@Horace phil,
Horace;79813 wrote:Ok. I think I am comfortable with these five...
A. The police suspect that [1] is the murderer.
I think the same principle at work in the "Inge knows that [1] wrote a novel" is at work here. Inge may know that Mark Twain or George Orwell wrote a novel, but not necessarily that Samuel Clemens or Eric Blair did. Even though Twain and Clemens, and Orwell and Blair are the same person, they render different truth values. Similarly, while the police might suspect John Doe as the murderer they might not suspect that Jim Doe (his alias) is the murderer. As a result, this is not a predicate. Were we to know the identity of [1] (let's suppose it is John Doe) we would have the expression "The police suspect that John Doe is the murderer," and were we to delete "the police" we would be left with the expression "x suspects that John Doe is the murderer," rendering, I think, "suspects that John Doe is the murderer" as the predicate.
F. [1] believes that 4 < 7.
This statement is true of anyone who believes that 4<7, and is false of anyone who does not believe that 4<7. As Mark Twain or Samuel Clemens can be inserted into the expression "[1] wrote a novel" as it is the individual named that is crucial and not how s/he is named, similarly here it can be as well. This is a predicate.
H. It is contingent that [1] is the murderer.
Where in expression A, we agree that the police might suspect that John Doe but not necessarily his alias Jim Doe, in this question it is not how the person is identified but simply that they are, and as a result, whether the murderer is known as Jim Doe or his alias John Doe, it is the person who such various names represent that is seen as the murderer. As a result, this is a predicate.
I. Tom has never met [1].
J. The Pope gave his blessing to [1].
These are predicates. In both of these examples, I think the subjects ("Tom" and "The Pope") might justifiably be deleted rendering our expressions "Tom has never met [1]" as "x has never met y" and "The Pope gave his blessing to [1]" as "x gave his blessing to y."
As for the others, I am not so sure yet...
Correct, I'll try and go into a bit more detail on the others.
Quote:B. It is necessary that [1] = 2.
C. It is necessary that [1]= 1.
A predicate is something that ascribes an object a property, or establishes a relation between two or more objects. The relation being established by these predicates is an identity holding between two objects (the two things on either side of the equals sign). If you where to fully formalise B into predicate logic (bearing in mind that it's a rather troublesome modal claim for predicate calculus to be dealing with) you would get:
∃xPxa
P: It is necessary that [1] = [2]
a: 2
Which reads "There exists an x such that it is necessary that x = 2". We've split the sentence into three parts: 'P' is the predicate, 'a' is a constant, and x is a variable.
If you want to go beyond the logical structure, and into meaning, the predicate, P, is satisfied by an infinite amount of values, any ordered pair <e,f> such that 'e' is identical to 'f' will give us a true sentence when we plug it in to the predicate. Therefore, we say that the semantic value of the predicate P is the set of ordered pairs {<e, f> : e is identical to f}. This is why the definition of a predicate you have been given, as something which yields a truth table, works; although, it's not really correct. Because relations are set theoretic objects, in order to be a relation it must be possible to replace any of the elements in the relation with another thing that is identical to it. This is why {<e, f>: e believes f} is not a relation, because sometimes we can't replace Eric Blair with George Orwell. A good rule for deciding whether or not an English predicate can be formalised into a logical predicate is to ask yourself, "does it express a relation?"
Quote:D. She expects to find [1]
Consider the two sentences:
Oedipus expects to find Jocasta in his bedroom.
Oedipus expects to find his mother in his bedroom.
In the Greek myth, Jocasta is Oedipus' mother, but Oedipus doesn't know this. He may expect to find Jocasta in his bedroom, but not his mother. To put it more formally {<e, f>: e expects to find f} is not a relation.
Quote:E. Prince Charles believes that [1] < 7.
'Belief' doesn't express a relation. Consider what happens when you ask most people, "Do you believe Mount Everest is the highest mountain in the world, or do you believe that Qomolangma is the highest mountain in the world?" Most people will say Everest, not knowing that Qomolangma is the Tibetan name for the same mountain.
I your example, you could plug in pi, or you could plug in "the ratio of a circle's circumference to its diameter". If Prince Charles does not know that pi is defined as the ratio of a circle's circumference to its diameter, then the truth value of the sentence is changed.
Quote:G. If Prince Charles believes that [1] < 7, then 2+2=4.
The If ... then ... bit of the sentence isn't formalised as a predicate, but it expresses a relation between two predicates: "If predicate X is true then predicate Y must be true". The two predicates it expresses a relation ship between are:
Prince Charles believes that [1] < 7 (which we have just shown is not a correct formalisation)
and
2+2=4
This does express a pretty clear cut relation between three objects, "The sum of one object and another object is identical to a third object", and there is no problem in formalising it is a three place predicate letter.
The sentence G as a whole, cannot be formalised as a single predicate letter, it should be formalised into two predicate letters, joined by the logical 'If... then... " symbol (the material conditional).