I submitted a similar thread in this category, but I thought I'd ask a more specific question on the free will defense (FWD), especially that given by Plantinga. The argument seems to rest on the assumption that being significantly free is more valuable than not being so. Do you agree? Is this assumption a little hasty? I hesitate to take it a face-value, but I cannot pinpoint what's wrong with it.
The FWD is about the problem of evil. And your question is no different from your other question, as far as I can tell. The idea is that having free will is (1) a necessary condition for being a person, and (2) the existence of person compensates for all the evil done by them. I think that (1) is true, and (2) of course, is a value judgment I happen to agree with. Namely, that it is better for persons to exist than for them not to exist. But, I admit, I might be a little biased.