The Same

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TuringEquivalent
 
Reply Mon 31 May, 2010 06:37 pm
@kennethamy,
kennethamy;171453 wrote:
The concept of change, or the concept of same? Both seem essential to how we think about the world.



It is common to reduce a problem to it ` s parts, and solve the parts. In this case, if you define "the same", to another concept " change", then a solution to the former is obtained given the solution to the latter.

The concept "change" don` t seem to be necessary to me.
 
kennethamy
 
Reply Mon 31 May, 2010 06:41 pm
@TuringEquivalent,
TuringEquivalent;171458 wrote:
It is common to reduce a problem to it ` s parts, and solve the parts. In this case, if you define "the same", to another concept " change", then a solution to the former is obtained given the solution to the latter.

The concept "change" don` t seem to be necessary to me.


All right, but lets hope that you will change your mind.
 
TuringEquivalent
 
Reply Mon 31 May, 2010 07:17 pm
@kennethamy,
kennethamy;171460 wrote:
All right, but lets hope that you will change your mind.


Or perhaps, adopting to a different idea!

I think any proposition that uses the notion of "change" can be reinterpreted to by some other things.
 
Fil Albuquerque
 
Reply Mon 31 May, 2010 07:30 pm
@kennethamy,
kennethamy;170677 wrote:
But the conversation has to be about something, and not consist in just random thoughts about some supposedly philosophical topic. Have you any idea how to draw the distinction (if there is one) between essential and accidental properties? How about presenting it?
 
kennethamy
 
Reply Mon 31 May, 2010 07:38 pm
@Fil Albuquerque,
Fil. Albuquerque;171491 wrote:


An accidental property is supposed to be a property that something does have, but which it need not have in order to be what it is. An essential property is a property that something must have in order for it to be the thing it is. Water may be a solid, or a liquid, or a gas. So whether it is a solid (say) is accidental. But if a substance is water, then it must contain oxygen. So oxygen is an essential property of water.
 
Soul Brother
 
Reply Tue 1 Jun, 2010 02:36 am
@kennethamy,
kennethamy;171161 wrote:
But it is not the same organism qualitatively,


Soul Brother;171183 wrote:
how is it not the same organism qualitatively if they share the same identical DNA?


kennethamy;171209 wrote:
The two copies may be the same in quality, but of course, not in quantity.


You are the one mistaken and you refer to me as not reading straight? you are behaving like a child stubbornly rejecting the truth, why don't you simply admit you are erroneous and avoid further embarrassing yourself?

Soul Brother;171183 wrote:
How are two copies of the same bacteria the same in quantity if they are two separate individual organisms? You must be hallucinating if you are confusing two distinctly unconnected bodies as one.


kennethamy;171209 wrote:
I think that you are not reading straight, and that you are reading what you want to read, not what I have written.


No I am reading straight, and I am not reading what I want to hear I am reading what you have written, look here.

kennethamy;171209 wrote:
But they are the same organism quantitatively, since the baby and the adult are one and the same individual. You have it exactly backwards.


As you can see you are UTTERLY wrong, or as the Austrian Pauli would have said of such stupid malarkey "Das ist nicht nur nicht richtig, es ist nicht einmal falsch!" Baby and adult? one and the same individual?

kennethamy;171209 wrote:
If two organisms share the same DNA they may still not be qualitatively the same if they have qualities other than their DNA, for they may differ in those qualities.


Qualities such as which? the number of protein molecules being carried through the gated transmembrane channels into the intracellular area? are these qualities that we can measure to compare for change?

Admit you are wrong. And that you should not have tried to rectify my proposition since there was nothing to rectify. This is now the third time that you have made a fool of yourself by fabricating errors in a non erroneous proposition simply because you don't want to admit that I am correct. Insanity: doing the same thing over and over again and expecting
different results. - Albert Einstein

Do you see the problem here? you are illusional believing that you are somehow always correct, wake up!
 
Reconstructo
 
Reply Tue 1 Jun, 2010 02:51 am
@kennethamy,
Quote:

4.04 In a proposition there must be exactly as many distinguishable
parts as in the situation that it represents. The two must possess the
same logical (mathematical) multiplicity. (Compare Hertz's Mechanics on
dynamical models.)


4.041 This mathematical multiplicity, of course, cannot itself be the
subject of depiction. One cannot get away from it when depicting.
Wittgenstein ain't always right, in my opinion. (Are we allowed to say this?) But this is interesting. Sometimes Wittgenstein seems nothing like a Platonist & at other times quite so.

I venture to suggest that no two things in nature are identical or the same. I suggest that perfect identity is intuitive, a sort of Platonic Form. Having thought about this sort of thing constantly for months, I suggest there is no better way to see if I'm right. Books are nice, of course. But I sincerely think they can get in the way in a case like this. It's the simplest too obvious things we are dealing with.
:detective:
 
Owen phil
 
Reply Tue 1 Jun, 2010 07:29 am
@Reconstructo,
Reconstructo;171650 wrote:
Wittgenstein ain't always right, in my opinion. (Are we allowed to say this?) But this is interesting. Sometimes Wittgenstein seems nothing like a Platonist & at other times quite so.

I venture to suggest that no two things in nature are identical or the same. I suggest that perfect identity is intuitive, a sort of Platonic Form. Having thought about this sort of thing constantly for months, I suggest there is no better way to see if I'm right. Books are nice, of course. But I sincerely think they can get in the way in a case like this. It's the simplest too obvious things we are dealing with.
:detective:


Our intuitive understanding of identity, is not 'too obvious' to me.

I agree that two different things cannot be identical.
If there is a property that x has and y does not have then they are not identical.
That physical objects occupy different space-time locations, however similar they are otherwise, provides proof that different physical objects are not identical. (some F)(Fx & ~Fy) -> ~(x=y).

'perfect identity' only occurs to itself, ie. a=a and only a=a.
If (a,b,c,..) are each unique and different values (names) of the individual variable, then only (a=a) because, a=b or a=c etc., are false.

x is identical to y, means, a property of x is equivalent to the same property of y, for all properties. ie. x=y defined (All F)(Fx <-> Gx), (Leibniz, I think).

Even this definition of identity has exceptions. ie. It seems to be restricted to extensional properties.

For example:
The number of planets is eight and Necessarily (eight is greater than seven) therefore, Necessarily (the number of planets is greater than seven) ..is false.

(the number of planets) = 8 & [](8>7), implies, [](the number of planets > 7)..is false.

Wittgenstein denied the use of (=) between different names. TLP *5.
But, in the case of described objects, we still need the identity sign (=).

2=2 is not informative, but (1+1=2) or (the sum of 1+1) is 2, is informative.

Another exception to LL, x=y -> (all F)(Fx <-> Fy), is...
(the present king of France)=(the present king of France).

(the present king of France) has the property F <-> (the present king of France) has the property F, is tautologous for all F. But, (the present king of France)=(the present king of France) is contradictory according to Russell's description theory.

(the present king of France)=(the present king of France) <-> (all F)(F(the present king of France) <-> F(the present king of France)), is contradictory.

'Similarity' also seems to be difficult to define. ie Similarity is neither too obvious nor too simple.

Russell defines natural number as: the class of those classes that are similar to it, where similarity is a one to one relation such that.....
That is, 1=(the class of classes that have exactly one member).
X is a unit class, implies, X is a member of 1.

Perhaps we should define x=y as
Necessarily[(x exists) & (y exists) & (all F)(Fx <-> Fy)].

Whatdoyouthink?
 
Fil Albuquerque
 
Reply Tue 1 Jun, 2010 07:49 am
@kennethamy,
kennethamy;171493 wrote:
An accidental property is supposed to be a property that something does have, but which it need not have in order to be what it is. An essential property is a property that something must have in order for it to be the thing it is. Water may be a solid, or a liquid, or a gas. So whether it is a solid (say) is accidental. But if a substance is water, then it must contain oxygen. So oxygen is an essential property of water.


I assume you are speaking metaphorically...because very obviously being a solid, a liquid or a gas, say depending on temperature, is necessarily a very important property of what being water is all about ! ( I get your point well enough but I must disagree with the loose sense in wich you use the word accidental )
 
Krumple
 
Reply Tue 1 Jun, 2010 08:35 am
@kennethamy,
kennethamy;170606 wrote:
The concept of the same is one of the central philosophical concepts with truth, knowledge, and good. What is central is how something can remain the same thing though change (persistence through change). The person is the same person although he is a baby, and adult, and an old person. The beginning of wisdom here is to take note of Wittgenstein's advice not to confuse the concept of the same with the concept of identity. How does something remain self-identical, although, at the same time, it changes?


I object to this. There is not a single thing that stays the same for an individual. What aspect remains the same for a person through out time? It sure is not the personality. It is definitely not physical, every single cell in the body gets replaced over time. So what exactly are you referring to that remains the same?
 
wayne
 
Reply Tue 1 Jun, 2010 10:54 am
@kennethamy,
kennethamy;170673 wrote:
Thoughts about what? Words by themselves seem to trigger you off. The issue, as I have already said, is how to draw the distinction between accidental and essential properties. And that question supposes that there is a real distinction in the first place.


If by essential properties, we are to understand essence, as in the essence of being, this could raise some interesting questions about the human experience.

At my Father's funeral, a few years ago, in conversation with a 90 year old woman I had known for many years, I asked her if she was still the same little girl she had always been. With a twinkle in her eye, she replied that yes she still felt she was that same little girl she had always been.

I take this as a demonstration that the essence of our being remains the same through out our lives. My own perception of my essence is the same as her's was.

Identity seems separate from this essence though. My own identity has changed through out the years. My experiences and growth have caused much change in my identity, although this has had no seeming effect on my essence.

I suppose the question I have, what is that essence that remains the same within us?
 
Twirlip
 
Reply Tue 1 Jun, 2010 12:41 pm
@Owen phil,
Owen;171701 wrote:
Our intuitive understanding of identity, is not 'too obvious' to me.

Nor to me; questions such as this cast me back into a "blooming, buzzing confusion", and I find it easier to type out a passage from Wittgenstein or criticise a point in Frege than to venture any thoughts of my own. So let's have a go at one of yours. Smile
Owen;171701 wrote:
Perhaps we should define x=y as
Necessarily[(x exists) & (y exists) & (all F)(Fx <-> Fy)].

I'm out of my depth here, and won't attempt to comment either on Leibniz's definition, your prefixing 'Necessarily' to it (if it's not there already), or Wittgenstein's rejection of identity as a binary relation. But I do note that you seem to be taking existence as a predicate. Do you mean this?

(Also, any true instance of your x=y would even seem to imply that x, i.e. y, exists necessarily!)
 
Reconstructo
 
Reply Tue 1 Jun, 2010 03:22 pm
@Owen phil,
Owen;171701 wrote:
Our intuitive understanding of identity, is not 'too obvious' to me.

I agree that two different things cannot be identical.
If there is a property that x has and y does not have then they are not identical.
That physical objects occupy different space-time locations, however similar they are otherwise, provides proof that different physical objects are not identical. (some F)(Fx & ~Fy) -> ~(x=y).

'perfect identity' only occurs to itself, ie. a=a and only a=a.
If (a,b,c,..) are each unique and different values (names) of the individual variable, then only (a=a) because, a=b or a=c etc., are false.

x is identical to y, means, a property of x is equivalent to the same property of y, for all properties. ie. x=y defined (All F)(Fx <-> Gx), (Leibniz, I think).

Even this definition of identity has exceptions. ie. It seems to be restricted to extensional properties.

For example:
The number of planets is eight and Necessarily (eight is greater than seven) therefore, Necessarily (the number of planets is greater than seven) ..is false.

(the number of planets) = 8 & [](8>7), implies, [](the number of planets > 7)..is false.

Wittgenstein denied the use of (=) between different names. TLP *5.
But, in the case of described objects, we still need the identity sign (=).

2=2 is not informative, but (1+1=2) or (the sum of 1+1) is 2, is informative.

Another exception to LL, x=y -> (all F)(Fx <-> Fy), is...
(the present king of France)=(the present king of France).

(the present king of France) has the property F <-> (the present king of France) has the property F, is tautologous for all F. But, (the present king of France)=(the present king of France) is contradictory according to Russell's description theory.

(the present king of France)=(the present king of France) <-> (all F)(F(the present king of France) <-> F(the present king of France)), is contradictory.

'Similarity' also seems to be difficult to define. ie Similarity is neither too obvious nor too simple.

Russell defines natural number as: the class of those classes that are similar to it, where similarity is a one to one relation such that.....
That is, 1=(the class of classes that have exactly one member).
X is a unit class, implies, X is a member of 1.

Perhaps we should define x=y as
Necessarily[(x exists) & (y exists) & (all F)(Fx <-> Fy)].

Whatdoyouthink?



Thanks for your detailed reply. I hope I didn't sound rude in my previous post. I feel smacked in the brain by this intuition of unity. But maybe I just need meds.

I think it comes down to our understanding of 1 + 1 = 2. We can change the symbols to other symbols, right? But we understand the one, I think. We simply have to understand the one to understand math at all. (Of course a person could invent a system where identity is just the name for some formal relationship. And one could argue that math is nothing but symbolic manipulation that is not understood- -but that sounds to me like "sex doesn't feel good." Math is high art, in my opinion. ) It would be nothing in this case except a tautology. 1 + 1 = 2 would just define the exchangeability of various symbols. For me, the different number bases really drive the point home. We can write the same number with all sorts of different digits. And this makes good sense to us, I think.

I agree that similarity is difficult, probably because it leaves the ideal realm of perfect identity. I think that unity is difficult because it cannot be defined in other terms. Because it is fundamental to human thought. Unity just is. Like a Platonic form. And identity is just a perfect iteration of this unity. I suggest that quantity runs thru all of human discourse..but that math is refined pure otherwise indeterminate quantity. Math is absolute or undiluted quantity. If it is slightly diluted, it's only because the glyphs we use are contingent. Other symbols would also work.

We call twins identical even though they are only strongly similar. They are identical-enough. You mention the concept of sets. I feel that sets are also an intuitive concept, and this is why its natural to try to found numbers on them. Sets are also unification. The members are thrown into the same imaginary union. All you need for sets is to know whether any possible member is in or out. A binary/boolean bit. Bits are something primary. But that's another thread.

If we say x = y, then we are inventing/suggesting something behind these symbols is the same. Unless we really don't see this there. But I do. And to me this ties in with human abstraction in general. To see what 2 or more things have in common.
 
Deckard
 
Reply Tue 1 Jun, 2010 04:31 pm
@Reconstructo,
What about analogies? When to things are compared through analogy does this point to a sameness of some kind? I would say yes it does. For example an analogy can point to a sameness of appearance or a sameness of structure.
 
Reconstructo
 
Reply Tue 1 Jun, 2010 06:06 pm
@Deckard,
Deckard;171800 wrote:
What about analogies? When to things are compared through analogy does this point to a sameness of some kind? I would say yes it does. For example an analogy can point to a sameness of appearance or a sameness of structure.


I was thinking about metaphor/analogy last night. We circle two objects. We use "is" as an equals sign. Or as an approximately equal sign. And this forces us to abstract what these things have in common, and leave behind what is not in common? basically a Venn diagram --which Euler invented it seems....
 
Arjuna
 
Reply Tue 1 Jun, 2010 07:42 pm
@Reconstructo,
The model we commonly use for reality has the contents of the temporo-spacial domain always in a state of becoming. This is the only thing static about it.

The logical problem this leads to is that we're imagining a progression now. The progression has to end at some point or it will go on infinitely, which is inconceivable.

The cousin to sameness vs difference is unity vs atomism.

So far all science can tell us is that it's both, which is good since neither can stand on its own logically.

Also notice that there's no difference between the points on a circle until you place an x-y axis over it. Now the points can have unique identity. Take away the axis and the circle is once again defined as a line where all the points are equidistant from the center. But there's no way to distinguish between the points on the line. So unique identity is dependent on the application of the axis or cross.

And of course the ultimate definition of any identity is that which is other than its opposite. The ultimate definition of the point at 0 degrees on the circle is: what's left when you subtract out the rest of the circle. Each point on the circle implies the rest of the circle.
 
Deckard
 
Reply Tue 1 Jun, 2010 07:46 pm
@Reconstructo,
Reconstructo;171840 wrote:
I was thinking about metaphor/analogy last night. We circle two objects. We use "is" as an equals sign. Or as an approximately equal sign. And this forces us to abstract what these things have in common, and leave behind what is not in common? basically a Venn diagram --which Euler invented it seems....

One interesting thing about analogy is that it destabilizes assumed notions of sameness usually relies on.

For example

A sea-horse looks like a horse but they have no common ancestor, no common origin. Yet a sea-horse looks the same as a horse in some respects. There's no connection between horses and sea-horses except for appearance.

Or to compare a woman to a rose. There's no genetic or causal connection. They look nothing like each other. Yet both have the power to fascinate and are pleasant to look at. Both are beautiful.

Yes indeed, to analogize is to think abstractly. It is to abstract sameness from two or more things.
 
Owen phil
 
Reply Tue 1 Jun, 2010 08:01 pm
@Twirlip,
Twirlip;171764 wrote:
Nor to me; questions such as this cast me back into a "blooming, buzzing confusion", and I find it easier to type out a passage from Wittgenstein or criticise a point in Frege than to venture any thoughts of my own. So let's have a go at one of yours. Smile

I'm out of my depth here, and won't attempt to comment either on Leibniz's definition, your prefixing 'Necessarily' to it (if it's not there already), or Wittgenstein's rejection of identity as a binary relation. But I do note that you seem to be taking existence as a predicate. Do you mean this?

(Also, any true instance of your x=y would even seem to imply that x, i.e. y, exists necessarily!)




Twirlip:
"But I do note that you seem to be taking existence as a predicate. Do you mean this?"

Yes. x exists, has x as its subject and exists as its predicate.

x exists, is defined as, there is some property which x has.

(x exists) <-> (some F)(Fx), where F is a primary predicate (property) of x.

(some F)(Fx) <-> (Gx v Hx v Kx v ...) <-> (x exists).

Gx -> x exists, for all x ...If x has the property G then x exists.

If (I think) then (I am), is tautologous.
 
Reconstructo
 
Reply Tue 1 Jun, 2010 08:13 pm
@Deckard,
Deckard;171884 wrote:

Or to compare a woman to a rose. There's no genetic or causal connection. They look nothing like each other. Yet both have the power to fascinate and are pleasant to look at. Both are beautiful.

Yes indeed, to analogize is to think abstractly. It is to abstract sameness from two or more things.


Right. I think the phenomenological attack is the best in philosophy. The rose and woman have something about their experienced-form that makes such a metaphor enjoyable. And metaphors are perhaps so rich because sensation itself is rich. Like the objective correlative of T. S. Eliot. We are never finished finding new meanings in metaphors.. Also Nietzsche's first book. The relation of music to myth, dionysos to apollo. Metaphor allows us to say what deader-metaphors (literalized abstractions) cannot say.

It seems to me that pure identity or unity is ordinary human discourse scrubbed of everything sensual and emotional. What 's left is pure concept, pure form. And it is discrete. It is one. I feel that if we scrub any metaphor down to its skeleton, we find a unity, a one, "Being."

---------- Post added 06-01-2010 at 09:16 PM ----------

Arjuna;171879 wrote:

Also notice that there's no difference between the points on a circle until you place an x-y axis over it. Now the points can have unique identity. Take away the axis and the circle is once again defined as a line where all the points are equidistant from the center. But there's no way to distinguish between the points on the line. So unique identity is dependent on the application of the axis or cross.

I think this touches on something I find utterly significant. And that is the relationship of the discrete (unit) and the continuous (perfect curve). Let's just consider the number pi. We intuit a perfect circle but if we apply our intuitive unit to this circle, we get a transcendental number. We intuit perfect continuity on one hand, and utterly perfect identity on the other. These Platonic/Kantian/Hardwired Forms won't gel. And Zeno's paradoxes are all about this, I think.
 
Twirlip
 
Reply Tue 1 Jun, 2010 09:45 pm
@Owen phil,
Owen;171897 wrote:
Twirlip:
"But I do note that you seem to be taking existence as a predicate. Do you mean this?"

Yes. x exists, has x as its subject and exists as its predicate.

x exists, is defined as, there is some property which x has.

(x exists) <-> (some F)(Fx), where F is a primary predicate (property) of x.

(some F)(Fx) <-> (Gx v Hx v Kx v ...) <-> (x exists).

Gx -> x exists, for all x ...If x has the property G then x exists.

If (I think) then (I am), is tautologous.

Aargh, waaaay past my bedtime! Again! So I must be brief. I've heard the slogan (kennethamy quoting Quine?) that to exist is to instantiate (satisfy?) a predicate. (Sorry, KA, if you're out there in limbo, and reading this, and gnashing your teeth at a silly error which you can do nothing to correct!) But I don't understand it. Seems to me that there are all sorts of problems with this. (Also, you didn't respond to my point about the apparent implication of necessary existence.) For one thing, you seem to be defining existence in terms of itself, thus: x exists iff there exists F such that Fx. Is this apparent circularity not real? It also seems to me that in order for the expression Fx to mean anything [the forum doesn't do Quine quasi-quotes, and anyhow I don't know how to use them], because F is not being asserted of the symbol 'x' itself, but rather of whatever x denotes, it must be presupposed that x denotes something, which is surely another way of saying that x exists. So that you would seem to have more than one kind of circularity (unless it's only my tired and addled brain that's going round in circles). And finally, and most immediately (I'm putting these objections in reverse order, for some reason), treating existence as a predicate seems to open you to the subtle fallacies associated with versions of the ontological argument, some of which, at least, Russell's theory of descriptions seems to sort out pretty nicely. (I must admit I haven't studied this stuff properly, but I'm just giving my immediate reactions, which seem natural enough to me. Sorry if, for reasons perhaps obvious to the more informed, they are off-beam.)
 
 

 
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