Processo-Materialistic Reality

@Holiday20310401,

I wonder why is it that when we are not happy or sad or angry or anything, but just in a simply normal mood, you know... why is it that in a "normal" mood we logically assess the moods happiness and sadness and we find we prefer to be happy rather than be sad?

It just seems like common sense. But why is this, why would I prefer to be happy over sad, why should I prefer to be happy over sad? Is it that happiness is an ingrained ideal for the body, or that sadness threatens some ingrained ideal or behavior; perhaps the instinct for survival?

But then on what terms does a human make preferences between relative emotions, two "irrational" statements. Emotion cannot be irrational. They have to be materially caused so that they can be finitely explained.

@jknilinux,

jknilinux wrote:

Whoever said matter cannot feel? I disagree strongly. Define "feeling" and we can go from there.

... that would be C.S. Peirce Smile

... when you say you strongly disagree that matter cannot feel, are you implying that a single quark can feel? - or simply that a trillion-bazillion quarks self-organized into a human being can collectively feel? ...

@jknilinux,

jknilinux wrote:

Depends on how you define touch.

But, I think he meant feeling as in emotion, in which case, I still disagree strongly.

... here's how C.S. Peirce puts it:

Quote:

... we have Feelings, comprising all that is present, such as pain, blue, cheerfulness, the feeling that arises when we contemplate a consistent theory, etc. A feeling is a state of mind having its own living quality, independent of any other state of mind. Or, a feeling is an element of consciousness which might override every other state until it monopolized the mind ...

... he goes on to distinguish "Feelings" as such from "sensations of reaction" (e.g., running into a post, when any feeling gives way to a new feeling, etc.) and "general conceptions" (e.g., habit - a connection between feelings determined by a general rule) ...

@paulhanke,

Well, it depends how you define it. C.S.Peirce seems to be lumping qualia, perception, and emotions into "feelings".

Nothing here seems to require that the mind is seperate from matter, IMO.

@paulhanke,

Paul - Glad you liked the essay. I've spent years exploring a neutral metaphysical position and it seems you're heading down the same track.

You raise some interesting issues. I don't know Dewey but I think that to say mind and matter are processes makes a certain sense, since both seem to require the passing of time in order to exist at all. It is relevant here that in Buddhism mental and corporeal phenomena are 'thing-events'. Without understanding exactly what Dewey is getting at I can't comment on his view, but it seems compatible with what I call metaphysical neutralism. I'll check him out.

Quote:

Anyhoo, given that you leave the definition of "neutral metaphysics" to another essay, I'm having a little trouble wrapping my head around the idea ... is a neutral metaphysics monistic? or is it N-istic with no priority given to one fundamental? or is it truly "zero-istic"? (Heck - am I even using these terms right?! )

A neutral metaphysical position is extremely confusing. I've been confused by it for years, although I think I'm beginning to get the hang of it. Is it monistic? In a way it is, since the universe would be a unity. But the universe would not be numerically one and so in a way it is not monistic. A monism that is opposed to dualism would be a positive metaphysical position. Is it zero-sistic? In a way it is, since nothing would really exist, but nihilism is a positive metaphysical position and so in a way it's not. This is not a paradox but a problem with our use of the word 'exist.' For a neutral position we cannot say that the original phenomenon - whatever is prior to mind and matter for a neutral position - either exists or not-exists, for both views are positive and are refuted by Bradley and Nagarjuna. This would be 'something' for which we cannot make this distinction.

@Whoever,

Whoever wrote:

I've been confused by it for years, although I think I'm beginning to get the hang of it.

... sounds like I've got a ways to go, then! Wink

Whoever wrote:

This is not a paradox but a problem with our use of the word 'exist.'

... having just finished a brief overview of Merleau-Ponty's ecart and reversibility, I do not doubt that you could be right ... it seems that in his opinion, the problems we have in categorizing the elements of experience do not stem from the ambiguity of the elements of experience themselves but rather from the fact that we still cling to categories derived from an inherently flawed analysis! ...

@jknilinux,

jknilinux wrote:

Nothing here seems to require that the mind is seperate from matter, IMO.

... quite right! Smile

... this thread rejects C.S. Peirce's conclusion for idealism in favor of interrogating the possibility of process/substance as inextricably intertwined such that they co-perpetuate each other ...

@Holiday20310401,

Holiday20310401 wrote:

But then on what terms does a human make preferences between relative emotions ...

... perhaps it is the emotions themselves that are the preferences?

@paulhanke,

paulhanke wrote:

... that would be C.S. Peirce ... when you say you strongly disagree that matter cannot feel, are you implying that a single quark can feel? - or simply that a trillion-bazillion quarks self-organized into a human being can collectively feel? ...

What is the difference between a bazillion quarks and a quarks that constitutes only one of the two being able to emerge the ability for the matter to feel. Nothing. Feeling is the interaction of the matter, not emergent of the system itself.

paulhanke wrote:

... perhaps it is the emotions themselves that are the preferences?

Sure but they cannot categorize themselves unless there is this ideal prioritizing of emotions that we consciously want when we are in a certain mind/body state. But there is really only one ideal state the body works to achieve through homeostasis (I'm assuming).

@Holiday20310401,

Holiday20310401 wrote:

Feeling is the interaction of the matter ...

... ummmm - isn't that the very definition of "emergence"? ...

Holiday20310401 wrote:

But there is really only one ideal state the body works to achieve through homeostasis (I'm assuming).

... and maybe "happy" is homeostasis?

@paulhanke,

paulhanke wrote:

... having just finished a brief overview of Merleau-Ponty's ecart and reversibility, I do not doubt that you could be right ... it seems that in his opinion, the problems we have in categorizing the elements of experience do not stem from the ambiguity of the elements of experience themselves but rather from the fact that we still cling to categories derived from an inherently flawed analysis! ...

This would be my view. A neutral metaphysical position is the abandonment of such clinging. All categories would be emergent, as Kant and Hegel concluded.

@paulhanke,

paulhanke wrote:

... just got a new book ... Process Theories: Crossdisciplinary Studies in Dynamic Categories ... cracked it open and read the intro ... one of the essays is on quantum mechanics and the self-similarity between the micro- and macro-worlds that becomes apparent when one takes a process-ontology approach ... whoa ...

... here's another "whoa" ... Process Physics ... The Pendulum of Natural Science ...

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