Because perspective can not be measured by itself, you MUST use a tool. That tool dictates a length and that length will always be determined by the tool, and not perspective.

Hold up a ruler near one eye and close the other eye so you can only see the face of the ruler with the open eye and make out atleast four inches in your view perspective. Now place an apple at the distance where the apple stretches across the ruler the whole four inches. I bet you'll have to get pretty close to the apple before it stretches the whole four inches. However; if you move the ruler farther away, the apple can be farther away before it fills the distance between the four inches of the ruler. This proves that perspective is not based on any unit of measure and because of this we can use any arbitrary tool to measure distances. It is also why there is special training involved in teaching people how to judge distances professionally.

But the tool does not, cannot, philosophically speaking, dictate a length. I'm not discussing perspective per se, but the unavoidable epistemological problems of perceptual relativism.

How does a ruler dictate a length? You are using a mere convention, which is a standardized metric. But how do we arrive at the standard, how can your ruler be proven to posess universal validity? It is only via intersubjective agreement, which brings us back full circle. Simply because everyone involved agrees to use a certain type of ruler does not mean that the ruler is somehow a metaphysical object. Not matter what form of measurement you devise and no matter when you devise it you can never prove that it exists or posesses any value outside of the mind. You cannot not solve the epistemological problems of perceputal relativism by applying systems of measurement.

It should be obvious that any axiomatic system rests upon mere subjective validity. Even if you are a philosophical pragmatist, you still cannot prove, beyond doubt that your pragmatism is the one true philosophy.





I understand that we can use any arbitrary 'tool' to measure distances, but this does not endow those 'tools' with objective validity. Unless you can use God's tool, the same old epistemological problems will persist. You have merely shifted the focus away from the epistemological problem of perception and toward questions regarding the objective status of axiomatic systems. Of course, there is no such thing as an objective axiomatic system.

What if the first axiom was "this is an objective axiomatic system"... could you prove beyond a doubt that it wasn't objective?

A better view, one which I can say I understand that is, is how can you say there isn't an objective viewpoint?

Isn't it possible that one of us possesses the objective view of reality even if they don't know it?

It is the implicit assumption of all axiomatic systems to attempt to provide objectivity. Euclid's system was an attempt to demonstrate the ontological structure of physical nature. It was overtly abstract; it was not pragmatic in nature or intent. The study of math originally was to describe or attempt to account for the true nature of physical existence. Objectivity, or rather truth, has always been the goal.



I can only say that there doesn't exist any proof that such an objective viewpoint has been reached.



I don't think an objective view of reality could be reached without sustained conscious philosophical and scientific effort. In my view, great achievements don't usually happen by sheer accident. So, I would say no, we could not reach a great achievement in life or history and not be aware of it; it doesn't make any sense, in my opinion.

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Well, yes, we agree on the large scale about objective views. However, I meant for it to be applied to the example at hand. Would it not be possible that his ruler matched exactly the true size of the standard ruler, therefore making his ruler an objective view of measurement in inches?

Obviously the same objections would apply, that there is no "proof that such an objective viewpoint has been reached". But would not the same concession also apply? That it is possible?

Do you have any specific 'possibilities' in mind here?

When it comes to man-made conventions they are more or less worthless, in my opinion. How do you expect to ground such a convention in a metaphysical certitude?

As I see it, there is great and profound merit in the quest, especially as it relates to a quest via the study of philosophy and the sciences.


We must develop a meaningful form of metaphysical relativism in such a way that places the human self in the absolute highest and most advantageous position. This seems to me the best that can be hoped for. And I think it will be the greatest thing that any man can ever do.

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It would not have to be grounded in a metaphysical certitude, just a physical one. That the ruler is indeed the same size as the standard ruler.

I too agree that relativism would be a great help in constructing a new way forward. But I have less of a concern for the idea of metaphysical relativism, because I have little care for metaphysics in the first place.

But the tool does not, cannot, philosophically speaking, dictate a length.

I'm not discussing perspective per se, but the unavoidable epistemological problems of perceptual relativism.

How does a ruler dictate a length? You are using a mere convention, which is a standardized metric.

But how do we arrive at the standard, how can your ruler be proven to posess universal validity?

It is only via intersubjective agreement, which brings us back full circle. Simply because everyone involved agrees to use a certain type of ruler does not mean that the ruler is somehow a metaphysical object.

It should be obvious that any axiomatic system rests upon mere subjective validity. Even if you are a philosophical pragmatist, you still cannot prove, beyond doubt that your pragmatism is the one true philosophy.

I understand that we can use any arbitrary 'tool' to measure distances, but this does not endow those 'tools' with objective validity.

Unless you can use God's tool, the same old epistemological problems will persist.

You have merely shifted the focus away from the epistemological problem of perception and toward questions regarding the objective status of axiomatic systems. Of course, there is no such thing as an objective axiomatic system.

But the standard ruler remains in an unproven, existential position. If you are an Existentialist, for example, then there may be no point in following the epistemological line of reasoning in a thorough manner. I'm not sure what the goal would be if epistemological inquiry were to proceed without any relationiship to first philosophy (metaphysics). In a sense, you have already reached your conclusions and you can point to the work of other Existentialists and simply subscribe to their well known, and very popular, points of view and you're all done.

I think you may be referring to the political and social development of relativism, which is so widespread today. This is more of a moral debate, in my opinion. I am not interested in morals or social thought here (see my thread on American Identity). This is basically epistemological inquiry (or that was my plan at the beginning).

I suppose at some point one falls into a certain camp, but my point is not that I think there is only the physical, but rather that it is possible. If that is so then the standard ruler is simply that, a standard length kept as close to accurate as possible for certain purposes.

You keep speaking of possibilities. This mean that you are a sort of representational realist. In other words, you believe that there is an objective world out there and we can somehow or 'possibly' relate to it.

Even though it is a respectable philosophical position (though you haven't described the nature of your 'possibilities'), I would disagree. Because I see no absolute, unerring, objective means of discovering or perceiving it. We always perceive under some aspect and the physical constituents themselves are not wholly comprehensible; they can always be physically rearranged into various 'objects' under various criteria. They are always only pragmatically and provisionally measured for some purpose or other, whose purposes remain relative to their uses.

There can be no final scientific theory which can categorize the constituents of the physical world in full.

At what distance must an object be from a perceiver in order for its appearance to equal its real size?

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Agreed. All objects have a size, but we make that size relative to ourselves. To come close to the perception of an object's size is to measure it so that we have an agreed frame of reference.

At what distance must an object be from a perceiver in order for its appearance to equal its real size?

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Nice question! I'm on this kick, lately. It seems to me that number cannot be perfectly applied to space. Number is digital. The transcendental intuition of space is analog, or continuous. Thus the paradoxes of Zeno & the need for the sophistry of calculus. And this is just one issue.

I wished to show that space-time is not necessarily something to which one can ascribe a separate existence, independently of the actual objects of physical reality. Physical objects are not in space, but these objects are spatially extended. In this way the concept "empty space" loses its meaning.

At what distance must an object be from a perceiver in order for its appearance to equal its real size?

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Nice question! I'm on this kick, lately. It seems to me that number cannot be perfectly applied to space. Number is digital. The transcendental intuition of space is analog, or continuous. Thus the paradoxes of Zeno & the need for the sophistry of calculus. And this is just one issue.

Nice question! I'm on this kick, lately. It seems to me that number cannot be perfectly applied to space. Number is digital. The transcendental intuition of space is analog, or continuous. Thus the paradoxes of Zeno & the need for the sophistry of calculus. And this is just one issue.

Tis therefore certain, that the imagination reaches a minimum, and may raise up to itself an idea, of which it cannot conceive any sub-division, and which cannot be diminished without a total annihilation. When you tell me of the thousandth and ten thousandth part of a grain of sand, I have a distinct idea of these numbers and of their different proportions; but the images, which I form in my mind to represent the things themselves, are nothing different from each other, nor inferior to that image, by which I represent the grain of sand itself, which is suppos'd so vastly to exceed them. What consists of parts is distinguishable into them, and what is distinguishable is separable. But whatever we may imagine of the thing, the idea of a grain of sand is not distinguishable, nor separable into twenty, much less into a thousand, ten thousand, or an infinite number of different ideas.

What an amazing question... And an implication of the veil of perception I had never considered. It's also problematic for Locke's distinction, because it means size - supposedly a primary quality - is just as subjective as colour or sound. In fact, if you really think about it, whenever we see an object, its size is only apparent to us in relation to the objects surrounding it, i.e. if you hold a pea right up to your eye, you know its small only if your also holding another larger object, e.g. your hand, up to the other eye.

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because it means size - supposedly a primary quality - is just as subjective as colour or sound.

... because it means size - supposedly a primary quality - is just as subjective as colour or sound. ...

Let's not confuse things. We are not talking about size, we are talking about the appearance of size. Things are a certain size whether we perceive them to be so or not.

At what distance must an object be from a perceiver in order for its appearance to equal its real size?

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