@kennethamy,
The point was merely that life is only your perception of it. Stuff and nonsense! German Idealism!
What of physicalism? The converse to Idealism, the mind is in fact physical and under pull of physical law. It is bound relationally to that which it experiences.
Here is my conception of what is the case. In the problem of the illusion, the subject finds himself experiencing what anoother might not, but the illusion is true as a physical occurence in the brain. The illusion is just a missfiring of synapses, an undue chemical occurance in the brain. The illusion itself, thus, is the case, however, the subjects interpretation of said event, may not be. It is not a point of contest that the event took place, but rather it is the interpretation and extrapolation upon the occurance that strays into falsity. For it is inductive that one should think that one's sensual events coincide with the events of others. The illusion, with no external reference, builds on this inductive process and the subject must assume its reality, having no other events by which it can be dsicredited.
Now, if the illusion exhibits properties such that it acts contradictory to the general case in question, e.g. in the case of the pink elephant, if you cannot ever get closer, or if the elephant disappears, or if you can walk through it like a ghost ect, you must conclude that it is not an elephant which is pink, but rather somthing else which superficially resembles it. If further the subject finds that upon relation to other sentients, the being is not in mutual experience, then he must draw the conclusion that it is confined to himself.
Arguing from a pure Idealism, what the subject has experienced to be the case in mutual experience is general confirmation on the part of those whom are percieved as sentients. Upon denial, the inductive framework of interaction the subject has developed experientialy indicates that this occurence is not the general case insofar as it is not affrimed by these entities which would generally affirm it.
Now, in the case of there being no secondary or tertiary subjects by which the first can meter his experience in this way, the subject is resigned to either accepting the experience as mutually confimable or not mutually confirmable. Erring on the side of caution, if the illusion is far too fantastic, the subject might prefer to act as though the illusion was not mutually confirmable, though his correctness is not affirmable in either case.
An occurance, by my reckoning, is sensual, and only that. Perception is the reaction to the sensation by induction on prior experience. Certain contradictions to the general case are sufficient to confirming the nature of an experience.