Different, but the same

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Reply Fri 30 Oct, 2009 10:00 am
The frying pan I just used was very hot, but now it is becoming cooler, and soon, it will be cold again. But it is the very same frying pan. And, if I were on the Moon, I would way much less, but it would still be me. How should we explain, persistence through change? What does it mean for something to be the same, even when it has changed? Aristotle gave one answer. He made a division between essential and accidental properties, and said that as long as the thing retains its essential properties, it is the same thing. But, unless we understand how to distinguish between accidental and essential properties, that is not helpful. So, what does "same thing" mean?
 
TickTockMan
 
Reply Fri 30 Oct, 2009 01:34 pm
@kennethamy,
kennethamy;100662 wrote:
The frying pan I just used was very hot, but now it is becoming cooler, and soon, it will be cold again. But it is the very same frying pan. And, if I were on the Moon, I would way much less, but it would still be me. How should we explain, persistence through change? What does it mean for something to be the same, even when it has changed? Aristotle gave one answer. He made a division between essential and accidental properties, and said that as long as the thing retains its essential properties, it is the same thing. But, unless we understand how to distinguish between accidental and essential properties, that is not helpful. So, what does "same thing" mean?


I would suppose that a distinction needs to be made between "the same thing" and "identical."

Example:

I am at a restaurant and a sign at the door reads, "Breakfast Special: 2 eggs any style, hashbrowns, bacon and your choice of juice - $3.99"

I choose the breakfast special with scrambled eggs and orange juice.
My friend chooses the breakfast special with eggs over easy and tomato juice.

I would say that we have ordered the same thing - the Breakfast Special.
However, our orders were not identical.

The essential property of the Breakfast Special would be that it includes some form of eggs, bacon, hashbrowns, and some form of juice, and the price of $3.99.

The accidental properties of the Breakfast Special are the manner in which the eggs are prepared, and the type of juice chosen.

The essential property of the frying pan is circular shape, raised sides, handle, made of metal of some type. These are the properties we normally associate with frying pans.

The accidental properties of the frying pan would the changes the metal undergoes (and I don't know enough about thermodynamics to describe this process in detail) during the heating and cooling process, and any residue that might be left on it from whatever you cooked.

I would from this argument conclude that "the same thing" means an object that has the properties normally associated, or which more immediately come to mind, with the object being described.

An accidental property might be me cutting my finger and leaving a scar. I'm still TickTockMan, I just have a scar now.

I'm sure I'm overlooking some vital point here, but I haven't quite isolated it yet . . . perhaps this is a good opening gambit though?


TTM
 
chad3006
 
Reply Fri 30 Oct, 2009 01:55 pm
@kennethamy,
All poodles are dogs, but not all dogs are poodles. I suppose it would also depend upon how broadly or narrowly we want do define the characteristics of a frying pan or breakfast special or ourselves. Furthermore, I suppose those definitions may vary depending upon the time, place, and the object being defined.
 
TickTockMan
 
Reply Fri 30 Oct, 2009 05:03 pm
@chad3006,
chad3006;100694 wrote:
All poodles are dogs, but not all dogs are poodles. I suppose it would also depend upon how broadly or narrowly we want do define the characteristics of a frying pan or breakfast special or ourselves. Furthermore, I suppose those definitions may vary depending upon the time, place, and the object being defined.


All Poodles are dogs.
Not all dogs are Poodles.

But no dogs are frying pans.
 
kennethamy
 
Reply Fri 30 Oct, 2009 10:15 pm
@TickTockMan,
TickTockMan;100692 wrote:
I would suppose that a distinction needs to be made between "the same thing" and "identical."

Example:

I am at a restaurant and a sign at the door reads, "Breakfast Special: 2 eggs any style, hashbrowns, bacon and your choice of juice - $3.99"

I choose the breakfast special with scrambled eggs and orange juice.
My friend chooses the breakfast special with eggs over easy and tomato juice.

I would say that we have ordered the same thing - the Breakfast Special.
However, our orders were not identical.

The essential property of the Breakfast Special would be that it includes some form of eggs, bacon, hashbrowns, and some form of juice, and the price of $3.99.

The accidental properties of the Breakfast Special are the manner in which the eggs are prepared, and the type of juice chosen.

The essential property of the frying pan is circular shape, raised sides, handle, made of metal of some type. These are the properties we normally associate with frying pans.

The accidental properties of the frying pan would the changes the metal undergoes (and I don't know enough about thermodynamics to describe this process in detail) during the heating and cooling process, and any residue that might be left on it from whatever you cooked.

I would from this argument conclude that "the same thing" means an object that has the properties normally associated, or which more immediately come to mind, with the object being described.

An accidental property might be me cutting my finger and leaving a scar. I'm still TickTockMan, I just have a scar now.

I'm sure I'm overlooking some vital point here, but I haven't quite isolated it yet . . . perhaps this is a good opening gambit though?


TTM


You are right to distinguish between "indentical" and, "the same". "Identical" means "one and the same" (sometimes called, numerically identical"). For instance, the copy of Tom Sawyer I took to read on the picnic was identical, numerically the same as the copy I had on my shelf. But the copy of Tom Sawyer you are reading, is different from my copy. It is the same book, but not numerically the same. There are two different books.

But the question is (turning to frying pans) what makes my frying pan numerically different from your frying pan? After all, your frying pan and my frying pan both are circular shape, raised sides, handle, made of metal of some type. But, nevertheless, they are numerically different frying pans. There are two frying pans, and not just one. So, those properties cannot be the essential properties on my frying pan as contrasted with yours. But my original question was whether the my frying pan when hot is the very same (numerically identical with) the frying pan when cold.
 
jgweed
 
Reply Sat 31 Oct, 2009 06:20 am
@kennethamy,
Suppose, though, that the "sameness" does not reside in the object (and here science tells us that objects always change, even if minutely), but in us, and how we understand the being of objects, or what it means for an object to "be"? And if this is the case, don't we have different criteria for different kinds of objects in our world? The sameness of the frying pan is surely different from the sameness of a close friend we meet after a ten-year separation.
 
kennethamy
 
Reply Sat 31 Oct, 2009 07:52 am
@jgweed,
jgweed;100791 wrote:
Suppose, though, that the "sameness" does not reside in the object (and here science tells us that objects always change, even if minutely), but in us, and how we understand the being of objects, or what it means for an object to "be"? And if this is the case, don't we have different criteria for different kinds of objects in our world? The sameness of the frying pan is surely different from the sameness of a close friend we meet after a ten-year separation.


That objects always change is just the issue. The question is (again) how it is possible that they change, but yet remain the same object. I am obviously assuming persistence through change. That I, on the Moon where I would weigh less than on Earth, and I on Earth where I would weigh more than on the Moon, am the very same individual.

Frying pans are different from people. I will concede that. But why would the notion of identity be any different?
 
YumClock
 
Reply Sat 31 Oct, 2009 10:35 am
@kennethamy,
The sameness certainly does not reside in the object. If a factory makes both pots and pans from the same load of iron, it does not mean that the pots and pans are the same. Human beings give inanimate objects identity.
The identity only stands if the judging human has seen a previous identity of the object. For example, a purchaser of a frying pan will only see a frying pan, but a factory worker at the same store will see it as both iron and pan.
 
kennethamy
 
Reply Sat 31 Oct, 2009 10:40 am
@YumClock,
YumClock;100832 wrote:
The sameness certainly does not reside in the object. If a factory makes both pots and pans from the same load of iron, it does not mean that the pots and pans are the same. Human beings give inanimate objects identity.
The identity only stands if the judging human has seen a previous identity of the object. For example, a purchaser of a frying pan will only see a frying pan, but a factory worker at the same store will see it as both iron and pan.


So is the frying pan the identical frying pan when hot as when cool? Let's suppose the pan is not judged by any person. No person sees it. Is there, then, according to you, no answer to that question? Suppose a star too far away to be observed is first hot, and it then cools. It it not the same star both times? Of does it keep being a different star with each degree of cooling? How would that depend on an observer when there is no observer?
 
YumClock
 
Reply Sat 31 Oct, 2009 12:00 pm
@kennethamy,
I accept that there is no answer to that question.
The previous things that defined a frying pan - shape, size, handle - are dependent on the observer. With no observer, these qualities of a frying pan would not exist. True, the frying pan would still have a configuration in space-time, but its circular shape would no longer matter.
With no definitions or guidelines set by an observing sentient mind, it is impossible to say when the star would become truly different.
 
kennethamy
 
Reply Sat 31 Oct, 2009 01:09 pm
@YumClock,
YumClock;100844 wrote:
I accept that there is no answer to that question.
The previous things that defined a frying pan - shape, size, handle - are dependent on the observer. With no observer, these qualities of a frying pan would not exist. True, the frying pan would still have a configuration in space-time, but its circular shape would no longer matter.
With no definitions or guidelines set by an observing sentient mind, it is impossible to say when the star would become truly different.


Are you saying there would be no frying pan without an observer? For every frying pan must have some shape, and size, etc. Whether they matter or not is irrelevant.
As for the star, isn't it different when it cools then when it is hot. The star is not a different star, but its temperature is different. You have to distinguish between whether the identity of the star changes from whether the star's qualities change. That is the difference between numerical identity and qualitative identity. I already mentioned that.
 
YumClock
 
Reply Sun 1 Nov, 2009 10:56 am
@kennethamy,
Every frying pan has a shape and size, but these things do not grant an identity.
 
kennethamy
 
Reply Sun 1 Nov, 2009 11:19 am
@YumClock,
YumClock;101019 wrote:
Every frying pan has a shape and size, but these things do not grant an identity.


No, they do not. But, unless frying pan X and frying pan Y have the same shape and size, X and Y are not identical. Having the same properties is a necessary condition of identity, although (perhaps) not a sufficient condition of identity.
 
Zetherin
 
Reply Sun 1 Nov, 2009 11:37 am
@kennethamy,
kennethamy;100803 wrote:
That objects always change is just the issue. The question is (again) how it is possible that they change, but yet remain the same object.


That is not the question (or maybe what I'm about to say is what you meant, but it wasn't clear). Because, obviously, they do not remain the same object. What does remain, is the identity we have assigned the object. And that, I think, to a large degree, can be explained through sentimentality.
 
kennethamy
 
Reply Sun 1 Nov, 2009 11:46 am
@Zetherin,
Zetherin;101031 wrote:
That is not the question (or maybe what I'm about to say is what you meant, but it wasn't clear). Because, obviously, they do not remain the same object. What does remain, is the identity we have assigned the object. And that, I think, to a large degree, can be explained through sentimentality.


I am the one and the same object who weighs less on the Moon than on Earth. And as someone mentioned, if I have a scar on my hand I did not have last week, I am the same object today as last week. (I do not know what you mean by the identity we have assigned). The issue is how it is that something persists through change. So that something can be qualitatively different, yet quantitatively (numerically) the same.
 
YumClock
 
Reply Sun 1 Nov, 2009 12:00 pm
@kennethamy,
But if identity does not exist as anything more than a thought, then there would be no set way to define things as "the same" or "different."

Imagine two frying pans, one metal, one made out of leaves. If every quality of the two pans was identical save the material, then the leaf frying pan would still not be a frying pan. A frying pan is a pan you can fry on, and frying is a human invention and concept.
In this case, the identity of the object is meaningless in a universal sense. The identity of the frying pan is mere thought.

So whomever looks at a star and thinks it is different is correct. And anyone who looks at the same star and deems it the same is correct.
 
kennethamy
 
Reply Sun 1 Nov, 2009 12:13 pm
@YumClock,
YumClock;101040 wrote:
But if identity does not exist as anything more than a thought, then there would be no set way to define things as "the same" or "different."

Imagine two frying pans, one metal, one made out of leaves. If every quality of the two pans was identical save the material, then the leaf frying pan would still not be a frying pan. A frying pan is a pan you can fry on, and frying is a human invention and concept.
In this case, the identity of the object is meaningless in a universal sense. The identity of the frying pan is mere thought.

So whomever looks at a star and thinks it is different is correct. And anyone who looks at the same star and deems it the same is correct.


I don't know what you mean by "identity does not exist as anything more than a thought", but two objects can be identical and we not think they are (e.g. the author of the Illiad, and the author of the Odyssey) and we may think that two things are identical, and they may not be identical, (as in the case of twins). So, whether two things are identical or not has nothing to do with whether they are thought to be identical.
 
YumClock
 
Reply Sun 1 Nov, 2009 12:19 pm
@kennethamy,
While I do think there is a difference between the identity of living and nonliving things, I see your point.
So what is the main deciding factor in differentiating between living creatures?
 
kennethamy
 
Reply Sun 1 Nov, 2009 12:23 pm
@YumClock,
YumClock;101045 wrote:
While I do think there is a difference between the identity of living and nonliving things, I see your point.
So what is the main deciding factor in differentiating between living creatures?


Whether they are living or not, two objects cannot be identical if they have different properties. If I smoke a pipe, and you do not smoke a pipe, then you and I are not the same individual. If you are 5 feet tall, and I am 6 feet tall, we are not the same individual.
 
YumClock
 
Reply Sun 1 Nov, 2009 07:57 pm
@kennethamy,
So what is the difference between twins?
If neither has been physically damaged and both siblings have been brought up in the same household, their physical properties should be very similar. The only thing truly different would be their minds, which is a very small change in the physical structure of their brains.
Different objects made from the same mold can have larger differences than the proposed twins in their physical properties, yet they are still called identical.
 
 

 
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