I think you can defend utilitarianism, but not act utilitarianism when applied to specific scenarios rather than as a general guideline.

Ok. But a true Utilitarian would state that an action that causes the greatest happiness is always the moral one. So if we're not agreeing with these scenarios which are consistent with Utilitarian thinking, then there's something wrong with the theory. So, I'm not sure where you're going with this response.

You specified "act utilitarianism" in the title. In "Rule utilitarianism" (if I understand it correctly) the bank robbers action would be immoral because having the rule "don't rob banks and shoot people" leads to greater happiness than the rule "it's ok to rob banks and shoot people".

I think there are other variations of utilitarianism which take into account the intention of the person involved. Actually, given that it's an ethical theory, I'm sure there are dozens of permutations which you can probably find at wikipedia or the stanford encyclopedia of philosophy.

I'm going to present two hypothetical scenarios in which I intend to show that the Utility Principle is not necessary or sufficient for an action to be a moral one.

This is the first: -

'A bank robber goes into the bank and shoots the bank clerk. The robber then leaves with a sum of money. However, what the robber didn't know is that the bank clerk was a terrorist who was planning to blow up some innocent people on the way home. The robber's actions lead to the greatest happiness even though he didn't intend to. Utilitarianism states that therefore this is a moral action.'
The greatest happiness is attained. Yet would we call the bank robber's action a moral one? He intended to rob a bank and accidentally reduced a lot of suffering in the process. So by Utilitarian standard, this is moral.


This is the second: -

'There's a child drowning in a body of water. A man spots the child and jumps in to save the child. Accidently, he lands on the child and contributes to the death of the child. Utilitarianism would say that this is an immoral action because the greatest happiness was not achieved. In fact, the opposite was achieved. Intuitively, jumping in to save a child from drowning is not an immoral action.'

So the man's action (jumping in to save the child) was immoral because it resulted in more pain than pleasure. This doesn't seem right.


How would we go about defending Utilitarianism here? Can we defend Utilitarianism?

"moral rightness depends on foreseen, foreseeable, intended, or likely consequences, rather than actual ones." In the scenarios in your post, such an act utilitarian would look at the likely consequences of the actions. Any action might produce better or worse results than anticipated, but in order for a moral theory to be a guide to action, it must deal with what is known, and not take into consideration what cannot be known.

I think there are at least two approaches one could take. One is to say, of course, since you are not an act utilitarian, you do not feel like the moral actions are really the moral actions. So what? You have proved nothing. And do you really think that it is bad to stop a terrorist from killing others, or that it is good to jump on top of a child and drown him or her? You see, how it is worded affects how one's "intuitions" are likely to direct one.

This is one of my biggest problems with utilitarianism; it doesn't really account for the limits of human reason.

I'm going to present two hypothetical scenarios in which I intend to show that the Utility Principle is not necessary or sufficient for an action to be a moral one.

This is the first: -

'A bank robber goes into the bank and shoots the bank clerk. The robber then leaves with a sum of money. However, what the robber didn't know is that the bank clerk was a terrorist who was planning to blow up some innocent people on the way home. The robber's actions lead to the greatest happiness even though he didn't intend to. Utilitarianism states that therefore this is a moral action.'
The greatest happiness is attained. Yet would we call the bank robber's action a moral one? He intended to rob a bank and accidentally reduced a lot of suffering in the process. So by Utilitarian standard, this is moral.


This is the second: -

'There's a child drowning in a body of water. A man spots the child and jumps in to save the child. Accidently, he lands on the child and contributes to the death of the child. Utilitarianism would say that this is an immoral action because the greatest happiness was not achieved. In fact, the opposite was achieved. Intuitively, jumping in to save a child from drowning is not an immoral action.'

So the man's action (jumping in to save the child) was immoral because it resulted in more pain than pleasure. This doesn't seem right.


How would we go about defending Utilitarianism here? Can we defend Utilitarianism?

You've miss understood. Review my post.

I think the burden of proof is on the unintuitive. In a practical sense because you are correct that we assume the intuitive is correct, but also because our intuitions are at least worth something, while there are as many bogus theories as you can think of.

... After all, intuition may be just another term for prejudice or unthinkingness. ...

I think that sentence is well worth repeating. Many times, "intuitions" are simply prejudices that people have imbibed from their upbringing. Many slave owners "intuitively knew" that having slaves was right and proper.

We also find that many times intuitions seem to contradict other intuitions, as in the Trolley Problem. In which case, intuition cannot be presumed to be correct, for then we are left with the issue of which intuition is presumed correct and which is presumed incorrect?

These are classic scenarios that only do one thing: They illustrate why the absolute adherence to any single ethical standard can be faulty. But we knew this, didn't we?

There's no single ethos method wherein the most outlandish won't reveal as flawed. This isn't to say that utilitarianism itself is flawed, only the silly notion that anyone would act in accordance with that, and that itself. But all things are like this; choose any political, ideological, metaphysical or theological philosophy that negates the mix of any other, and you can come up with an illustration of why that is flawed. I think the best judgment of actions is one that takes into account our priorities and the reality of life's complexity.

So no, while utility is a useful measure in judging the morality of actions or decisions, it can't, doesn't and shouldn't operate in a vacuum bereft of other considerations. Besides, as I've learned many a time; the devil's in the details. While they're not paramount, intent must figure in as well as the extremeness of the situation. Utility is important, but it isn't "all" nor should it be posited that way - or so I think

Thanks

It is not that adherence to a single standard is flawed.

The question I posed is how, given a standard, we should use it.

Pyrrho;163849 wrote:

I think that sentence is well worth repeating. Many times, "intuitions" are simply prejudices that people have imbibed from their upbringing. Many slave owners "intuitively knew" that having slaves was right and proper.

We also find that many times intuitions seem to contradict other intuitions, as in the Trolley Problem. In which case, intuition cannot be presumed to be correct, for then we are left with the issue of which intuition is presumed correct and which is presumed incorrect?

Yes indeed.

There is the important Church doctrine that, miracula sine doctrina nihil valent. That without a theory of how to understand and detect miracles, the mere assertion that some event is a miracle is worth nothing.

And as every quality which is useful or agreeable to ourselves or others is, in common life, allowed to be a part of personal merit; so no other will ever be received, where men judge of things by their natural, unprejudiced reason, without the delusive glosses of superstition and false religion. Celibacy, fasting, penance, mortification, self-denial, humility, silence, solitude, and the whole train of monkish virtues; for what reason are they everywhere rejected by men of sense, but because they serve to no manner of purpose; neither advance a man's fortune in the world, nor render him a more valuable member of society; neither qualify him for the entertainment of company, nor increase his power of self-enjoyment? We observe, on the contrary, that they cross all these desirable ends; stupify the understanding and harden the heart, obscure the fancy and sour the temper. We justly, therefore, transfer them to the opposite column, and place them in the catalogue of vices; nor has any superstition force sufficient among men of the world, to pervert entirely these natural sentiments. A gloomy, hair-brained enthusiast, after his death, may have a place in the calendar; but will scarcely ever be admitted, when alive, into intimacy and society, except by those who are as delirious and dismal as himself.