It is not a question of knowledge, but one of ontology. Let me ask you this: if you had perfect knowledge of everything, would you know whether Kennedy 'would have won' the 1964 election? In other words, is the answer a member of the set of all facts?

Sure. Why not? It is true now that Kennedy was assassinated; true a million years ago, and true, a million years hence. But, as you just said, it is not a question of knowledge. It is a question of truth (ontology). And, the set of all facts is the set of all truths.

Sorry, I don't understand your answer. The question is not whether he was assassinated, but whether he would otherwise have won the subsequent election. But what precisely does "would have won" mean? Would have won if what? If he had been popular at the time? (Answer: yes.) If he had been unpopular? (Answer: no.) If he had decided not to run for a second term? (Answer: no.) You can invent all kinds of contingencies that will affect the answer. So how can there be a 'right' one? If just one is true, what makes it true?

If it is true that Kennedy was assassinated in 1963, then, as I said, it was true in 1269 that Kennedy was assassinated in 1963, and it is true in 2189, that, Kennedy was assassinated in 1963.

To say that Kennedy would have won need not be understood as a conditional, as you are understanding it. It can be understood as referring to the unfulfilled future. Just as saying the "could: in Kennedy could have won in 1963 is the past of "can". Not a conditional, with a hanging "if".

What makes a statement about the future true is, of course, what would have happened in the future.

Scientific method, for instance, consists of argument, but certainly not pure reason.

Reason/rationality, contains the modular, scalar, weaker set (a range of behavior), of spontaneous a-ha's.

Mathematicians often consider emotional outbursts as direct sequitur to Original Cause. It is the scientific metrics that decipher conventional effect~cause relationships, and falsity is contained by this modular, scalar truth.

:surrender::surrender:

It's quite simple: any accurate truth contains its opposite in the set (see: set theory), therefore, as long as time and space persist, false will eventually become true, and true will eventually become false (see: Flux).

Just do the math.

I can discover this by math? I haven't learned that math. (False what, and true what)?

True in 2189, yes. True in 1269? Well, I tend to side with Aristotle on this, but for the purposes of this thread I'll accept your assertion. I want to concentrate on the question of Kennedy winning the 1964 election.



I'm perfectly happy with "could have won", since it allows any alternative possibility, e.g. "could have lost" or "could have failed to contest". But "would have won" is different, as it rules out "would have lost" etc.



But I don't understand what "would have happened in the future" means in relation to non-existent courses of events. I understand what "would happen in the future" means in relation to actual courses of events (e.g. "In 1269 Kennedy would be assassinated in the future"). But what does "Kennedy (had he survived) would have won the 1964 election" mean without an 'if'?

You refer to the "unfulfilled future". What on earth is that? And how can you show (without begging the question) that it is unique?

You believe there can be no truths about the future because the future does not exist. But why can't there be truths about the future because the future will exist?

In 1962 there would be an election in 1964. And, it might be that anyone who ran in the election would have won. Including, JFK.

By saying "the future will exist" you have presupposed what you are trying to prove. If the future will exist, then of course it is true that the future will exist, hence there is a truth about the future. But "the future will exist" is exactly the point I am questioning. Firstly, the world could theoretically end in a moment's time. Secondly, even if we concede that it is now true that a particular future time will exist, it does not follow that it is now true that a given future event will exist. (If it were true now that A rather than B will happen, it would mean that A is predetermined.)



In 1962 there would very probably be an election in 1964. And anyone who ran in it might have won. That is my point; there were an infinite number of possible scenarios.

Surely not infinite. I imagine many fewer than that. We would have to go back and examine what would have been the real possibilities. Nixon, maybe.

I suppose you mean, "very probably" as contrasted with "certain". But those are not the only alternatives. There is also knowing. We knew that there would be an election in 1964. Our belief that there would be was adequately justified, and, if it was true, then we knew it.

(b) In 1962 we believed there would be an election in 1964, and we believed we knew this, but we did not know that we knew it;
(c) We now know that we knew it, since there was indeed an election in 1964.

That is right. But, then, we do not have to know we know, in order to know. In fact, it is the converse. We have to know in order to know we know. Whether or not we know we know (certainty) we know.

The two situations are quite different. There is certainly a fact of the matter whether there is extraterrestrial life, and you might well be right if you guess there is not. We are talking here about something that is (or is not) actually the case. The answer is somewhere 'out there'. But the answer to "Would Kennedy have been re-elected?" is nowhere to be found in the universe - nowhere in the totality of spacetime. He didn't contest the 1964 election, and that is all there is to be said.

You have tried to make the question answerable by supposing a fixed election. Firstly, I would ask: "But what if there were no evidence that the election was going to be fixed?" And secondly, even if there were, I would still contend that the question is meaningless if applied specifically to Kennedy and that particular election. If, on the other hand, you were to ask: "If an election is fixed in favour of a particular candidate, will he/she win?", the question would make sense, and the answer would be: "Very probably".

Why couldn't Kennedy be a particular candidate?

Because he was dead.

You see, I am talking about a "particular candidate" who actually runs in the election in question. Kennedy did not do so (in 1964), and that is the difference. Events will determine the result of a future fixed election, but events will not determine the result of a 1964 election fixed in favour of Kennedy, because there was no such election. The result of an actual election is (or will be) a real entity, but the result of a 1964 election featuring Kennedy is nothing. (The phrase in bold has no reference.)

Well, I amend it to, "had Kennedy been alive, and had run in the 1964 election". Won't that do the trick?