What is the difference between mere doubting and philosophic scepticism??

Doubting is in my opinion a piece of philosophical skepticism. Doubt is the emotion that leads us to skepticism.

There are historical philosophical movements which are called "skeptical." The word is used to refer to some ancient Greek philosophers "The Skeptics" (the term comes from them.) In general they thought that truth was unreachable in principle.

Later philosophers have been called skeptical as well. The label used in a general way can apply to theories that state limits to our ability to gain truth as well, a softer form of skepticism if you will.

The scientific method recruits skeptical concepts by attempting to falsify rather than prove. Scientific skepticism has obvious utility.

I tend to say of an argument that "I am skeptical" when I can explain why it is fragile, rather than when I only feel it is wrong then I'd say "I doubt it."

The difference between mere doubt and philosophic skepticism?

Doubt and skepticism have no necessary differences. To be skeptical of something is to doubt something.

However, there does seem to be some emotional baggage when we use the word "philosophical" - as if philosophy is something apart from more mundane contemplation (whatever that is).

If we are going to differentiate between doubt and skepticism, we should remember that the difference is vague and mostly a manifestation of our need to think of our doubt as somehow more significant than doubting whether or not Jim has a big nose or something like that. If we are going to differentiate between doubt and skepticism, it seems doubt is more general, while skepticism is doubt with a more structured approach.

Yes, you provided a definition. One we might accept. What you have not done is shown that your distinction is a necessary distinction.

For example, doubting the existence of God can certainly extend to philosophical bounds, yet you call this "ordinary skepticism" because you limit "philosophical skepticism" to epistemology.

Yes, you provided a definition. One we might accept. What you have not done is shown that your distinction is a necessary distinction.

For example, doubting the existence of God can certainly extend to philosophical bounds, yet you call this "ordinary skepticism" because you limit "philosophical skepticism" to epistemology.

I think it is useful to distinguish between disbelief on the basis of the particular facts, and disbelief on the basis of process or principle. The words are used interchangeably though I agree and it's simple enough to elaborate on a case by case basis.

It is not unusual for formal philosophy papers to include definitions for words used in a very specific manner. Which is a very good idea considering the obvious reasons for us to be skeptical of language's ability to transfer ideas to others

Thinking there are limits to our ability to understand phenomena of various kinds with various approaches isn't that unusual, and is certainly not restricted to formal philosophy. "Skepticism" these days is rarely used in it's most extreme sense.

When conversing we have a certain amount of responsibility as listeners, to be cooperative in the sense of trying to understand what meaning the other person is trying to convey. As speakers we have a responsibility to be cooperative with our listener, by trying to use language in a reasonable way, and by attempting to head off semantic confusion.

Language is always somewhat ambiguous, does it strike only me as ironic that we are having a conversation about skepticism?

kennethamy - I think you missed the point. We can, if we please, accept and use your distinctions - they might be useful. But you have not shown that doubt and skepticism are essentially different, as they are not essentially different given that to doubt something is to be skeptical about it.

What I think I have pointed out is that philosophical doubt (philosophical skepticism) and ordinary doubt (ordinary skepticism) are different, since the former is directed at knowledge, and the latter at truth.

And that is one way of tackling what is, after all, a fairly unclear distinction as stated.

To doubt something is to be skeptical about it. But doesn't it make a different what you are doubting: in this case, whether it is knowledge, or whether it is truth?

Why confuse them by saying they are both doubt-which they are, of course?

And I do not think you have.

From what I can tell, you have pointed out that we can, if we find use in it, divide doubt into two categories - what you call "philosophical skepticism", which is supposed to be "philosophical doubt", and "ordinary doubt", which is supposed to be "ordinary skepticism".

You say there is doubt about knowledge, and then doubt about truth, and that they are two different things. I agree, we can be skeptical about knowledge, and we can be skeptical about truth. But as to why one such doubt is "philosophical" and another is "ordinary" you have not established at all. From what I can tell, philosophers have a rich history of being skeptical of both knowledge and truth.

The point is that the term "skepticism" is traditionally an epistemic term.

Skepticism is the view that knowledge (whatever that is) cannot be achieved.

That skepticism often applies to epistemic concerns does not mean skepticism is limited to epistemic concerns. Sure, skepticism often refers to epistemic skepticism, but this does not mean that, traditionally, skepticism has been limited to epistemic concerns. We can be skeptical about whether or not God exists, and not be skeptical about whether or not we can know God exists.



No.

Philosophical skepticism - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia
Skepticism - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

Well, of course we can be skeptical about whether God exists. I already pointed that out. That is what I called ordinary skepticism, or skepticism about the truth of the proposition that God exists. And I distinguished it from philosophical skepticism, which is skepticism about whether (for instance) we can know that God exists. If you like, we can call the first kind of skepticism, "truth skepticism", and the second kind, "knowledge skepticism". After all what words we use is far less important than the distinction they mark. As long as we make the distinction, I don't much care what we call it, except, of course, I would like the words to be appropriate for the sake of practicality.

Right, and in being skeptical about whether God exists could rightly be called "philosophical skepticism" as the question is a common one to philosophy.

Don't get me wrong, I agree there is a difference between doubting the truth of something, and doubting whether or not we can know the truth of something.

I object to the arbitrary labeling of one of these as "philosophical" and the other as "ordinary". Your suggestion about "truth skepticism" and "knowledge skepticism" is more agreeable, but I would like to point out that if we accept these, your answer to the original question no longer seems accurate at all because both of these types of skepticism are 'philosophical'.