Causes are the origin of effects.

Causes are the origin of effects... I.

Alternatives

1. Causes are non-reductive, explanatory ultimates that do not need any explanation in "itself" in the same way that entities are posited in a complete theory of physics.

Causes are true explanations of events.

Assuming that you're still defending the deductive nomological theory of explanation, are you saying that, for example, your visit to a restaurant, on the recommendation of a friend, is the prediction of a logical argument with laws of science as premises?

What does, "prediction of a logical argument" mean?

our knowledge of the laws of nature as they govern human action, leaves a lot to be desired

on the DN model, the causes of the action (beliefs and desires) can be understood (in principle) by in terms of covering laws together with initial conditions.

The claim of the deductive nomological theory is that explanations have the same logical form as predictions.The deductive nomological theory is a theory of scientific explanations, and science has no pretensions of making statements about laws of nature.It's not a matter of "in principle", either science has a law that functions as a premise in an argument predicting your visit to the restaurant or it hasn't. If it has, what is that law?

There might be such laws that are unknown, of whose formulation is too complex to be produced.

Alternatives

1. Causes are non-reductive, explanatory ultimates that do not need any explanation in "itself" in the same way that entities are posited in a complete theory of physics. A common "argument" of the sort appeals to inference to the best explanations. The reason is that it best represent our best scientific intuition of some complete theory of physics. The dispositional properties of say an electron is fully, and completely described by the causal capacity of the electron. The best way to understand this is to see it as natural necessity intrinsic to the electron. This of course commit us to property essentialism.


2. Causes are reductive. There are no causal, physical necessity.
In this view, non-nomic facts in the spatial-temporal manifold fully determine all nomic laws. In other words, two possible worlds with the same events, states of affairs as each other will have the same laws. The common problem for this view is the following: Imagine one worlds with 5 different types particles. There will be interaction between these different types of particles. There would be a law of some form the govern their interaction. Imagine two of these type are very far apart. Intuition tells us that there would be a law that govern what would happen if the two particles do interact, but according to the the reductive view, there is no such law in that world. In some sense, the example suck for it supposes laws is the first place, but it does reveal two things:
1a. physical necessities are intuitive.
2b. Account of laws must support subjunctive conditionals.

2b is most important in my opinion for it seems to hint at the most basic essential difference between the reductive, and non-reductive account of laws. In some sense, 2b hint on 1a for it is based on the intuition that if things are different, the laws would still apply. If one denies 1a, then i suppose he would also have to deny 2b.

Assuming that you're still defending the deductive nomological theory of explanation, are you saying that, for example, your visit to a restaurant, on the recommendation of a friend, is the prediction of a logical argument with laws of science as premises?

Of course. And effects are events that have causes as origins. And, around, and around, we go, and where we stop, nobody knows.

Causes are true explanations of events.

---------- Post added 03-14-2010 at 11:59 AM ----------



Do not need, or do not have, explanations? The first is true, the second is false.

What does, "prediction of a logical argument" mean? But, ideally, the DN model should apply here too. It has been argued, of course, that explanations of human actions are profoundly different from explanations of ordinary physical events, but that is a different matter. Of course, our knowledge of the laws of nature as they govern human action, leaves a lot to be desired. But suppose I explain someones crossing the street by saying, "He wanted to speak to his friend whom he saw across the street". My explanation is in terms of the person's belief (he saw his friend) and desire (he wanted to speak to his friend). And, on the DN model, the causes of the action (beliefs and desires) can be understood (in principle) by in terms of covering laws together with initial conditions.

The question is if cause is explanatory primary without invoking circular reasoning, and introducing more primitives alone the way. In other word, either a concept is primitive, or it is not. It is not good to say A is in some predicate relation to B, since it does not tell us anything more about A, and in addition, B.

There is no free will. It is possible to trace everything any human has ever done to before their first memory.

We would not be able to know anything with certainty if we could not isolate a cause with an effect, and the reason we know so little is that this usually cannot be done, and thus the uncertainty principal which does not deny cause and effect, but only points out how generally impossible it is to know...

This is unrelated to what i said.

Dya think???
Then let me offer a book that tests my ability to understand...It is: Critique of Scientific Reason, by Kurt Hubner; translated by Paul R. Dixon, Jr.. And Hollis M. Dixon....It covers a lot of this stuff, really presumptions science and scientists make in order to make sense of the world, You know, Law of Nature and such.... But since my life is a train wreck, and I am the cause, I may not be able to do you much good..

It is best to realize that "A cause B" implies "B events always follows by A events". There is nothing deep here. The real question is if there is more to the constant conjunction. This is hume` s view, and part of the reductive view of cause. Like i said before, the problem with this view is that it is contra to the intuition that things could be govern by the same laws of nature had things been different. Or, the constant conjunction view does not support counterfactual conditions.

You make no sense at all. What the hell. The topic is about reductive and non-reductive use of the word cause. Do you contribute anything? no. You jump around here, but saying how we need to isolate cause with their effect. It is laughable how this got to do with what i am asking. I don` t care much of your ability to understand, but rather it is your ability to not focus on the topic at hand. Now, you want to give me this?