What is the argument about why rationalists have become rationalists in the first place?

It seems there is no logical argument based on reason why people take only the reason as true medium for knowledge and reject feeling, faith and intuition. Therefore the argument is probably based on good faith, subconscious programmed or just it feels right.

By that statement it seems it's wrong to claim that only the reason is a true medium for knowledge, which implies that it is right to take into consideration the other mentioned mediums for knowledge.

Any thought about this issue?

Regardless of whatever affirmative epistemic claims one may make, it is at least certain that any correlation that faith, feeling, and intuition have to the truth is entirely accidental. Reason can allow us to either arrive at what we know with certainty, or to know why we can't know something with just as much certainty.

Well since I consider them as sources of knowledge, I don't need a logical prove to myself to confirm them as valid. Moreover, they are the kind of sources that don't imply a proof

That does not mean that I exclude reason, but it's just one of the tools in order to get to some truth.

As of examples, I have some from my personal life experience. Feelings, intuition and faith had led me to some significant changes in life, inwardly (phyche) and outwardly (surrounding). I've learn some knowledge and moral values based on those changes. All I do with reason is make interpretations and draw principles from that knowledge which give me some laws and systematic approach in general, that I can later apply to different experiences in life.

What do you think we can know with certainty? That is, without the possibility of error? (I thought that "to err is human").

That does not mean that I exclude reason, but it's just one of the tools in order to get to some truth.

That is I can't say that I know something without being certain of it.



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is it possible to know something and not know why you know it?

If you drop all the justified belief in of X business and get down to the brass tacks of knowing something.
To know something is a personal claim, a testemonial of sorts about X. Justified belief can hinge on any justification one assumes is sufficient to make the knowledge claim.
Knowledge is an action, one asserts that one knows, even internally. It is not a passive reception of truth, in fact it has no direct claims on truth. It only has direct claims on the justification of the belief.

1. We think we know a hell of a lot of things we don't know. For example, that our parent are really our parents. Or that we were born.
2. We know no more today than we knew 100 years ago.

Do you believe either 1 or 2 ?

@ Gosh

I'm not really comfortable making knowledge claims of things I could be wrong about. But if I were to turn course on that, getting back to the topic, it wouldn't be in light of feelings or intuitions or faith or anything of that sort.

If you drop all the justified belief in of X business and get down to the brass tacks of knowing something.
To know something is a personal claim, a testemonial of sorts about X. Justified belief can hinge on any justification one assumes is sufficient to make the knowledge claim.
Knowledge is an action, one asserts that one knows, even internally. It is not a passive reception of truth, in fact it has no direct claims on truth. It only has direct claims on the justification of the belief.

But suppose someone claims he knows that p is true. What has to be true for his claim to be true? What are its truth conditions? Isn't that the question? Analogy: someone claims that he has checkmated your king. What has to be true for his claim to be true. What are its truth conditions? In chess, the truth conditions are: 1. your king is in check. 2. Your king has no legal move. When those conditions are satisfied, you are checkmated. Now, what are the truth conditions for X knows that p?

The claim is still about the condition not the truth, actual truth is ancillary to the claim.

I don't know what you mean. Truth is a truth condition of knowledge, since you cannot know that p is true unless p is true. No one can know that Quito is the capital of Bolivia, since Quito is not the capital of Bolivia.

The truth condition is not the truth the truth condition is the justification. Someone can know that Quito is the capital of anywhere if the justification upon which s/he makes the claims are met. People know stuff all the time that may or may not be true. Knowledge has little to do with truth it has everything to do with the belief in the justification. Belief in the justification is what motivates the knowledge claim and all further action based on that claim. The truth just happens to be what it is. Your knowing it versus your knowing the not-truth affects your behavior and belief in exactly the same way.

The truth condition is not the truth the truth condition is the justification. Someone can know that Quito is the capital of anywhere if the justification upon which s/he makes the claims are met. People know stuff all the time that may or may not be true. Knowledge has little to do with truth it has everything to do with the belief in the justification. Belief in the justification is what motivates the knowledge claim and all further action based on that claim. The truth just happens to be what it is. Your knowing it versus your knowing the not-truth affects your behavior and belief in exactly the same way.

No one can know that Quito is the capital of anywhere unless it is the capital of that place. You can be justified and still be mistaken, if that is what troubles you. My belief that Zelda is at home may be completely justified, yet Zelda not be at home. My belief that Zelda was at home was fully justified, but I turned out to be mistaken. Of course, it is true that my belief that I am justified may motivate my claim the I know, but that has nothing to do with whether that claim that I know is true. I may be motivated to claim that Quito is the capital of Bolivia by my reasons for believing that Quito is the capital of Bolivia. But, so what. It is simply not true that Quito is the capital of Bolivia. Therefore I do not, and cannot, know that Quito is the capital of Bolivia.

And you know your opinion to be true based from the justification that you claim the axiom, "knowledge must be based on something true", yet no one can prove the truth of that axiom. After all its an axiom, presupposed truth.