@LWSleeth,
LWSleeth wrote:I have no idea why you are trying to draw a distinction between past-present and observed-unobserved. Both are part of the problem as Hume expressed it. He said, "Opinions about unobserved matters of fact are somehow derived from [past] experience. All beliefs about unobserved matters of fact are derived from experience by induction." Yet you seem intent on creating a false dilemma where there is none.
We can eliminate neither the phenomenon of experience nor our experiential history with a subject and make sense of Hume's problem of induction. In my discussion of it in this thread, I've made no attempt to separate observation and the history of experience that would serve as an inductive reasoning base because I don't see how one can possibly describe the "problem" without both aspects. So, once again, I don't know why you are attempting it . . . it makes no sense to me.
But the unobserved matters of fact need not be about the future. They may also be about the past, or about the immediate present. Isn't that so? Therefore, the problem of induction is not about inference from the past to the future, but from what we have already observed (in the past) to what we have not observed about the past, or about the present, or, of course, also about the future. Isn't that right? But, I agree, that point, although well worth noting is not Hume's difficulty. His difficulty is the inference from the observed to the unobserved. And, the question is, exactly what is the difficulty supposed to be? Why is there a problem with drawing conclusions about the unobserved from the observed? We do it every day of our lives. Is it that we cannot do it with absolute certainty, so that our inference might be mistaken. That is so. But that is not a problem unless we should expect that it would be impossible for an inference which we are justified in making, to be mistaken. Why should we expect an inference to be beyond the possibility of error? Of course, deductive inferences are beyond the possibility of error, for in a valid deductive inference, if the premises are true, then so must the conclusion be true. And, there is no such guarantee in the case of inductive inference. But, is this really the problem? That inductive inference is not deductive inference?