You honestly try to argue that you understand Libet's work better than Libet? Okay.

Do you want me to go through and show you the myriad of ad hominem's you use?

Nice try with the semantic trickery. "Me" generally refers to what people perceive to be their 'self', which is different from the true 'self'. You do not know me. You do not know my name, my favorite book, my favorite song. You know nothing of my family, or any of my environment for that matter, other than that I am living in the US, perhaps. What you do know is that my true nature is a 'self' beyond my apparent 'self', you do not know me.

I'd like to, but you keep telling me I'm wrong because of my ego.

I'm not sure how karma relies upon cause and effect. As I understand, the principle of karma is supposed to work because everything is interrelated, that there is no fundamental difference between you, me, or any other sentient being. Could you elaborate?

First, there is the most basic question: 'Does man have free will' but what value is this question? Even if man has a will, the heart of the issue is not the freedom of man's will, but rather, the freedom of the man himself. If we have a will, the question then becomes, 'can man freely apply his will'?

Second, if we are to say that "Free will is then an illusion that we percieve through the disconnect between ourselves and the totality" how do you reconclie this with the fact that we are part of that totality?

Well, that is an entirely different question altogether. Even if the question of free will is not valuable (it really isn't much more than a brain teaser, merely acting confirms the absurdity of true choice and determinism) it is distinct and separate from discussions on material freedom.

Our conscious experience is epiphenomenal, it is not a causal actor.

Depending on one's conception of will and what freedom could/does amount to, the question might be different. However, if we say man has a will, and this will is free (that a man can will as he pleases), we must still ask ourselves if the man is free. It might be the case that I have free will, but not free action because I cannot freely apply my will.

My general point being that discussion of the "will" is often overemphasised when we talk about free action. Even the topic of the thread, "free will", represents this tendency to think of man's freedom in terms of his will (probably because we all like to think we do have free will; we seem to).

Some argue this is the case, others object to the claim. For example, it seems concious experience does have a causal influence. My brother loves to drive fast. Speeds everywhere. The other day he was pulled over by the police for the first time, and he was written a ticket. After that ticket, he drives a great deal slower, and pays more attention to traffic laws. It seems his experience (of being pulled over and written a ticket) affected his future actions.
Do our pains, thoughts, and feelings really have no influence over our actions?

They do not necessarily, our conscious reactions to experience may stem from the same nature that our actions do.

My general point being that discussion of the "will" is often overemphasised when we talk about free action. Even the topic of the thread, "free will", represents this tendency to think of man's freedom in terms of his will (probably because we all like to think we do have free will; we seem to).

Yes, I agree. And so did John Locke who wrote that it was not the will that is free, but the person who is free.
I really do not know what a will is supposed to be. What reason is there to think there is such an entity? It is persons whom we say are free or not, and by that, we mean that they are, respectively, not under compulsion of some kind, or under some kind of compulsion.

I think they are certainly related. It seems that, sometimes, concious experience influences certain actions. I would imagine that our mentality (in a very broad sense) influences the way we understand our experiences and influences our decisions to act and how to act.

None the less, if our concious experience has causal significance, which it seems to have, the claim "Free will is then an illusion that we percieve through the disconnect between ourselves and the totality" does not seem to have much credibility. We are part of the totality; free action is not an illusion, if anything, it is the notion of self that is illusory.