categories of being

  1. Philosophy Forum
  2. » Metaphysics
  3. » categories of being

Get Email Updates Email this Topic Print this Page

Reply Mon 19 Apr, 2010 06:47 am
This is from wiki Category of being - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

Quote:
Philosophers have many differing views on what the fundamental categories of being are. In no particular order, here are at least some items that have been regarded as categories of being by someone or other:
[edit]Physical objects
Physical objects are beings; certainly they are said to be in the simple sense that they exist all around us. So a house is a being, a person's body is a being, a tree is a being, a cloud is a being, and so on. They are beings because, and in the sense that, they are physical objects. One might also call them bodies, or physical particulars, or concrete things, or matter, or maybe substances (but bear in mind the word 'substance' has some special philosophical meanings).
[edit]MindsClasses
We can talk about all human beings, and the planets, and all engines as belonging to classes. Within the class of human beings are all of the human beings, or the extension of the term 'human being'. In the class of planets would be Mercury, Venus, the Earth, and all the other planets that there might be in the universe. Classes, in addition to each of their members, are often taken to be beings. Surely we can say that in some sense, the class of planets is, or has being. Classes are usually taken to be abstract objects, like sets; 'class' is often regarded as equivalent, or nearly equivalent, in meaning to 'set'. Denying that classes and sets exist is the contemporary meaning of nominalism.
[edit]Properties
The redness of a red apple, or more to the point, the redness all red things share, is a property. One could also call it an attribute of the apple. Very roughly put, a property is just a quality that describes an object. This will not do as a definition of the word 'property' because, like 'attribute', 'quality' is a near-synonym of 'property'. But these synonyms can at least help us to get a fix on the concept we are talking about. Whenever one talks about the size, color, weight, composition, and so forth, of an object, one is talking about the properties of that object. Some-though this is a point of severe contention in the problem of universals -- believe that properties are beings; the redness of all apples is something that is. To deny that universals exist is the scholastic variant of nominalism.
[edit]Relations
An apple sitting on a table is in a relation to the table it sits on. So we can say that there is a relation between the apple and the table: namely, the relation of sitting-on. So, some say, we can say that that relation has being. For another example, the Washington Monument is taller than the White House. Being-taller-than is a relation between the two buildings. We can say that that relation has being as well. This, too, is a point of contention in the problem of universals.
[edit]Space and Time
Space and time are what physical objects are extended into. There is debate as to whether time exists only in the present or whether far away times are just as real as far away spaces, and there is debate as to whether space is curved. Many contemporary thinkers actually suggest that time is the fourth dimension, thus reducing space and time to one distinct ontological entity, the space-time continuum.
[edit]Propositions
Propositions are units of meaning. They should not be confused with declarative sentences, which are just sets of words in languages that refer to propositions. Declarative sentences, ontologically speaking, are thus ideas, a property of substances (minds), rather than a distinct ontological category. For instance, the English declarative sentence "snow is white" refers to the same proposition as the equivalent French declarative sentence "la neige est blanche"; two sentences, one proposition. Similarly, one declarative sentence can refer to many propositions; for instance, "I am hungry" changes meaning (i.e. refers to different propositions) depending on the person uttering it.
[edit]Events
Events are that which can be said to occur. To illustrate, consider the claim "John went to a ballgame"; if true, then we must ontologically account for every entity in the sentence. "John" refers to a substance. But what does "went to a ballgame" refer to? It seems wrong to say that "went to a ballgame" is a property that instantiates John, because "went to a ballgame" does not seem to be the same ontological kind of thing as, for instance, redness. Thus, events arguably deserve their own ontological category.
Properties, relations, and classes are supposed to be abstract, rather than concrete. Many philosophers say that properties and relations have an abstract existence, and that physical objects have a concrete existence. That, perhaps, is the paradigm case of a difference in ways in which items can be said to be, or to have being.
Many philosophers have attempted to reduce the number of distinct ontological categories. For instance, David Hume famously regarded Space and Time as nothing more than psychological facts about human beings, which would effectively reduce Space and Time to ideas, which are properties of humans (substances). Nominalists and realists argue over the existence of properties and relations. Finally, events and propositions have been argued to be reducible to sets (classes) of substances and other such categories.


Which categories do you commit to, and why?
Monism is the belief that there is only one ontological category. pluralism is the belief that there is more than one ontological category. One thing that is interesting about categories are that they are supposed to be fundamental, and unanalyzable. This means that their nature is in some way as self-evident as the axioms of mathematics.


http://www.philosophyforum.com/blogs/turingequivalent/911-categories-being.html
 
Reconstructo
 
Reply Tue 20 Apr, 2010 01:02 am
@TuringEquivalent,
How about the category of categories?
 
TuringEquivalent
 
Reply Tue 20 Apr, 2010 01:37 am
@Reconstructo,
Reconstructo;154360 wrote:
How about the category of categories?


. It is what is called a plurality.
 
Reconstructo
 
Reply Tue 20 Apr, 2010 02:17 am
@TuringEquivalent,
What about categories for the categories of the categories of being? The set of all sets that contain all sets? Is it a member of itself? Or is it a member of the set of sets that are not members of themselves?
 
TuringEquivalent
 
Reply Tue 20 Apr, 2010 02:22 am
@Reconstructo,
Reconstructo;154387 wrote:
What about categories for the categories of the categories of being? The set of all sets that contain all sets? Is it a member of itself? Or is it a member of the set of sets that are not members of themselves?


My bad, it is a "class". If you are committed to classes( or sets), then a class of a class is also a class etc.
 
Owen phil
 
Reply Tue 20 Apr, 2010 03:37 am
@Reconstructo,
Reconstructo;154387 wrote:
What about categories for the categories of the categories of being? The set of all sets that contain all sets? Is it a member of itself? Or is it a member of the set of sets that are not members of themselves?


The set of all sets, V={xMad=x}, exists and it is a member of itself V e V.
See: Quine ..Set Theory and Its Logic, New Foundations.

The set of sets that are not members of themselves, does not exist.
{x:~(x e x)} has no members and is not a member of any set.
 
Reconstructo
 
Reply Tue 20 Apr, 2010 12:36 pm
@Owen phil,
Owen;154394 wrote:

The set of sets that are not members of themselves, does not exist.


Thanks for data, O. Didn't Russell come up with some sort of rule to avoid this paradox? But it's just a dodge. Just as the limit in math is a dodge of the infinitesimal. This takes us to foundational questions. Who sets the law in such matters?
 
ABYA
 
Reply Sun 2 May, 2010 07:18 pm
@Reconstructo,
Turingequivalent wrote
Quote:

Which categories do you commit to, and why?

1= Matter.
2 = Form in matter.
3 = Abstract form.
4 = Essence.
These 4 categories of knowledge dress onto one another

The first 2 categories deal with fact, something all observers can see for themselves. The 3rd gets us on speculative ground and can be divisive, and the 4th category is purely individual.

An example

MATTER = A Man.

FORM IN MATTER = He is a strongman.

ABSTRACT FORM = When we seperate the "form" from "matter", in this example it would be "strength". Abstract form is when we talk about something unconnected to any particular object.

ESSENCE = In this instance, this is something that constitutes the notion of strength to me.

In the first 2 categories we are all in agreement, the 3rd category starts to seperate opinions and by the time we analyse the 4th category, its possible that we all have entirely seperate conclusions.

The first 2 are objective, the second 2 subjective. Something for us to keep in mind when we are trying to prove our point through philosophy.
 
 

 
  1. Philosophy Forum
  2. » Metaphysics
  3. » categories of being
Copyright © 2021 MadLab, LLC :: Terms of Service :: Privacy Policy :: Page generated in 0.02 seconds on 03/07/2021 at 07:23:33