It is in the definition of digital system (robot) that is cannot possess, or understand, semantics. And, I think people like Searle believe that semantics is a necessary condition for intentionality. And if something doesn't have intentionality, I don't think we would say that it has a mind, in the sense that we generally use the term. Searle attempts to demonstrate that in this argument
Searle's argument does play on our intuition, at least for me anyway -and this also reminds me of Chomsky's universal grammar concept as well- but after doing alot of thinking I ended up disagreeing with his argument. Mainly because I cannot accept such an ethnocentric (if that is such an appropriate term) conclusions that minds require, to quote Searle, "the right stuff." I just cant come to agree with him that only neurons, or some sort of biological system similar to ours, can only contain minds. Regardless if its neurons or silicon chips I think consciousness depends not on what kind of stuff its made out of, but on the appropriate network instead.
I would go into more detail but Im sick and have to study. It also might be a bit off topic too.