Well, considering that the exact physical processes are not totally known, how would you suggest this be answered? Also, by your definition, the process of pressure changing the atomic makeup of a rock is not necessarily hyper complex(a dubious term considering what you mean by it).

I wonder, how can you verify that something is necessarily hyper complex? What phenomena have we been totally unable to model to any degree of accuracy(and not just because no efforts have been made) that might clarify exactly what the property of hyper complexity entails?

I think that we currently lack the tools to develop a any sort of accurate model of the physical processes that would result in certain cultural tendencies. Neuroscience is still in its infancy.

What we do have is a tool set that can give us a social/linguistic explanation, but you seem to be going where I'm going here (by speaking of 'hypercomplexity'), that the (currently)correct approach to this problem is not found in physical science.

Your general theory of the mind is one that I essentially share. As far as social games, of course this is true, but I don't know if I would call it delusion. It essentially relies on a general cultural understanding( due to cultural conditioning) that has psychological(neurological++) underpinnings. Many concepts do not exist without a social context, such as the notion of power as something abstract(not just strength or brute force). The social game is one that is so strictly enforced that one rarely(if ever) has the opportunity to leave it, and if he does, he must leave behind any trace of social interaction.

In systems theory, if I can use Davidson's Triangulation as an example of a system for simplicity's sake, there is a valuation that occurs immediately when the object of investigation is determined. In this case, it is epistemology (e.g. the community justifying the intersubjective world) , the thing , whereupon the object takes on a secondary consideration (e.g. physical tools, cars, airplanes, pictures etc.). The subjects are considered in a metaphysical way because this is an epistemic study. The object sheds everything but what the subjects take into account while coming to some sort of agreement on it's mapping. The neurology is completely shed from the triangle. The quantum probabilities are shed as well. Linguistics creeps in because it is the mode of communication to justify the outside world within a community. You get the idea. This happens in any system employing criteria. Though, we must use a collaborative approach to arrive at a descriptive ontology.

I'm not well versed in neoroscience. I can't really say too much here. I read this essay called "Shutup and Calculate" by a mathemetician named Max Tegmark, that had a theory, in which I disagreed with because of false premises, that said mathematics is ontology. It is the "Theory of Everything". Basically, he says numbers don't have any anthropomorphic, meaningful baggage. They are completely abstract. This is what I disagreed with, but you should make up your own mind. But, yes. I agree with you. I think we might gain the tools eventually, but for now we will have to be resourceful with our sciences and explanatory systems.

Your notion of power here is something I disagree with. Power is always physical, but it has little to do with muscles. Speech might detail my take on it here. If Clinton gives a speech about low income schools, his words - the vibrations extending from his throat - are powerful given the context of recording and broadcasting devices at the speech. His words are televised, recorded through analogue and digital equipment, and will survive in a physical medium like a DVD or a tape for decades, even centuries. Also, his words have acquired power through physical leadership. They have grown in strength. If you think otherwise, if I speak into a microphone and record it, a handful of people might listen to it hastily... even if I talked about the same thing. My point is that power is physical. This does not necessitate that power structures are real. I think they are corrupted by epistemic shortcomings and the shortcomings are exploited. In a sense, what I'm saying is that because we don't have a tight grip on reality because of the epistemic / ontological problem, social (power) structures are fake insofar as it is not determined by an ultimate form of criteria... some pure, true criteria.