You seem to be saying that self-reference should be disallowed. That works for curry's paradox, but not for the strengthened liar and many other paradoxes. Besides, by disallowing self-reference, you disallow an infinity of OK statements. You even disallow consciousness in a sense, since it is by definition self referential, since it derives from Tarski's semantically closed thought. That's the big point, and the one that makes me think self-reference should be kept.
And yes, I know P*~P is always false, which is why it's so bad when we have something that says it's true, like a paradox.
And thanks for the link! If anyone wants an overview of the paradox, be sure to check it out!
Ugh. I'm reaallly sorry, I didn't see your post.
Anyway, F => T (False thing implying true thing) is totally different from ~R => W (if it's not raining, then the street is wet.)
All false things are contradictions. A better example, then, is "If it is raining AND NOT raining, then the street is wet." Since I just showed that from any from any contradiction we can derive anything we want, then it is true that "if it is raining and not raining, then the street is wet".
Anyway, with regards to your solution:
The sentence isn't equivalent to "if the moon is made of cheese, then this sentence is true."
I'm afraid I'm not understanding your point, but I'd love to help.
You're right in a sense: the truth of the statement comes from the self-reference. The paradox is
seen in the "If this sentence is true, then the moon is made of cheese" bit, because I proved a contradiction. However, the paradox is totally different from "If it's raining and not
raining, then the moon is made of cheese"- that isn't a paradox at all, since it just shows the problem we have if there's a true false thing. Since there aren't any true false things, we don't have a paradox... except for curry's case...
Once again, I'm really sorry I didn't see your reply... you know how it is.
btw: zenetic: awesome- the Fibonacci sequence... and You thought I wouldn't notice