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Yogi DMT
 
Reply Mon 8 Jun, 2009 08:22 pm
@deepthot,
My take on this is there are two types of existence, tangible and mental. First, we have to establish that we are actually real, are thoughts are real, and the world we live in is real. We cannot prove this except to accept this and live off of what we're pretty sure is. Mental existence includes any type of idea, relations, or law. These are created and formed within our heads and amongst ourselves. The only way we come to agreement on these mental existences is if our logic and unite and bring together acceptable and common thoughts. Mental existence can always be disagreed upon or contested making it a less real type of existence. Tangible existence is the world around us, the world we live in. Mental existences are based of these environmental existences meaning that we need tangible existance to function in society. These tangible existences tend to be physical and are less of an opinion but more of a fact. Objects such as chairs, are just there, with nothing else to it. You could contest that idea but you'd be plain wrong unless your not following a common set of logic, example: i believe that the phrase a chair is there means a chair is NOT there. Once you've both established the same train of thought you can both say for sure that this physical object exists. To conclude, i would rather simply the situation, what was written in the original topic made some good points, this is my take on existence.
 
kennethamy
 
Reply Mon 8 Jun, 2009 08:29 pm
@Yogi DMT,
Yogi DMT;67561 wrote:
My take on this is there are two types of existence, tangible and mental. .



First of all, atoms, and electrons are not tangible. At least I have never touched an electron. Have you? Yet, electrons and atoms exist. So there must be some things that exist that are not tangible.

Second of all, even if you were correct, that would not mean there are two types of existence. What is would mean is that there are two kinds of things that exist. Mental and tangible. But those would not be two types of existence, would they?
 
Yogi DMT
 
Reply Mon 8 Jun, 2009 08:37 pm
@deepthot,
I guess not if you want to play with wordings, Two kinda of things that exist might seem more correct. Electrons, atoms, sub-atomic particles are there, they indisputably exist, even if us humans are too big to interact with the, directly. I am using tangible as more of physical existence than a literally meaning of you being able to touch an electron. I think your missing my point and what I'm getting at. The self-created ideas, laws, values, emotions, ect. that we share or do not fit under one category while certain concepts do not exist in our mind such as a chair, another universe that we cannot touch, or even an electron that we cannot touch, these idea fit into the other category. Maybe that will clear this up for you.
 
kennethamy
 
Reply Mon 8 Jun, 2009 08:49 pm
@Yogi DMT,
Yogi DMT;67565 wrote:
I guess not if you want to play with wordings, Two kinda of things that exist might seem more correct. Electrons, atoms, sub-atomic particles are there, they indisputably exist, even if us humans are too big to interact with the, directly. I am using tangible as more of physical existence than a literally meaning of you being able to touch an electron. I think your missing my point and what I'm getting at. The self-created ideas, laws, values, emotions, ect. that we share or do not fit under one category while certain concepts do not exist in our mind such as a chair, another universe that we cannot touch, or even an electron that we cannot touch, these idea fit into the other category. Maybe that will clear this up for you.


I am not "playing at wordings". I am reading what you wrote, and trying to understand it. I am not a mind-reader. The concept, chair is in our mind, but chairs are not in our mind, are they?
What you write leaves me even more confused. Especially about that other universe we cannot touch. What is that supposed to be?

What about these alleged two types of existence. Are they still around?
 
Yogi DMT
 
Reply Mon 8 Jun, 2009 08:57 pm
@kennethamy,
I am not "playing at wordings". - YOU: "would not mean there are two types of existence. What is would mean is that there are two kinds of things that exist"

I am reading what you wrote, and trying to understand it. I am not a mind-reader. The concept, chair is in our mind, but chairs are not in our mind, are they? The idea of chair chair being there is in our minds, is it not?


What you write leaves me even more confused. Especially about that other universe we cannot touch. What is that supposed to be? - This is what you proposed to disprove my post. You decided to take tangible as a literal meaning therefore atoms are too small to touch and universes are to big, simple enough

What about these alleged two types of existence. Are they still around? - You lost me there??? What's your question?
 
kennethamy
 
Reply Mon 8 Jun, 2009 09:32 pm
@Yogi DMT,
Yogi DMT;67573 wrote:
I am not "playing at wordings". - YOU: "would not mean there are two types of existence. What is would mean is that there are two kinds of things that exist"

I am reading what you wrote, and trying to understand it. I am not a mind-reader. The concept, chair is in our mind, but chairs are not in our mind, are they? The idea of chair chair being there is in our minds, is it not?


What you write leaves me even more confused. Especially about that other universe we cannot touch. What is that supposed to be? - This is what you proposed to disprove my post. You decided to take tangible as a literal meaning therefore atoms are too small to touch and universes are to big, simple enough

What about these alleged two types of existence. Are they still around? - You lost me there??? What's your question?


The idea of a chair is in our minds; chairs are not. They are too big to fit in our head.

What is the universe we cannot touch? Is there such a universe?

So, what kinds of existence do you still suppose there are, if you do?

My take on this is there are two types of existence, tangible and mental.

You did write the above, didn't you? (You must remember). So I am asking you whether these two types of existence are still hanging around. As I pointed out, those are not "types of existence"; those are types of things that exist. There are lots of kinds of things that exist. Ships, and fish, and pains, and numbers, etc. But they all just exist.
 
Yogi DMT
 
Reply Tue 9 Jun, 2009 05:01 am
@kennethamy,
The idea of a chair is in our minds; chairs are not. They are too big to fit in our head. - Why do i try? There's no point Sad

Also i think it's safe to say that numbers exist as an idea within most if nt all of our heads while fish exist in our world and are indisputably there.
 
deepthot
 
Reply Wed 10 Jun, 2009 01:31 am
@kennethamy,
kennethamy;67549 wrote:
Or even wrong. As I said.

---------- Post added at 09:50 PM ---------- Previous post was at 09:49 PM ----------



Only, philosophy is not physics. And what is supposed to be the matter with the old terminology?


Philosophy is not physics, you say.

NO KIDDING?

The old terminology is vague and ambiguous. It is not part of a frame of reference. And it is imprecise.

My new terminology sharpens it up a bit, and imbeds it withing a coherent system, a framework for understanding. It offers a meta-language, namely value theory. For modes of being, and categories of subsistence, are kinds of value. They all have some value, and it takes an axiology to explain them.
 
kennethamy
 
Reply Wed 10 Jun, 2009 09:28 am
@Yogi DMT,
Yogi DMT;67628 wrote:
The idea of a chair is in our minds; chairs are not. They are too big to fit in our head. - Why do i try? There's no point Sad

Also i think it's safe to say that numbers exist as an idea within most if nt all of our heads while fish exist in our world and are indisputably there.


If you think that the idea of a chair, and a chair are the same thing, then I don't suppose there is a point. Ideas are in the head. What they are ideas of, are not.

Numbers do not exist as an idea, since numbers are not ideas, and the only things that "exist as ideas" are ideas. Numbers are not ideas, thus, they do not exist as ideas. But, I agree, the idea of the number three exists as an idea. How else? But I thought we were talking about numbers, not the ideas of numbers. Looks like you are confusing the idea of a number with a number. Just as you confused the idea of a chair with a chair.
 
deepthot
 
Reply Thu 11 Jun, 2009 01:00 pm
@kennethamy,
I would like to suggest that ideas only consist, and that what is perceived by the senses exists.

This proposed usage will in the long run avoid confusions that arise from an ambiguous use of language.

The results of conceptualization consist (in minds), but the results of perceiving exist (out in the world). And then there is experience - which integrates the other two.

S: conception
E: perception
I: experience.

These are on a spectrum, from least value to most. ...S being the least.

What exists, I claimed, is what is localized in space and time.
In my mini-ontology I distinguished between subsistents: those entities which are logically-conceivable; and existents: those which exist.

Attributes (the names of properties) merely subsist, while wholes (facts) exist. I grant that abstract entities may exist; but not ideas. For they have no location in space nor in time.
 
kennethamy
 
Reply Thu 11 Jun, 2009 02:48 pm
@deepthot,
deepthot;68329 wrote:
I would like to suggest that ideas only consist, and that what is perceived by the senses exists.

This proposed usage will in the long run avoid confusions that arise from an ambiguous use of language.

The results of conceptualization consist (in minds), but the results of perceiving exist (out in the world). And then there is experience - which integrates the other two.

S: conception
E: perception
I: experience.

These are on a spectrum, from least value to most. ...S being the least.

What exists, I claimed, is what is localized in space and time.
In my mini-ontology I distinguished between subsistents: those entities which are logically-conceivable; and existents: those which exist.

Attributes (the names of properties) merely subsist, while wholes (facts) exist. I grant that abstract entities may exist; but not ideas. For they have no location in space nor in time.



What does it mean to "consist"? In English, X consists of other things? Like, cakes consist of flour, eggs, and sugar. What do ideas consist of? And if idea consist of something else, then don't ideas exist?

Attributes cannot be names of anything. Red is an attribute of apples, but red is not a name. What is it a name of? The word, "red" is a name. Only words are names.

Why must everything that exists be in space and time? Where did that revelation come from? Not Mt.Sinai.
 
jeeprs
 
Reply Sat 13 Jun, 2009 04:35 am
@deepthot,
A relevant quote from the scholastics:

1. Intelligible objects must be independed of particular minds because they are common to all who think. In coming to grasp them, an individual mind does not alter them in any way; it cannot convert them into its exclusive possessions or transform them into parts of itself. Moreover, the mind discovers them rather than forming or constructing them, and its grasp of them can be more or less adequate. Augustine concludes from these observations that intelligible objects canno be part of reason's own nature or be produced by reason out of itself. They must exist independently of individual human minds.

2. Intelligible objects must be incorporeal (see below) because they are eternal and immutable. By contrast, all corporeal objects, which we perceive by means of the bodily senses, are contingent and mutable. Moreover, certain intelligible objects - for example, the indivisible mathematical unit - clearly cannot be found in the corporeal world (since all bodies are extended, and hence divisible.) These intelligible objects cannot therefore be perceived by means of the senses; they must be incorporeal and perceptible by reason alone.

3. Intelligible objects must be higer than reason because they judge reason. Augustine means by this that these intelligible objects constitute a normative standard against which our minds are measured. We refer to mathematical objects and truths to judge whether or not, and to what extent, our minds understand mathematics. We consult the rules of wisdom to judge whether or not, and to what extent, a person is wise. In light of these standards, we can judge whether our minds are as they should be. It makes no sense, however, to ask wiether these normative intelligible objects as they should be; they simply are and are normative for other things. In virtue of their normative relation to reason, Augustine argues that these intelligible objects must be higher than it, as a judge is higher than what it judges. Moreover, he believes that apart from the special sort of relation they bear to reason, the intrinsic nature of these objects shows them to be higher than it. These sorts of intelligible objects are eternal and immutable; by contrast, the human mind is clearly mutable. Augustine holds that since it is evident to all who consider it that the immutable is clearly superior to the mutable (it is among the rules of wisdom he identifies), it follows that these objects are higher than reason.
 
kennethamy
 
Reply Sat 13 Jun, 2009 09:05 am
@jeeprs,
jeeprs;68745 wrote:
A relevant quote from the scholastics:

1. Intelligible objects must be independed of particular minds because they are common to all who think. In coming to grasp them, an individual mind does not alter them in any way; it cannot convert them into its exclusive possessions or transform them into parts of itself. Moreover, the mind discovers them rather than forming or constructing them, and its grasp of them can be more or less adequate. Augustine concludes from these observations that intelligible objects canno be part of reason's own nature or be produced by reason out of itself. They must exist independently of individual human minds.

2. Intelligible objects must be incorporeal (see below) because they are eternal and immutable. By contrast, all corporeal objects, which we perceive by means of the bodily senses, are contingent and mutable. Moreover, certain intelligible objects - for example, the indivisible mathematical unit - clearly cannot be found in the corporeal world (since all bodies are extended, and hence divisible.) These intelligible objects cannot therefore be perceived by means of the senses; they must be incorporeal and perceptible by reason alone.

3. Intelligible objects must be higer than reason because they judge reason. Augustine means by this that these intelligible objects constitute a normative standard against which our minds are measured. We refer to mathematical objects and truths to judge whether or not, and to what extent, our minds understand mathematics. We consult the rules of wisdom to judge whether or not, and to what extent, a person is wise. In light of these standards, we can judge whether our minds are as they should be. It makes no sense, however, to ask wiether these normative intelligible objects as they should be; they simply are and are normative for other things. In virtue of their normative relation to reason, Augustine argues that these intelligible objects must be higher than it, as a judge is higher than what it judges. Moreover, he believes that apart from the special sort of relation they bear to reason, the intrinsic nature of these objects shows them to be higher than it. These sorts of intelligible objects are eternal and immutable; by contrast, the human mind is clearly mutable. Augustine holds that since it is evident to all who consider it that the immutable is clearly superior to the mutable (it is among the rules of wisdom he identifies), it follows that these objects are higher than reason.


What is an "intelligible object" and how is so much known about them? (If it is).
 
jeeprs
 
Reply Sat 13 Jun, 2009 05:37 pm
@deepthot,
I think mathematical and scientific laws, and the idea of the lawful behaviour of nature, originated in this understanding of 'intelligibility' (which was based on Augustine's reading of Platonism and is seminal in the history of Western philosophy).

So, in direct answer to your question, an example of an 'intelligible object' is a number - any number, or the concept of 'number'. If you read the passage above again, substituting the term 'number' for 'intelligible object', it has much the same meaning. And indeed the text does refer to mathematical order as an example of 'intelligibility'.

Going back to the original post in this thread, then:

Ephemeralities tend to desist.
Essences consist
Existents exist
Realities persist.

Perhaps it could be said that mathematical order is, then, an attribute of reality, however not of existents.

The original post says that existents are 'countable' - that is, one of the characteristics of any existent is that it can be counted (because to be counted something must be separable and distinguishable from other things, which is the root meaning of 'exist': ex=apart from ist=be.)

But for anything to be counted, there must be an intelligence capable of counting - in this case, human intelligence. However the numerical relations of objects - that is, numbers - are pre-existent. They are recognised by human intelligence, but not devised by human intelligence as indeed Augustine shows when he says: "Intelligible objects [and indeed numbers] must be independent of particular minds because they are common to all who think" (my insertion).

Ergo, the assertion that 'numbers exists in the mind' is false. Numbers are instrinsic to the nature of reality. Certainly, one must be intelligent to comprehend numbers, but they are pre-existent: discovered, not devised. I suggest that this is why Pythaogoras and Plato (and, later, Augustine) understood mathematics to be an aspect of the 'divine intelligence'. And finally, this is where I differ with the original assertion that 'an idea is mental construct'. But I won't go into that here.
 
BrightNoon
 
Reply Tue 16 Jun, 2009 08:01 pm
@deepthot,
deepthot;66493 wrote:
To say something exists means what?
Some claim that "an idea exists; and a table exists.
Both exist ...but in a different way."

I disagree that "an idea exists." Why do I say that?

An idea only consists as a construction, a stipulation, of a mind. It is a mental construct.


I disagree with the statement 'a table exists' unless it means that the table exists in the same way that an idea exists, i.e. as a mental construction. The statement 'some things exist which are not mental constructions' is a meaningless and unverifiable statement: meaningless because we cannot, by definition, know what something which is not a mental construction is (looks, feels, smells, sounds, tastes like), and unverifiable because, again, we do not know what such a thing is, so how could we show that it exists? An ontology based on a division between 'real' (table) and 'imaginary/mental' (memory of table) modes of existence is contradictory, as the only concievable basis for the knowing that the formr exist, is if the former are in fact the latter: i.e. physical objects are in fact thought, mental images, etc. To arrive at a 'real,' physical world outiside of experience and thought requires the assumption that there is such a world (which most are willing to make) and moreover, the assumption that, if existent, that world exist for every perspective (objectively) as it appears to us. That is a very bold and foolish assumption in my opinion.

Thanks
 
deepthot
 
Reply Tue 16 Jun, 2009 11:39 pm
@deepthot,
Bright wrote: "I disagree with the statement 'a table exists' unless it means that the table exists in the same way that an idea exists...."

I detect here a confusion between the intension of a concept and a referent of the extension.

I say a specific heavy footstool exists, and if while moving through a darkened room, you happen to trip over that footstool, landing flat on your nose, you will know it exists.

Is that footstool any different, with respect to being a physical object with a location in space and time, than the table in that earlier illustration? I think not.

However ideas, being intangible, may trip one up, but in an entirely distinct manner.from the material, empirical thing. The idea of a table is not a table -- except perhaps to Bishop Berkley and his followers.

The idea and the actual table are on differing levels of abstraction, and should not be confused. It is well for us to be aware of, and to keep clear on, different levels of abstraction. Sometimes we deliberately merge them in common speech but Russell & Whitehead's Ramified Theory of Types helps us to explain how it may make sense for a store-clerk to assert, It's in stock but it's out of stock. I.e., it is not on the shelf available for sale, but we carry it in stock. Or the corpse in a play is both alive and dead - Alive in one sense; dead in another.
Or a nurse is on duty, but asleep on the desk.
 
BrightNoon
 
Reply Wed 17 Jun, 2009 06:12 pm
@deepthot,
Deepthot,

First, let me say there is no confusion on my part. I understand your view and I have another. In any case, here is the issue as I see it. The thought-table and the trip-table are not the same; they have different characteristics. I do not claim otherwise. The issue is, roughly put, 'where' they exist: in the mind/consciousness/experience, or in a physical reality independent of consciousness. I am suggesting that both tables exist in consciousness only, as far as we know or could know anyhow. If there is a table existing outside of consciousness, we have never come across it, nor could we. But there is still a difference between the two tables; what is that difference? The thought-table is a higher order mental construction derived form the lower order trip-table; to generalize, thoughts consists of complexes of sensations. The difference between thought and sensation is one of degree or complexity, whereas the difference between thought and sensation on the one hand, and an independent physical reality on the other, is a difference of kind. The former is the only kind we know, experiential. The other we can only imagine, or rather think we imagine; it is by definition impossible to imagine this world because it is defined as 'that which is outside experience.'
 
deepthot
 
Reply Thu 18 Jun, 2009 05:32 pm
@BrightNoon,
BrightNoon;69968 wrote:
Deepthot,

...here is the issue as I see it. The thought-table and the trip-table are not the same; they have different characteristics. I do not claim otherwise. The issue is, roughly put, 'where' they exist: in the mind/consciousness/experience, or in a physical reality independent of consciousness. I am suggesting that both tables exist in consciousness only....



We agree that all of us are projecting our own reality; and that life is consciousness.

I just hope that you don't "waste the dawn." :whistling:

It sounds like one who takes a position like this can't tell if he is awake or still just dreaming that he is. Smile
 
kennethamy
 
Reply Thu 18 Jun, 2009 11:58 pm
@deepthot,
deepthot;70182 wrote:
We agree that all of us are projecting our own reality; and that life is consciousness.




I think you must mean that sometimes we have different views about what is happening. Not that we have our own reality literally. Reality is what actually exists, and what actually is happening. But sometimes we make mistakes about what exists and actually is happening. But that is because what we think exists and is happening is not true.
 
Zetetic11235
 
Reply Sat 20 Jun, 2009 01:52 am
@kennethamy,
If something has a sense to it, that is, if something is set of identifiable attributes, then it can exist. What necessarily exists is the logical form of the event or object. Whether the logical form of the object is manifest in such a way that it can be interacted with in the standard sense(if you can experience it with your 5 senses without simply amalgamating past experience in your mind to create the idea of the object) does not directy play into the identity of the object itself.

Anything that is a logically coherent idea/form could possibly exist; you are simply suggesting that we should divide various objects into classes based on a single attribute that any logical form has built into it, that it can exist, on the pretext that there is some logical polychotomy that is not really there.

The reason that we can only talk about an object in terms of its possible existence or its actual existence, but not its nonexistence is because nonexistence is not verifiable nor is it logically necessary(built into the logical form of an object/event, unless it is senseless, like a square circle), so it cannot be logically determined in any absolute manner. It might be practically determined to a practical degree of certainty, but the idea of Axiology is to apply the solidarity that comes from logical certainty, is it not? So if an idea has a set of logically possible attributes, then you can only grant either that it possibly exists in the usual way, so that any object of descrptive thought(so we exclude thoughts that are simply syntax with no sense objects behind them) must be placed in the same category with a 'real' object, differing only in that they have been verified.

So the ontology breaks down to objects that are verified and ones that are not.

As far as numbers go, I would say that the aspect of countability is built into the logical form of an object. The number system is just linguistic, more for communication purposes, but the property of countability is intrinsic in every object that we can count. Because the logical form of the action that is counting exists, and we have a situation that permits its application, the logical form of counting can be superimposed on the presence of objects that can be counted and from this we derive the 'practical idea' of counting. Or the idea of counting as we generally use it.

Just my take:).
 
 

 
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