The word "capital" has properties (it begins with a 'c') If you don't mean the word, "capital" (or what businessmen seek to expand their businesses) then I don't know what you mean by "capital".

I understand. But it seems as though this prudential ought could be used also for moral propositions. Why do you think it could not be? It would lend to practicality when we communicate moral propositions.



And what makes it a fact that rape is wrong is that it is considered wrong by many authoritative bodies. That is the de jure reason. And the de facto reason is that rape is recognized by most to be wrong.

It just doesn't hold here? I seem to be missing a piece of the puzzle, or have convoluted the matter.

But if it is prudential to do something (i.e. in one's own self-interest) then if someone acts prudentially, we may praise him for being wise, or canny. But we don't pin any moral medals on him. After all, he is only acting in his own self-interest. Why would that be a moral thing to do? Kant would say of it that it had no "moral worth". (Not, of course, that it would have to be immoral. It would just be amoral. Neither moral or immoral).

There is no universally recognized authority as to whether rape is wrong. There is a universally recognized authority about capitals (namely, the government of the country).

edited out

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My understanding of the abstract properties are that they are the defining characteristics by which concrete particulars are organised. They belong on a different level ontologically to concrete particulars (or 'corporeal beings').

As for the main argument of Stevenson, it is not very different from the main argument of A.J. Ayer, in Language Truth and Logic, which attempts to explain all meaningful utterances to propositions which correspond to actual states of affairs. Statements concerning ethical matters do not refer to any actual states of affairs but are emotive in nature and express the view of the speaker with regards to what should happen etc.

Therefore many arguments that can be used against Logical Positivism can also be deployed against Stevenson's non-cognitivism.

Yes, Ayer and Stevenson are both emotivists, although Stevenson offers a more sophisticated emotivism than Ayer. But emotivism does not rely on Logical Positivism as far as I can tell. As Hume points out, moral sentences are clearly not just statements of fact, as are scientific sentences. When we say of something, or someone, that it is good or bad, right or wrong, we are, at the same time, expressing an attitude, and not only saying what we believe to be true or false. And, along with that attitude, we also are implying an imperative about what we think the attitude of others should be too. When we say that someone is an evil person, we are not simply putting it forward as a matter of fact, as if we are saying that the person has a scar on his face. An attitude is being expressed, and an attitude is expected.

Fair enough. The question I keep asking though is 'what is the attitude based on'? I can't see how he can avoid subjectivism - that the attitude is just a matter of opinion. So 'my attitude versus your attitude'. Doesn't this trivialise, or at least relativise, all ethical judgements?

The word "capital" has properties (it begins with a 'c') If you don't mean the word, "capital" (or what businessmen seek to expand their businesses) then I don't know what you mean by "capital".

"If we take in our hand any volume of divinity or school metaphysics let us ask this question, does it contain any abstract reasoning concerning quantity or number? No. Does it contain any experimental reasoning concerning matter of fact or existence? No. Commit it then to the flames, for it can be nothing but sophistry and illusion." (1)

The fact is, exactly the same criticisms can be made of Hume's 'Inquiry Concerning Human Understanding'. It too does not contain any abstract reasoning concerning quantity or number, not any experimental reasoning concerning matters of fact or existence. So, following his advice.....

I imagine that he meant the notion of a capital city. That idea has several properties. In fact, everything has at least one property and everything has an infinite number of properties.

Hume also said:



The fact is, exactly the same criticisms can be made of Hume's 'Inquiry Concerning Human Understanding'. It too does not contain any abstract reasoning concerning quantity or number, not any experimental reasoning concerning matters of fact or existence. So, following his advice.....

Anyway, much the same can be said of non-cognitivism. If only statements concerning empirical fact can be said to be truly factual, and if statements concerning ethics are only expressions of an attitude - then this too is just an expression of an attitude. It says nothing factual and is obviously cannot be justified with regard to any empirical observations. So it is hoist by its own petard, you could say. And furthermore it is an attitude I choose not to agree with.


(1) Hume, David
1748 An Inquiry Concerning Human Understanding. Section xii: Of the academical or skeptical Philosophy, Part iii, Paradigm 132

Hume is the beginning of modern anti-philosophy, which is the predominant kind nowadays. Although Kant was more than his match.

That was very poetic of Wittgenstein. But I don't think his propositions are senseless. He was a bit dramatic in general. What a life story! As much as I love the Tractatus, I'm glad he didn't get stuck there. He seems to have pushed on, lightened up, accepted a more holistic view of language. The ladder metaphor is great! Sounds like a mystical tradition sort of move. Great thinker, fascinating man.

But was Hume explicit about this? I'm asking not arguing.