Other Minds

@Leonard,

Leonard;109380 wrote:

If only you had a mind, you would find no need to call it a 'mind'. Or attempt to define it.

So ?...............

@Leonard,

Leonard;109380 wrote:

If only you had a mind, you would find no need to call it a 'mind'. Or attempt to define it.

Thanks Buddha. Tell Jesus I miss him.

---------- Post added 12-08-2009 at 07:46 PM ----------

kennethamy;109373 wrote:

He used to be when much younger, but not in his middle and later years. He is now dead.

I know he's dead. In his later work, he is still a linguistic philosopher. You might not want to call him one, for you might have a different notion of linguistic philosophy. But Wittgenstein was one of Rorty's big influences. He also quotes the sh*t out of Davidson. And this linguistic aspect is one of the things I love about Rorty. He also thought highly of Dewey and Heidegger. I read his later essays many times. He's got style, as well as substance. He's the sophist with a smile.

@kennethamy,

kennethamy;109273 wrote:

Robots don't have minds.

I understand you are probably playing devil's advocate with this thread so Im curious as to why you would say this, with what appears to be such certainty. You arent playing a very consistent advocate in regards to this statement and the concept of the thread... amirite?

@Kielicious,

Kielicious;109412 wrote:

I understand you are probably playing devil's advocate with this thread so Im curious as to why you would say this, with what appears to be such certainty. You arent playing a very consistent advocate in regards to this statement and the concept of the thread... amirite?

It isn't with certainty. I am just pointing out that the possibility is good that they do not. The question is, how we can tell whether they, or people walking down the street, do. Or, what would justify us in believing they do. The question is not whether robots have minds, but how we know (if we think we know) that they do. (And I don't know which devil you think I am advocating).

@kennethamy,

kennethamy;109463 wrote:

It isn't with certainty. I am just pointing out that the possibility is good that they do not. The question is, how we can tell whether they, or people walking down the street, do. Or, what would justify us in believing they do. The question is not whether robots have minds, but how we know (if we think we know) that they do. (And I don't know which devil you think I am advocating).

It is in the definition of digital system (robot) that is cannot possess, or understand, semantics. And, I think people like Searle believe that semantics is a necessary condition for intentionality. And if something doesn't have intentionality, I don't think we would say that it has a mind, in the sense that we generally use the term. Searle attempts to demonstrate that in this argument.

@Zetherin,

Zetherin;109467 wrote:

It is in the definition of digital system (robot) that is cannot possess, or understand, semantics. And, I think people like Searle believe that semantics is a necessary condition for intentionality. And if something doesn't have intentionality, I don't think we would say that it has a mind, in the sense that we generally use the term. Searle attempts to demonstrate that in this argument.

Searle's argument does play on our intuition, at least for me anyway -and this also reminds me of Chomsky's universal grammar concept as well- but after doing alot of thinking I ended up disagreeing with his argument. Mainly because I cannot accept such an ethnocentric (if that is such an appropriate term) conclusions that minds require, to quote Searle, "the right stuff." I just cant come to agree with him that only neurons, or some sort of biological system similar to ours, can only contain minds. Regardless if its neurons or silicon chips I think consciousness depends not on what kind of stuff its made out of, but on the appropriate network instead.

I would go into more detail but Im sick and have to study. It also might be a bit off topic too.

@kennethamy,

Is "mind" a word any of you would apply to something that lacked consciousness?

@Reconstructo,

Reconstructo;109499 wrote:

Is "mind" a word any of you would apply to something that lacked consciousness?

I would not. Because those things which have minds bear intentionality, and those things which bear intentionality, are conscious.

@kennethamy,

For me, consciousness is enough, even if it were devoid of intentionality. What is the light (metaphor) that discloses beings?

To me consciousness and being are strange strange issues.

@Reconstructo,

Reconstructo;109499 wrote:

Is "mind" a word any of you would apply to something that lacked consciousness?

Yes. While I think mind could apply to something that lacked consciousness i.e. mind is some lower form of consciousness, it is in drawing the line between mind and consciousness that is difficult.

@kennethamy,

I'm not attached to particular words. I suppose that consciousness is the difficult issue.

@validity,

validity;114983 wrote:

Yes. While I think mind could apply to something that lacked consciousness i.e. mind is some lower form of consciousness, it is in drawing the line between mind and consciousness that is difficult.

Give me an example of something that has a mind, but no consciousness.

@Zetherin,

Zetherin;115025 wrote:

Give me an example of something that has a mind, but no consciousness.

With the idea that the mind is a lower form of consciousness, I offer cell signaling Cell signaling - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia as form of mind that is without consciousness.

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