Yes, I suppose we must make note which sense of the word "identical" we're using. The sense described in my dictionary states, "Having such a close similarity or resemblance as to be essentially equal or interchangeable.". And that does seem to be how we ordinarily use the word. When I say the two tires are identical, I don't think I am incorrect, and it's certainly not a meaningless statement. Saying the two tires are identical is different than saying the two tires are kind of the same, for instance. When I say "identical" here I am implying a very high level of exactness.

"A thing is only identical with itself", seems to be a tautology. Why even use identical here? We could just say X is X.

I guess what I'm still not grasping is - why use "identical" in its strictest sense? Is there an example where using "identical" in its stricting sense could lend us further understanding?

Yes, I suppose we must make note which sense of the word "identical" we're using. The sense described in my dictionary states, "Having such a close similarity or resemblance as to be essentially equal or interchangeable.". And that does seem to be how we ordinarily use the word. When I say the two tires are identical, I don't think I am incorrect, and it's certainly not a meaningless statement. Saying the two tires are identical is different than saying the two tires are kind of the same, for instance. When I say "identical" here I am implying a very high level of exactness.

"A thing is only identical with itself", seems to be a tautology. Why even use identical here? We could just say X is X.

I guess what I'm still not grasping is - why use "identical" in its strictest sense? Is there an example where using "identical" in its stricting sense could lend us further understanding?

Yes, I suppose we must make note which sense of the word "identical" we're using. The sense described in my dictionary states, "Having such a close similarity or resemblance as to be essentially equal or interchangeable.". And that does seem to be how we ordinarily use the word. When I say the two tires are identical, I don't think I am incorrect, and it's certainly not a meaningless statement. Saying the two tires are identical is different than saying the two tires are kind of the same, for instance. When I say "identical" here I am implying a very high level of exactness.

"A thing is only identical with itself", seems to be a tautology. Why even use identical here? We could just say X is X.

I guess what I'm still not grasping is - why use "identical" in its strictest sense? Is there an example where using "identical" in its stricting sense could lend us further understanding?

Yes, as with my examples with types and tokens from before. Also two terms may have identical referents.

And one term different referents.

Well, one term type different referents.

For example, the first eyewitness said, "Sandy bit Charlie," and the second eyewitness said, "the girl with the red hair sunk her teeth down into the guy with square glasses." It is clear to all involved that both eyewitnesses are referring to the same girl and guy and mean virtually the same thing by what they say. The statements made to the cop by the eyewitnesses are virtually the same (yet each used different ways to express the same proposition), or at the very least, they are consistent. We have two people (and not just one person) saying that the girl bit the guy.

In this case, I would agree that the propositions are the same. But just because, in this case, the propositions expressed are the same, it does not follow that logical equivalence is a sufficient condition for propositional identity, does it?

No. Do you know why he brought it up?

Sometimes, the word "believe" is the word of choice by those that know but fear to claim knowledge. A person that sees that proposition X is the same as proposition Y may fear saying so and claim instead that they're equivalent, but I suspect that you even deny that proposition X and proposition Y are equivalent (let alone the same).

The sentence, "Sandy bit Charlie" is not the same as (nor equivalent to) the sentence, "the girl with the red hair sunk her teeth down into the guy with square glasses," but what can be meant by the expression of those sentences in certain unique situations can be the same (or at least very similar), so what can be expressed by a person (or different people) uttering those sentences (making statements) can be the same. There is certainly more to a statement than a sentence.

For example, the first eyewitness said, "Sandy bit Charlie," and the second eyewitness said, "the girl with the red hair sunk her teeth down into the guy with square glasses." It is clear to all involved that both eyewitnesses are referring to the same girl and guy and mean virtually the same thing by what they say. The statements made to the cop by the eyewitnesses are virtually the same (yet each used different ways to express the same proposition), or at the very least, they are consistent. We have two people (and not just one person) saying that the girl bit the guy.

Maybe the word, "logically" is throwing me. It seems to me that two different statements can be the same or similar or altogether different. If something is close to being the same but not quite the same, then I might say they're similar. What does "logically equivalent" mean anyway if not similar?

They wouldn't go away!

Referring terms have referents, and all terms have meaning. Since when do sentences have referents?

English is preferable to all this possible world jazz. It makes me think of The Return of the Living Metaphor. If you keep saying there are possible worlds, I fear that you might start to believe it.

Hmmm. I didn't know that. I mean, I know that some terms have multiple words, and a phrase can be considered a term, but I didn't know that a whole sentence could be considered a term.

I didn't know that either. Still not sure that I do.

Really? I thought it was just a way to explain the notion of logical possibilities.

For example, it's not possible (well, not a real possibility anyhow) that I can from a standing position jump forty feet in the air. But, it is a logical possibility. Hence, imagine a possible world where there is very little gravity. In such a world, I can jump that high. See, it's just a way to explain the concept. Unfortunately, people have mistaken the metaphor and taken it literally.

OK.


Ok.



It is a way. But not "just".



Unfortunately you don't have a clue what you are talking about, do you? It's easy to convince me that you do. Mention some introductory articles/books to PWS you have read. Hint: There is one on SEP, maybe you can find it.

It is not a metaphor. Why do you think it is a metaphor? It is a way to talk, but it is not a metaphor. They are not the same.

Besides, you cannot justifiably dismiss Lewis' Modal Realism just be saying that it is a metaphor gone wild. If you are not concerned with being justified, then I cannot help you.

If you are not concerned with being justified, then I cannot help you.

So you really do believe there are possible worlds as well as the actual world? So you don't believe it is "a way to talk". I don't say that when I assert that there are elephants, that is "a way to talk" I? That would suggest that I don't believe there are elephants. There are problems (which I used to know some about, but no longer) about quantifying over possible worlds that Quine used to talk about. Again, problems having to do with identity and individuation. Doesn't the view that there are (really) possible worlds (other than this one) conflict with what Russell called, "a robust sense of reality"?

You may want to recall what a possible world is. It is merely a consistent set of propositions, not a world as in how we ordinarily use the word "world". I am not a modal realist like David Lewis.