Yes, the only way I see it being meaningful, is if it refers to a proposition contained in another sentence.

For instance,

If a person pointed to the sentence "The chemical composition of water is H2O" and said, "This sentence is true". Of course, we would translate "this sentence" into "the proposition being made in that sentence".

Sigh! Yes, if only the rest of the world saw things as do you, and fast, and I! The whole business seems to me to be one of those cases Berkeley's apothegm applies to so well: "Philosophers raise the dust, and then complain they cannot see". Aetiology shows!

Yes, but the confusion ensued when you began focusing on not knowing what was meant by "this sentence". It wasn't that you didn't know which sentence was being referred to, it was that you did not see a proposition contained within that sentence. And this is what you did not make clear to Night Ripper.

Hopefully he understands now why his example (This sentence has five words) is not analagous to the example in question (This sentence is false).

the problem with "This sentence is false", is, I think, that we do not attribute the properties true or false to sentences. We attribute the properties true or false to propositions.

Are "true" and "false" properties? If I remember correctly, you're a realist about abstract objects, including propositions, are you suggesting that false propositions exist?

It could be in reference to another sentence, and it could not refer at all, but I think we have good reason to believe it does refer and that it does refer to the sentence in which "this sentence" is present. A good reason would be, among many, that in this particular paradox, that is the assumption that is to be made. Another good reason is that it is common in language when we use the phrase "this X" to refer to the thing in which the phrase is in, or related to (I am not claiming that this is always the case, but think of other examples, like, for instance, "I did X, and all I got was this lousy t-shirt"). And I think you know this, since you said it was clear what sentence he was referring to.

In the example, "There are seven words in this sentence", I am inclined to believe that there is a proposition being made. First, as noted, yes, I think it is reasonable to assume that "this sentence" refers to the sentence in which the phrase is in. And it seems to me that it is either true or false that a sentence has seven words; there is meaning here.

However, the problem with "This sentence is false", is, I think, that we do not attribute the properties true or false to sentences. We attribute the properties true or false to propositions. So, I do not think a proposition is being made, and I'm not sure the sentence is meaningful.

No, Zetherin wrote, "Since you're not claiming that you do not know which sentence 'this sentence' refers to". Emphasis mine. You left out a "not".

Yes, but the confusion ensued when you began focusing on not knowing what was meant by "this sentence". It wasn't that you didn't know which sentence was being referred to, it was that you did not see a proposition contained within that sentence. And this is what you did not make clear to Night Ripper.

Hopefully he understands now why his example (This sentence has five words) is not analagous to the example in question (This sentence is false).

Lots of people attribute truth/falsity to sentences. If you don't, then you are some kind of non-sentence theorist. In your case, a monistic proposition theorist (= all things that are true/false are propositions).

Fast is a pluralist proposition theorist (= propositions are the basic truth carriers but some sentences are also true/false).

I don't know about Ken. Sometimes what he writes makes one believe that he is a monist proposition theorist, but other times he talks about true beliefs and true sentences indicating that he thinks they are sometimes truth carriers as well (i.e. some pluralist theorist), or maybe only as a shorthand (so they are not really true, but it is easier to talk as if they were, similar to evolution when we talk about what nature selects for.)

Propositions are not contained in sentences. They are expressed by them. I think the sentences are analogous, by the way.

They had better, since true propositions exist, and the negation of a true proposition is a false proposition. (Unless you are suggesting that negations don't exist, of course).

Just to be clear, apart from the abstract object which is the proposition 1+1=2, you claim that there exist an, at least, countable infinity of abstract objects which are propositions of the form 1+1=x, where x=/=2?

Yes, I believe that only propositions can be true or false. If I were to say, "That sentence was true", I would be referring to a proposition expressed by that sentence. For what are we saying is true or false, if there was no proposition? Would you say that an elephant is true or false, or that my cup is true or false? No, true and false aren't properties we assign to cups or elephants. And I don't think they are properties to be assigned to sentences. "This sentence is false" begs the question - just what is false?



I thought you may point that out. Expressed by them, then. I was searching for a good word. "Expressed" is better, thanks.

I believe that, yes.

Well, I certainly hope that Kennethamy doesn't, as such assertions are fictions, and he's devoted several weeks to denying the existence of fictional objects.

Well, I certainly hope that Kennethamy doesn't, as such assertions are fictions, and he's devoted several weeks to denying the existence of fictional objects.

I don't understand? How can an assertion be a fiction? And, what assertions do you refer to?

I think that Mickey Mouse is a cartoon character, so it follows that something is a cartoon character. So, am I denying the existence of fictional objects. Let me know, please.

Maybe he meant "fictious" as in some poetic way of saying false, that is, false assertions.

Here I am considerably influenced by the arguments of C.E.M. Joad (1891-1953).
Joad argued ([105], 267-70) that the play Hamlet, for example, could not reasonably be identified with any particular in the world: neither with an idea in Shakespeare 's mind, nor with any manuscript he wrote, nor with any printed edition of the text, nor with any particular production, nor with any audio or video recording of any particular production. For Hamlet could exist even if any one or several of these were not to exist. While Joad, himself, rightly expressed some diffidence about his own arguments, I think that they add considerable impetus to a theory which would posit abstract entities.

If a person pointed to the sentence "The chemical composition of water is H2O" and said, "This sentence is true". Of course, we would translate "this sentence" into "the proposition being made in that sentence".

Maybe he meant "fictious" as in some poetic way of saying false, that is, false assertions.

I meant what I wrote. I know that 1+1=2, it's a fact that 1+1=2, whereas it's a fiction that 1+1=stilton.
.

So Emil was right, all you mean by "fiction" is false? Well, I certainly think there are false statements. Why would you think I did not?

I guess we have come full circle. What is an intentionally (or unintentionally) constructed fiction? Isn't 1+1=stilton just a false statement if it is a statement at all? (You really must get over thinking that if you repeat a phrase several times that will overcome the objections made the first time. Repetition really does not help).