Ok, the analogy isnt equivalent.
There arent any colors in the dark because color is defined by what wavelength is being reflected off of the said object. So no light means no color. Similarly if there was no auditoy frequency then there wouldnt be sounds.
People could identify color way before they knew anything about wavelengths. And can now. Children can identify red, but know nothing about angstrom units. And, of course, it there were no sound waves, there would be no sound. But that does not mean that sound is only sound waves.
And when did I say that people couldnt identify colors before our knowledge of wavelenghts? I seriously dont follow this at all...
You said that color is defined by wavelength. But people can say what red is and know nothing about wavelengths. Does that mean that they don't know that something is red. "Red" is the name of a color many apples have. We can define "red" by pointing at red things. In fact, that is how we teach children the term, "red".
If there is a third party viewing, do I really need to respond to the above statement?
I'm sorry for going off-topic earlier. If you want me to clean up the thread, I will.
I am on the same page as you, and this is what is stopping me from clearly understanding what knowledge is. I'm now contemplating what you say about considering knowledge as a sum of its parts, instead of evaluating each condition individually. You're right, justification does not give us any verificiation that we have a true belief, it just gives us reason to believe that our belief can, and sometimes probably, is true.
It still confuses me whenever I consider the "true" part of JTB. I still don't see how true is distinguished from certain. If something can be true, and not certain, what makes something true - the possibility of being true? That wouldn't make sense, but if it's true, it seems to me that it is certainly true; if there is such a thing as an uncertain truth, wouldn't that just be me thinking something was true? And if I just think something is true, that wouldn't be enough for what we call knowledge. Or, is knowledge really just me having a justified belief that, for whatever reason ( I guess based on justification), has a strong possibilily of being true?
As many times as I've gone over this, for countless hours, and in countless threads, I still just don't get it.
In your thought experiment you nonchalantly state, "Then, if in addition, my belief is true...", but in many real life scenarios, we may never be able to confirm whether something is actually true or not. If we cannot, how do we ever know that we know?
If, on the other hand, the proposition is about the past, for example, whether the postman has been yet, I guess we can look into the postbox to see whether there are letters in the box. If there are, then we infer that the postman has been.
I'm sorry for going off-topic earlier. If you want me to clean up the thread, I will.
The letters in the mailbox would be justification for my belief that it was true the mailman came, but it doesn't provide verification that it is true the mailman came. Because, even though the letters are in my mailbox, the mailman may not have come. So, how can I ever know the mailman ever came? I can think the mailman came. I can believe the mailman came. But I don't understand how I could ever know the mailman came, if we can only know what is true, and we cannot verify whether the mailman having come is true.
Even if we cannot verify, you're saying we just follow a procedure, and then call it knowledge. Does this mean there are different sorts of knowledge, then? Some we're more certain of than others? I suppose that would make sense, but I still don't see exactly where truth fits in.
Do we have to know what we know, to know? "I know that Jim knows", isn't a tautology. Is "I know that I know" a tautology, though?
It seems to me that your objection amounts to saying that you cannot be absolutely certain beyond the possibility of error that the mailman came. And that is true. But, I think that I already have said that certainty is not the criterion of knowledge. As I think I also said, I my belief (the proposition I believe) may be true, and I not be certain (or even know) that it is true. (Knowledge implies truth, but truth does not imply knowledge). So, I think there is no reason to believe that just because it is possible that I am mistaken about the mailman, and so I am not certain he came, that I do not know that he came. For I can know without being certain.
What is the distinguishing factor that seperates a justified belief from knowledge? If I saw the mail in the mailbox, I would have justification for believing that the mailman came. I would probably even believe the mailbox came. But if I cannot directly verify that the mailman came, I cannot know that I know, and so why should I ever proclaim that I know the mailman came? I could be wrong that I know, couldn't I? And, then, in that case, I wouldn't have known after all.
Is my proclaiming that I know, for many things empirical, come with the implication "I know beyond a reasonable doubt"? If I say I know the mailman came, I am not saying it's true the mailman came, but rather that I think the mailman came beyond any reasonable doubt? We cannot know something that is false, but we can be mistaken about knowing something. So, since this is true, when we say we know, it's only a temporary placeholder until we can verify the truth? It's like being innocent until proven guilty -- I know until it's proven that I do not know (that whatever it was, was in fact false)?
Yes. That is the price of being an Empiricist, and surrendering certainty. Your complaint is exactly the complaint that Descartes made when he argued that Empiricism inevitably led to skepticism, namely, the impossibility of knowledge. Of course, by "knowledge" Descartes meant certainty, and "knowing that one knows". And that's the bullet (if that is the word) that the Empiricist has to bite. Empirical knowledge is fallible knowledge, and the Empiricist must also be a fallibilist. A fallibilist is someone who holds that although it is necessary that if one knows that p, then p, but that it is false that if one holds that p, tnen p is necessary. (Sound familiar?). In other words, a fallibilist is not a skeptic. He holds that if we know that p, then p is true. But not that if we know that p, then p must be true. That if I know that p, I could be mistaken, but that I am not mistaken. And if my belief is justified, then, even if my belief might not be true, as long as it is true, then I have satisfied the conditions of knowledge. I have justified true belief. I know that you may find this unintuitive, and many do. But that is partly the fault of the language which misleads us into thinking that knowledge is certainty. Remember the modal fallacy. And how philosophy is a constant battle against the bewitchment of the intelligence by language.
Do we think in language? If not, then I can tell you right now, I am confused even without using language.
What is the value in saying that you know something instead of saying that you have a justified belief for something, in regards to things empirical? If my knowledge is fallible, why don't I just ditch "knowledge" altogether, and not proclaim that I know, since I don't know that I know?!
Dude: "Hey, man, do you know if the mailman came today?"
Me: "I think the mailman came, that's all I can give you! Sorry, old chap!"
Dude: "But weren't you just here a moment ago? You must know!"
Me: "My knowledge is fallible, buddy, I could be wrong. But I may know. I just don't know if I know."
Dude: "You don't know if you know? Well, what good does that do me?!"
Me: "It does you no good, and I don't understand why I even voiced that! Now get lost!"
But is there a difference between her having only justified belief that Quito is the capital and her knowing it. Of course. Since she would have had justified belief even if she had been mistaken. But she would not have known if she had been mistaken. Isn't that right?
As I asked, why should I have to know that I know in order to know, any more than I have to know that Quito is the capital of Ecuador in order for Quito to be the capital of Ecuador?
But she could have said Quito without knowing, too. She could have said Quito only holding a justified belief. Heck, her saying Quito could have just been a guess, even if she had studied!
Because if I do not know that I know, even if I really do know, I'm hesistant to say I know, because I could be mistaken. I wouldn't want to mislead anyone. Why would I say I know unless I'm sure of it? If I thought I was sure I was six feet tall, I would tell people I know I'm six feet tall. And I am sure about many things like that, including capitals. However, when we start speaking of things which are spatially or temporally dependent, things which are empirical, I start doubting myself. And, so, I do not want to say I know without certainty. Because, if I was wrong about knowing, I would be misleading people.
I know there's a difference between justified belief and knowledge. Perhaps you misunderstood me, because I never said there wasn't a difference. That's not the problem I'm having, you're beating the wrong horse. The problem I'm having is knowing when I should say I know, and knowing when I should say I only have a justified belief.
You're confident Quito is the capital of Ecuador because, "I believe that Quito is the capital, and the probability of my being mistaken is vanishingly small.", and from this you feel comfortable saying that you know.
I don't feel as comfortable saying I know unless I'm psychological certain. And, with many things, I'm not.