...

http://www.google.com/search?hl=en&rlz=1W1GGLL_en&q=Na%C3%AFve+realism&start=0&sa=N


YouTube - Perceiving the World - Philosophy
 
Scottydamion
 
Reply Wed 17 Feb, 2010 01:37 am
@Pythagorean,
Pythagorean;128148 wrote:
But the standard ruler remains in an unproven, existential position. If you are an Existentialist, for example, then there may be no point in following the epistemological line of reasoning in a thorough manner. I'm not sure what the goal would be if epistemological inquiry were to proceed without any relationiship to first philosophy (metaphysics). In a sense, you have already reached your conclusions and you can point to the work of other Existentialists and simply subscribe to their well known, and very popular, points of view and you're all done.


I suppose at some point one falls into a certain camp, but my point is not that I think there is only the physical, but rather that it is possible. If that is so then the standard ruler is simply that, a standard length kept as close to accurate as possible for certain purposes.


Quote:
I think you may be referring to the political and social development of relativism, which is so widespread today. This is more of a moral debate, in my opinion. I am not interested in morals or social thought here (see my thread on American Identity). This is basically epistemological inquiry (or that was my plan at the beginning).


I may be, I should probably research relativism more before trying to discuss this further.
 
Pythagorean
 
Reply Wed 17 Feb, 2010 02:17 am
@Scottydamion,
Scottydamion;129274 wrote:
I suppose at some point one falls into a certain camp, but my point is not that I think there is only the physical, but rather that it is possible. If that is so then the standard ruler is simply that, a standard length kept as close to accurate as possible for certain purposes.


You keep speaking of possibilities. This mean that you are a sort of representational realist. In other words, you believe that there is an objective world out there and we can somehow or 'possibly' relate to it.

Even though it is a respectable philosophical position (though you haven't described the nature of your 'possibilities'), I would disagree. Because I see no absolute, unerring, objective means of discovering or perceiving it. We always perceive under some aspect and the physical constituents themselves are not wholly comprehensible; they can always be physically rearranged into various 'objects' under various criteria. They are always only pragmatically and provisionally measured for some purpose or other, whose purposes remain relative to their uses.

There can be no final scientific theory which can categorize the constituents of the physical world in full.
 
Scottydamion
 
Reply Wed 17 Feb, 2010 02:31 am
@Pythagorean,
Pythagorean;129284 wrote:
You keep speaking of possibilities. This mean that you are a sort of representational realist. In other words, you believe that there is an objective world out there and we can somehow or 'possibly' relate to it.


The reason I said it was possible was to distinguish that I am not in that "camp" but I see merit in it, as I see merit in other views that disagree with it.

Quote:
Even though it is a respectable philosophical position (though you haven't described the nature of your 'possibilities'), I would disagree. Because I see no absolute, unerring, objective means of discovering or perceiving it. We always perceive under some aspect and the physical constituents themselves are not wholly comprehensible; they can always be physically rearranged into various 'objects' under various criteria. They are always only pragmatically and provisionally measured for some purpose or other, whose purposes remain relative to their uses.

There can be no final scientific theory which can categorize the constituents of the physical world in full.


That's fine to believe, probably healthy to believe, but you could be wrong.
 
Arjuna
 
Reply Wed 17 Feb, 2010 06:42 am
@Pythagorean,
Pythagorean;127695 wrote:
At what distance must an object be from a perceiver in order for its appearance to equal its real size?

--
This is such a cool question. The first thought that comes is that it would have to be in your eyeball. But that can't be right.... then you couldn't see it at all.

So there's actually two things going on:

1) the further you are from the object, the less space it takes up in your visual field... so you're actually using your visual field as a standard reference, like it's a TV screen, even though we're not usually too conscious of the boundaries.. What's wierd about that is.. how would you measure the dimensions of your visual field? You'd have to pick a distance from your eye, put up a big screen and have somebody draw the boundary while you stare at a fixed point. So at 3 ft from my eyes, my visual field is about 10 feet wide, maybe 7 feet high? This turns out to be meaningless information, though. We don't use that kind of hard measurement in everyday perception.. we're just constantly comparing objects in our field of vision. We like to have a familiar object to use as reference, so a botanist might put his thumb in a photo of a flower as a reference for its size.

2) Closer objects appear more detailed. That's a visual cue that the object is far away.

So what P's question shows us is how much distance, detail, and familiarity are meshed into the deciphering of visual information.
 
longknowledge
 
Reply Sun 28 Feb, 2010 02:08 am
@Scottydamion,
Scottydamion;127735 wrote:
Agreed. All objects have a size, but we make that size relative to ourselves. To come close to the perception of an object's size is to measure it so that we have an agreed frame of reference.

Of course Continental philosophers would have a different frame of reference than that of Anglo-American philosophers. They would give the real size of a quarter in centimeters rather than inches.Very Happy

Try this as an experiment. Look intently at a freeze frame of TV picture in a darkened room. Now see if you can make the TV picture appear larger by adjusting your eyes. It will seem as if the picture is getting closer to you.

What is happening is that you are adjusting the focus of your eyes so that the image that appears on the retina is larger. So as a result you interpret the TV picture as being closer than it actually is.

A similar thing happens when you look at the moon when it's overhead and then when it's at the horizon, only in this case the explanation is that the light is fainter when it's at the horizon, so your eyes try to adjust to give it the brightness that you expect it to be and in so doing make it appear to be larger.

See The Myth of Metaphor, by Colin Turbayne (Yale U Pr, 1962; rev ed, U of S Carolina Pr, 1970).

:flowers:
 
Reconstructo
 
Reply Sun 28 Feb, 2010 05:52 am
@Pythagorean,
Pythagorean;127695 wrote:
At what distance must an object be from a perceiver in order for its appearance to equal its real size?

--


Nice question! I'm on this kick, lately. It seems to me that number cannot be perfectly applied to space. Number is digital. The transcendental intuition of space is analog, or continuous. Thus the paradoxes of Zeno & the need for the sophistry of calculus. And this is just one issue.
 
Scottydamion
 
Reply Sun 28 Feb, 2010 12:39 pm
@Reconstructo,
Reconstructo;133521 wrote:
Nice question! I'm on this kick, lately. It seems to me that number cannot be perfectly applied to space. Number is digital. The transcendental intuition of space is analog, or continuous. Thus the paradoxes of Zeno & the need for the sophistry of calculus. And this is just one issue.


I'm currently reading Einstein's "Relativity", and he makes an interesting note:

Quote:
I wished to show that space-time is not necessarily something to which one can ascribe a separate existence, independently of the actual objects of physical reality. Physical objects are not in space, but these objects are spatially extended. In this way the concept "empty space" loses its meaning.


This was an added note (1952) that points to an added appendix where he elaborates on his views about the problems of space in general.

Einstein is to me one of the great philosophers of science and math. His keen intuition regarding experience was the starting point for all of the fruits he bore (not to mention his gigantic brain).
 
Gracee
 
Reply Mon 1 Mar, 2010 02:25 pm
@Scottydamion,
Pythagorean;127695 wrote:
At what distance must an object be from a perceiver in order for its appearance to equal its real size?

--


What an amazing question... And an implication of the veil of perception I had never considered. It's also problematic for Locke's distinction, because it means size - supposedly a primary quality - is just as subjective as colour or sound. In fact, if you really think about it, whenever we see an object, its size is only apparent to us in relation to the objects surrounding it, i.e. if you hold a pea right up to your eye, you know its small only if your also holding another larger object, e.g. your hand, up to the other eye.

Reconstructo;133521 wrote:
Nice question! I'm on this kick, lately. It seems to me that number cannot be perfectly applied to space. Number is digital. The transcendental intuition of space is analog, or continuous. Thus the paradoxes of Zeno & the need for the sophistry of calculus. And this is just one issue.


This is so cool, had never crossed my mind... tell me more! Like how does it apply to Zeno's paradox (i get how it does superficially, but in detail...)?
 
Pyrrho
 
Reply Tue 2 Mar, 2010 11:16 am
@Reconstructo,
Reconstructo;133521 wrote:
Nice question! I'm on this kick, lately. It seems to me that number cannot be perfectly applied to space. Number is digital. The transcendental intuition of space is analog, or continuous. Thus the paradoxes of Zeno & the need for the sophistry of calculus. And this is just one issue.


I think that our concept of space is also really digital. To use Hume's example, if one takes an ink dot on a piece of paper, one can view it from various distances, and at a certain point it will be very, very tiny, such that moving any further away makes one unable to see it at all. That is as small as one can see anything (as large as one can see anything would be taking up one's entire visual field). To view something very small, one either gets closer, or uses something like a microscope to see it, but what is then occurring is that it is taking up more of one's field of vision; it is not ultimately altering the amount that one can see (that is to say, it is not altering the range of sight that is possible). Likewise, people can imagine something small, but they can only imagine smallness to some level, and then to imagine something smaller still and picture it in the imagination, one mentally changes perspective, to imagine that small thing bigger so that one can imagine something yet smaller still.

Hume discusses this fairly early in his Treatise of Human Nature (Book I, Part II, Sections I & II).

Quote:
Tis therefore certain, that the imagination reaches a minimum, and may raise up to itself an idea, of which it cannot conceive any sub-division, and which cannot be diminished without a total annihilation. When you tell me of the thousandth and ten thousandth part of a grain of sand, I have a distinct idea of these numbers and of their different proportions; but the images, which I form in my mind to represent the things themselves, are nothing different from each other, nor inferior to that image, by which I represent the grain of sand itself, which is suppos'd so vastly to exceed them. What consists of parts is distinguishable into them, and what is distinguishable is separable. But whatever we may imagine of the thing, the idea of a grain of sand is not distinguishable, nor separable into twenty, much less into a thousand, ten thousand, or an infinite number of different ideas.

Online Library of Liberty - A Treatise of Human Nature

If we wish to think of this in modern terms, one's ability to see, which is commonly thought of as analog, is restricted in how fine one can distinguish things (in both space and time, but let us ignore time for the present), such that one can view a picture made up of nothing but dots, and it will appear to be perfectly smooth and "analog" if one is at an appropriate distance. This, of course, is how many photos are printed in newspapers, and is also relevant to TVs and computer screens. Likewise, there are least noticeable differences in shades of color, and in intensity of light. So all of these things may very well be digital in the brain, even though one may feel that it is analog.

Or to put the above another way, there are limits both to perception and to imagination and thinking, and although we may employ strategies for trying to deal with things beyond those limits, such strategies do not fundamentally take away our limitations. With mathematics, we understand the idea of adding one more, or many more, but once numbers get very large, we really have no distinct idea of the differences in a non-mathematical way. For example, can you really picture a billion apples in your mind? You can, of course, imagine a very large pile of apples, but that will not distinguish between a million and a billion of them.

---------- Post added 03-02-2010 at 12:45 PM ----------

Gracee;134181 wrote:
What an amazing question... And an implication of the veil of perception I had never considered. It's also problematic for Locke's distinction, because it means size - supposedly a primary quality - is just as subjective as colour or sound. In fact, if you really think about it, whenever we see an object, its size is only apparent to us in relation to the objects surrounding it, i.e. if you hold a pea right up to your eye, you know its small only if your also holding another larger object, e.g. your hand, up to the other eye.

...



If you want to read criticisms of Locke, you may want to read Berkeley and Hume, who both are good at showing problems with many of his ideas. (In Hume's case, much of his criticism of Locke comes from Berkeley, but this does not make Berkeley the better philosopher. If you were only going to read one, read Hume, but if you just want criticisms of Locke, Berkeley is an excellent choice.) And you are right, there is trouble with Locke's distinction between primary and secondary qualities.
 
Zetherin
 
Reply Tue 2 Mar, 2010 11:48 am
@Pythagorean,
Gracee wrote:

because it means size - supposedly a primary quality - is just as subjective as colour or sound.


Let's not confuse things. We are not talking about size, we are talking about the appearance of size. Things are a certain size whether we perceive them to be so or not.
 
Pyrrho
 
Reply Tue 2 Mar, 2010 11:57 am
@Zetherin,
Gracee;134181 wrote:
... because it means size - supposedly a primary quality - is just as subjective as colour or sound. ...


Zetherin;134632 wrote:
Let's not confuse things. We are not talking about size, we are talking about the appearance of size. Things are a certain size whether we perceive them to be so or not.


But the initial post was about both appearance and "real" size:

Pythagorean;127695 wrote:
At what distance must an object be from a perceiver in order for its appearance to equal its real size?

--


I think that "real" size, as with the board is four feet long, is relational and is, in a sense, a matter of appearance. When we say a board is four feet long, this means that if we have a measuring tape that we set next to the board, the length of the board will be the same as four feet of the measuring tape. There does not seem to me to be anything more to it being "really" four feet long. It does not matter how close or far one is from it, as long as one is close enough to see it, and not too close to see it.
 
 

 
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