Because I cannot prove that such a world exists, in the same way that I can prove that my own experience exists. Therefore, that it exists is an assumption. Again, not an unfounded assumption, but still an assumption. A similiar assumption would be that the sun will rise tommorow. I have every reason to believe it will, but it is an assumption. I cannot know for a fact that it will come up tommorow. And remember, this is epistemology, so that distinction, between proved fact and assumption, makes a difference.

Indeed it is true that we cannot know the external world outside of our experience because it takes experience to know things. From my understanding, the external world is that which exists independent of our experience. .

But that would be like arguing that we cannot know there is fire outside our observation of there being smoke. We know that where there is fire, there is generally smoke, so when we observe smoke, we infer that that there is a fire. Our experience of the visible allows us to know about the invisible. For instance, we cannot observe electrons, but we can observe their effects, and therefore we infer from their effects to their cause. Namely,electrons.

But why should your standard of proof be that your own experience exists? (Indeed, and this is a different issue, I don't think that we can prove that our own experience exists. Just how would we go about doing that?) .

Meditaciones del Quixote ("Meditations on Quixote") in 1914: "I am I and my circumstance . . .," where as he later explains that the first "I" represents "my life" and the second "I" the "I" we have mentioned above. Thus, a fuller statement of the formula is "My life consist of I and my circumstance," which appears in later works.

Now it is my opinion that instead of the word that Ortega uses in Spanish "circumstancia," which straitforwardly translates as "circumstance," he could have used "environment," if there were an equivalent word to it in Spanish. He variously refers to "circunstancia" as "lo que nos rodea," ("that which is around us"), "contorno" ("surroundings"), "ambiente" ("ambience"). and even "environs," which is the French equivalent of "environment." What is interesting is that in English translations of his work, in many of the places where he uses the word "circumstancia" in Spanish, the translator uses the word "environment" instead. Being an environmentalist, as well as an amateur philosopher, I would like to think that Ortega would agree with this interpretation of what he meant by "circunstancia."

If we look at the passages where he explains in detail what he means by "circumstancia," he sometimes enumerates what is included in that concept. Included are what he generally calls "cosas," "things": "chairs," "mountains," "trees," "animals," "books," "other people," but also, "ideas," "emotions," "dreams," and even "hallucinations," which have been mentioned in previous postings to this thread. Thus, at one poin the says that "circumstancia" is anything "Other" than "I".

Now this model of reality resolves the question of "outside" and "inside" in this way: "My circumstance" is everything "outside" of "I," and both "I" and "my circumstance" are "inside" the "radical reality" that is "my life." An interesting corollary would be that "I" am "outside" "my circumstance." We could also use the words "external" and "internal" in a similar fashion.

In terms of the original posting, then "external reality" would be equivalent to that part of the "radical reality" that is "my life" called "my circumstance," including the so-called "physical phenomena" that "occur" to the "I" or "me," as well as so-called "mental phenomena," that also "occur" to the "I' or "me." In other words, all "phenomena" that occur to "me" are "outside" "me," but both the "phenomena" and the "I" are "inside" the "radical reality" called "my life."

And the word "experience," takes on new meaning that is actually an "old" meaning. "Ex-peri-ence" comes from the Latin "experientia" with the roots "ex-" ("outside"), "peri-" ("around") and -ente ("being"), that is "being around outside," which is the same thing as "circum-stance," from the Latin "circumstantia," with the roots "circum-" (around) and "stantia" ("standing"), thus "standing around."

One of Ortega's goals was to create the equivalent of a "physics of human life." His model constitutes what we might call the "statics of human life." A sympathetic interpreter of Ortega's model says that the word "circumstance" should be replaced by the word "circumdynamics," because Ortega says that both "I" and "my circumstance" are always changing.

Now the so-called "external world," interpreted as what is "behind," "outside," "the cause of," the "physical phenomena" that "occur" to us, is a "concept," that is, it is an "experience" of a so-called "mental phenomenon" that is not the same thing as our direct "experience" of the "physical phenomena," but rather a "thought," or "idea" that is also an "experience" that may "occur" to us at the same time or subsequent to our "experience" of the "physical phenomena," because we have learned to associate the two. And this in turn is due to the fact that at some time in the past it had "occurred" to some person to make the association and it has subsequently been adopted by most people, but especially "physicists," as the "interpretation" of the "physical phenomena" that "occur" to them.

And this "idea" of an "external world" "behind," or "the cause of" the "physical phenomena" that "occur" to "us" has become so ingrained in our discourse that for many people the idea "occurs" to them almost automatically at the same time that the "physical phenomena" occur to them, so that it becomes part of what they believe of as "physical reality."

I hope this presentation is useful to you in understanding the concepts of "inside " and "outside" as discussed in this thread.

longknowledge

I've never read Ortega's work, but it sounds to me like I'm very much in agreement with his basic concept, differing only in the terminology. I'll have to hold off on commenting in detail though until I read some Ortega myself. Thanks for the post.

Perhaps 'prove' isn't the right word. As we all know, there is no absolutely sound logical proof; all such proofs rest on some given information or premise which must be assumed to be true for the argument which follows from it to be true. So no, I can in this sense of the word not prove that my own experience exists, no more than I can prove any other statement. However, I consider the existence of my own experience to be self-evident. Whatever it is which is occuring for me at the moment, which I choose to call 'experience,' is indeed occuring. It is a fact. Whereas, the existence of something which I have never and cannot, by definition, experience, is not a fact in the same way. It may or may not be the case. It is assumed to exist.

I don't know there is "no absolutely sound logical proof". Maybe because I don't really know what it is you are denying there is. Logic books define "sound argument" as an argument which is valid, and all of whose premises are true.

As for "experience", I suppose you mean what some call "subjective experiences". But, they are not all self-evident. Suppose I am asked whether I have ever had the experience of having a migraiine headache. It may be that since I am not sure what a migraine headache is, I am not sure whether I have had a migraine.

Or, maybe I have had a bad headache, but I am not sure whether it is a migraine, since it lacks some characteristics of a migraine, although it also has some of them too.

Exactly. How do we know that the premises for any given argument are true? Either we assume they are true And or we demand proof of their veracity. And then the argument which proves them to be true in turn must have some premises, which in turn must either be assumed to be true, or proven by yet another argument, and so on ad infinitum. My point is simply that any logical argument is only valid insofar as its premises are valid, and ultimately all premises rest on assumptions, or there is an infinte chain of reasoning and the argument never ends. Therefore, it is impossible to prove any statement without making assumptions. Regarding my thoughts on experience; this means that I cannot prove through some logical argument that 'my experience exists' without making assumptions, but this is not evidence against the truth of that statement, because all statements requires assumptions to be made in order for them to be proven.

My method is simply to begin my argument, my entire system in fact, with the premise that there exist facts of experience, i.e. my experience. I don't see how that's doubtful. If some experience is occuring, then indeed it is occuring. I am simplhy unable to consider this as an assumption myself, so self-evident does it seem, but if anyone likes to question whether or not their own experiences as such in fact exist as experiences, that's fine. If so, then my system is not for them. But if you accept this premise, then the rest of my arguments (I hope) follow.



That is a matter of language. If you one day had what is commonly called a 'migraine headache,' but let's say you decided to call it a 'burlap sack,' the same thing has occured. It makes no difference. If I say 'have you had a migraine today?' and you say ' No, I've had a burlap sack,' we are referring to the same thing. I am arguing only that the experiences themselves do in fact occur, without doubt from the person having them. Whatever it's called, the experience in question is occuring.



Again the act of placing X or Y experience in a category, giving it a name, relating it to others, judging its value, etc. have no effect on the experience as such when it occured. There is the experience, regardless of the rest. In other words, the identity of the experience is not dependent on anything other than the experience per se. The experience which is commonly called 'migraine headache' does not need to be called 'migraine headache' in order to be the experience that it is.

[...]My point is simply that any logical argument is only valid insofar as its premises are valid, and ultimately all premises rest on assumptions, or there is an infinte chain of reasoning and the argument never ends.

Therefore, it is impossible to prove any statement without making assumptions.

I suppose the above is an example of how to do 'continental philosophy'.

First, we do not have to know that the premises are true for them to be true.

And, we do not have to know that an argument is sound for it to be sound.

Second, I do know that it is true, for example, that if a number is divisible by 2, then it is an even number (and so do you) and I do know that 6 is divisible by 2 (and so do you) if it makes any difference.

It is not a matter of calling the headache a migraine. It is a matter of what kind of headache it is. Abraham Lincoln (so the story goes) once asked his son, Tod, "If a dog's tail were called a "leg", how many legs would a dog have? Tod promptly replied, "Five legs. The four legs and the tail". And Lincoln replies, "No, you are wrong. Calling a dog's leg a tail does not make it a tail". And, of course, calling a headache a migraine does not make it a migraine.

If the experience of a migraine headache is not the experience of a migraine headache, then what is it an experience of?

Don't confuse the word with the thing. There were migraine headaches (I suppose) before they were called "migraine headaches". Don't you believe so?

And, I certainly agree that if there is an experience, then there is an experience. It would be difficult to deny that, since it is a logical truth. For any X, if X then X. But what is supposed to follow from that?

I suppose the above is an example of how to do 'continental philosophy'.

Correct, but we do have to know that the premises are true in order to know that they are true, and therefore in order to know that the argument that rests upon them is true.



Correct again. But for the argument to be considered sound, for it to be persuasive, it must be known to be true, which means that its premises must be known to be true.



A mathematical argument rests on premises just as a verbal/logical argument. The argument '2 + 2 = 4' is no more intrinsically true than the argument 'mutton is tasty.' The former is only true because of its premises, which is to say that it is only true because it exists within a logical system that defines the terms such that the argument must be true. I will say again, no argument, of whatever kind, can be demonstrated to be absolutely true, but rather only true to the extent that its premises are assumed to be true.



No, that is false. If X is defined as 'something,' then the statement 'X is something' is true. If the next day you define that same something as Y, then the statement 'Y is something' is then true. However, whatever name you give for some thing or phenomenon, that thing or phenomenon is the same. Recall your Shakespeare.



If you want to define the word 'migraine' as the experience which is commonly called a migraine, then obviously that experience is a migraine. But I could well call that same experience a 'burlap sack,' and would my experience of that experience be any different? No, of course not. That's all I'm claiming.



There was the experience which we today, in this language, call 'migraine headache' long before anyone uttered the word 'migraine headache.' Certainly, and that's my point. Again, the identity of the experience is not dependent on the name or it, a judgement about it, etc. The experience is the experience as such. That is the reason that I chose originally, some years ago, to set as my premise the claim that 'experiences exist.'



Nothing is supposed to follow directly from that, or easily. It is just one of the basic premises of my entire philosophy, which you will find strewn about the forum in various stages of development. Perhaps some time, when I think I've got it organized enough to be coherent to someone who is not the author, I'll post the whole thing.



The Anglo-American philosopers (Hume and few others exempted) ought to have saved the world from themselves and instead spent their time designing a better steam engine or something. I'll take the nonlinear anyday. Cheers to my fellow continentals! ....We also use a fork and knife correctly! :bigsmile:

Sorry, I have no idea what a "true argument" is. You had better explain it. It is not necessary to know that an argument is sound for the argument to be sound. I know that.

"Mutton is tasty" is not an argument. It is a statement. What are the premises of 2+2=4? It can have no premises since it is not an argument.

I think Emil is right. You really ought to learn a little logic. Or even what logic is all about.

If you cannot understand my arguments unless they are translated into symbolic logic, then you will not ever understand my arguments, because I have no intention of translating them into symbolic logic. If philosophy is, in your mind, reduced so that it is only worthwhile or even coherent if in a certain format, then we have come, in my opinion, to a very a sad state of affairs. It means that method and systematization have replaced the actual persuit of Truth and, paraphrasing Nietzsche, methods are required by those that lack character. In other words, formality is required by those who do not bridle at formality: i.e. those who have something to express which does not fit within the formal structure, or in any case does not require that formal structure. Then again, maybe my arguments are utter nonsense and cannot be understood at all. If that's the case, then repeating them for the nth time won't solve our confusion, so I suppose it's best to stop here and cut our losses.

Regarding the part of your comments that I underlined above, I'll ignore your suggestion but I have one of my own for you, which you no doubt will ignore, but I feel inclined to make nonetheless. Forget all symbols which are not contained in the alphabet, learned to express yourself purely through the most refined medium, burn your symbolic logic books, read the Will to Power, read it again, and then write down what you've learned.