# P is true based on the non-logical constants in P.

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3. » P is true based on the non-logical constants in P.

Sun 21 Mar, 2010 03:16 am
If P is analytic, and true. There are two possibilities. They are:

1. P is true base on the logical constants in P. This , thus makes P necessary true.

2. P is true based on the non-logical constants in P.

For case 2, it seems P can be necessary true, based on the non-logical terms of P. That is, P is true if and only if it appeals to essential properties. That could only work if essentialism is true.

Question/challenge to you is the following:

Figure out ways for P to be necessary true, or contingent true if P is based on the non-logical terms of P?

kennethamy

Sun 21 Mar, 2010 03:19 am
@TuringEquivalent,
TuringEquivalent;141827 wrote:
If P is analytic, and true. There are two possibilities. They are:

1. P is true base on the logical constants in P. This , thus makes P necessary true.

2. P is true based on the non-logical constants in P.

For case 2, it seems P can be necessary true, based on the non-logical terms of P. That is, P is true if and only if it appeals to essential properties. That could only work if essentialism is true.

Question/challenge to you is the following:

Figure out ways for P to be necessary true, or contingent true if P is based on the non-logical terms of P?

The Sun is either hot or it is not the case that the Sun is hot. I don't see what this has to do with essentialism, though

TuringEquivalent

Sun 21 Mar, 2010 03:47 am
@kennethamy,
kennethamy;141828 wrote:
The Sun is either hot or it is not the case that the Sun is hot. I don't see what this has to do with essentialism, though

That is case 1. I ask for what makes p true for case 2.
You example is necessary true since it is based on the logical form "p or -p".

kennethamy

Sun 21 Mar, 2010 07:15 am
@TuringEquivalent,
TuringEquivalent;141833 wrote:
That is case 1. I ask for what makes p true for case 2.
You example is necessary true since it is based on the logical form "p or -p".

Yes, I agree. But you asked for an example of a necessary truth not using non-logical terms. Maybe, I did not understand what you were asking. The proposition that red is a color is a necessary truth, but not an instance of a logical truth. And, Saul Kripke holds that the proposition I could not have had other parents than those I had is a necessary truth.

TuringEquivalent

Sun 21 Mar, 2010 07:20 am
@kennethamy,
kennethamy;141859 wrote:
Yes, I agree. But you asked for an example of a necessary truth not using non-logical terms. Maybe, I did not understand what you were asking.

I am asking for examples of true p that is based on only it ` s non-logical constants. There are two possibilities: Either P is true necessary, or contingently. Give a story for each. If not, then state why not.

kennethamy

Sun 21 Mar, 2010 07:23 am
@TuringEquivalent,
TuringEquivalent;141860 wrote:
I am asking for examples of true p that is based on only it ` s non-logical constants. There are two possibilities: Either P is true necessary, or contingently. Give a story for each. If not, then state why not.

What is the matter with red is a color? Isn't that a necessary truth?

TuringEquivalent

Sun 21 Mar, 2010 09:02 am
@kennethamy,
kennethamy;141862 wrote:
What is the matter with red is a color?

I never said anything on this matter.

Quote:
Isn't that a necessary truth?

I prefer you write more on why you think "red is a color" is necessary. If your answer is that it is obvious, then you are not making it fun for me.

"red is a color" seems to be true, but there seems to be two ways to interpret the statement.

We can thing of color as a universal, and red as a particular. If so, then does it make sense to call it necessary?

We can also think of P:= red, and q:= a color. Since p is true iff q is true.
It seems perfectly alright to translate that as P is P which is logically necessary, but those that mean the original statement is true based on it logical constants?

kennethamy

Sun 21 Mar, 2010 09:10 am
@TuringEquivalent,
TuringEquivalent;141891 wrote:
I never said anything on this matter.

I prefer you write more on why you think "red is a color" is necessary. If your answer is that it is obvious, then it is unproductive for me, and it is quite useless in philosophy.

It is always difficult to say why a truth is a necessary truth unless it is a logically necessary truth. And some think that there are no necessary truths except for logical truths. I suppose you are one of those people.

TuringEquivalent

Sun 21 Mar, 2010 09:19 am
@kennethamy,
kennethamy;141892 wrote:
It is always difficult to say why a truth is a necessary truth unless it is a logically necessary truth. And some think that there are no necessary truths except for logical truths. I suppose you are one of those people.

No, not at all.

I think there are non-logical truth. Whenever we make the substitution that P is Q, we use non-logical truth. What i don` t know is if these non-logical truth is necessary, or contingent.

kennethamy

Sun 21 Mar, 2010 01:12 pm
@TuringEquivalent,
TuringEquivalent;141896 wrote:
No, not at all.

I think there are non-logical truth. Whenever we make the substitution that P is Q, we use non-logical truth. What i don` t know is if these non-logical truth is necessary, or contingent.

I suppose that depends on the proposition. The proposition that red is a color seems to be a non-logical truth, but necessary.

HexHammer

Sun 21 Mar, 2010 01:56 pm
@kennethamy,
kennethamy;141828 wrote:
The Sun is either hot or it is not the case that the Sun is hot. I don't see what this has to do with essentialism, though
When is it not the case, that a sun isn't hot?

kennethamy

Sun 21 Mar, 2010 03:50 pm
@HexHammer,
HexHammer;141955 wrote:
When is it not the case, that a sun isn't hot?

HexHammer

Sun 21 Mar, 2010 03:59 pm
@kennethamy,
kennethamy;141991 wrote: