I think that your paper is well written. I agree with nearly everything you say about Epicurus and hedonism. Epicurus's hedonism was of a moderate type; not what you would usually think of when someone mentions hedonism. It is clear that in practice hedonism can vary from person to person based on the individual's perspective. It almost seems as if Epicurus's hedonism is compatible with asceticism, which doesn't seem to make much sense.

The only statement that I'm not so sure about is the following: "So if the only actions that I take are within my little bubble of acquaintances, then I can consider myself personally responsible for every act of injustice that goes on within my realm of knowledge." This statement appears to mean that you believe that altruism is an obligatory value. That is, you believe that self-sacrifice for the happiness of others is an absolute obligation and if an able person does not sacrifice their own well-being for another they are morally responsible for the other person's suffering. I disagree with that completely. I'm not saying that you shouldn't sacrifice yourself for someone. I'm just saying that it's not obligatory because it is incompatible with natural appetites. The natural appetite that altruism violates is the appetite of self-preservation. Once again, I am not saying that you should never sacrifice your well being for someone else. I have many causes that I want to be an advocate for but I don't hold people morally responsible for not sacrificing their well being for another person's well being. Altruism cannot be justified as a fundamental ethical value, but it can be justified as a relative value. Like you said, not helping people will probably cause [you] more grief and guilt.

There are, however, situations where self-sacrifice is related to a higher cause that can or does directly affect the individual as well as the collective society.

Thank you so much for your input. You have definitely given me something to think about.

Let me see if I can try to communicate my thoughts. I think I mean that I am responsible for things that I could stop from happening, just as much as I am responsible for things that I directly do. Mind you, responsibility does not necessarily entail guilt in itself. Guilt merely comes as a result of me having the sort of preferences and values that I do. But, with or without the guilt, I still believe that I (and anyone else in a similar position) would be responsible nonetheless (that is, with or without the emotion).

Allow me to elaborate. I think that a person in responsible for things that they don't do in the same sense as the fact that choosing and refusing are ultimately inseparable. That is, in choosing one thing, a person is consciously or unconsciously having or doing that in the stead of something else. Similarly,in refusing something a person is choosing to go without that particular thing.

Responsibility behaves in the same manner. I am responsible for the things that I do, and the things I do not. In doing one thing, I choose not to do another thing that I equally could have done. Thus, in not doing something, I am choosing to allow that part of the world, so to speak, to go on without my influence. However, the irony is that even choosing to leave my influence out of something, I unintentionally have an influence.

The guilt merely comes in as an afternote. You see, since (guilt or no guilt) it can be certain (if I have explained it correctly) that I am responsible for many things, good and bad, which occur around me, and since I am the sort of person who feels guilty over such things if such things cause unnecessary suffering, then it seems to me that, even in Epicurus' view, I am justified in my feeling; i.e. I am feeling guilty in a reasonable way.

However, Epicurus' position doesn't appear to extend its position that far, and that is sort of what I argue against. I don't see the distinction. I think that, even in Epicurus' view, without altruism, the fact that I feel guilty over unnecessary suffering gives me grounds to take action in removing that pain; again, Epicurus' definition for pleasure is "the absence of pain an anguish."

It's a bit late, and I just finished work, so I hope this didn't come out too terribly jumbled. I will definitely heed your input, and I truly appreciate your response. I'm going to give it some serious contemplation and decide what my thought about it is, rather than just going off of my initial response here.

I understand where you're coming from with the guilt and the suffering, but I'm still unsure about something. Why should I be held responsible for the genocide in Sudan when 1. I don't harbor ethnic prejudice or racial beliefs, 2. I did not directly or indirectly cause the suffering in Sudan, and 3. I may have responsibilities that don't allow for me to use my time to try and save the lives of people way across the world. I believe that the only people who are morally responsible for the suffering in Sudan are the people who are causing the suffering in Sudan. This is not to say that we shouldn't try and help the Sudanese people, but why should we be held morally responsible for suffering that we did not cause?

Actually, I completely agree with you. I think it only makes sense that a person feel guilt as a result from neglecting things they can change (or at least, things that they realize or believe they can have a hand in changing). In the scenario you bring up I think it is perfectly sensible that you don't feel "guilt" over it; though, of course that isn't to disregard any other emotions that may be experienced. "Guilt," however, would not necessarily arise from that situation.
Does that make sense?
If, on the other hand, I hold the capability to make a difference, but I choose not to, then I am indirectly responsible.

Sort of like this scenario: there is a person being beat up on the street, and I choose to walk by instead of interfering or calling the police or some other such means of doing something. If it is a situation like this one (though on a much larger scale), where something could clearly be done to help, then silence is compliance; and in my opinion I would then hold equal responsibility.

Yeah, that makes sense. So would you hold yourself indirectly responsible for the genocide in Sudan? Surely you do not have the capability to bring it to an end. I mean, you could influence capable people to bring an end to the genocide, but you can't actually do it yourself.

For that last example, what if the person who is doing the beating has a weapon and can hurt you if you get directly involved? I've heard stories where someone was killed for trying to help someone who was being abused. I would most likely call the cops in that situation, but what if I couldn't get to a phone on time and the person was beat to death because I didn't directly interfere? Should I be held morally responsible for my appetite for the self-preservation of my personal well-being?

Well, while there have been many inspirational martyrs, MLK for example, I would never recommend, nor would I condemn for that matter, dying for "the cause." This is a tough topic for certain. Some people may have reasons that they would say "die for the cause"...perhaps they hold religious beliefs or absolute moral beliefs of some sort. However, I hold a firm opinion that, in most scenarios at least, a person can have more of an influence in the world while they are alive than they can after they are dead. No, unfortunately sometimes bad things have to happen; and judgments about these things can only be made subjectively. The key, however, for anyone who does want to often be altruistic (note: by altruistic I mean a person who can act primarily for another being's welfare; yet this does not take away the need and desire for self-preservation; that would be insensible) is to realize, or at least do their absolute best to realize when they can and cannot make a difference for others. Some people avoid being part of a cause simply because they feel too small to ever make a difference. Well, I feel that the anti-slavery movement is a prime example for what can be accomplished from the grassroots up!

---------- Post added at 11:04 AM ---------- Previous post was at 10:59 AM ----------

I forgot:



No, however I personally would feel guillty if I did not write the occasional letter to my congressmen or sign the occasional petition. Also, when I'm not absolutely broke I try to research organizations that actually make a difference and donate to them...particularly those that help care for refugees. I don't have much to give, but I figure that if everyone did something tiny, then it would amount to something much bigger than expected.

Sorry, I just realized that I forgot to answer that question.

But isn't altruism an ethical doctrine that holds that individuals have a moral obligation to help, serve and benefit others, if necessary at the sacrifice of your own self-interest? Or maybe you're speaking of altruism in general, and not the specific ethical doctrine.

Altruism (ethics) - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

Altruism - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

On Epicurus, doesn't it seem strange that his hedonism can also be viewed as asceticism, similar to the Buddhist ethical doctrine of enlightenment? Aren't hedonism and asceticism polar opposites? I'm starting to feel like Epicurus's ethics was really ascetic and not hedonistic. What do you think?

I completely agree with you about Epicurus's theory. One thing which has occurred to me is that it seems as though Epicurus (like many philosophers, I suppose) began his theory with a desired conclusion, and he manipulated things to make it sound as appealling as possible. For example, he has a very stoic (I think) definition for the word pleasure, simply the freedom from pain and anguish. From the coining of that definition he was able to steer his theory into a very ascetic direction, as we very well have observed. His theory is asceticism in sheep's clothing, if you will.




I am definitely speaking of altruism in general, as the above noted theory appears to me to be self defeating. For example, I would never eat if I followed that definition, because I would constantly be giving my food to the people who need it waround me. It may be important in this discussion to define the term "need" or "necessary" as well, but I am not ready to do that at the present time.

Also, ought implies can. If one says that a person ought to do something, there is an underlying presupposition that the person would be capable of doing that particular thing. In the scenario where a person is being held at gunpoint, if interfering will likely result in your death and subsequently theirs as well, then it seems insensible that one could say that a person holds an obligation to physically interfere in an effort to help, unless the odds of them actually having a good affect are there.
I would have pity and respect for anyone who did die trying, however, I still do not think it would be the sensible choice. Call the police or be smarter about interfering.

I suppose that as of yet I hold a sort of commonsense theory and approach to ethics. Admittedly, not to my benefit, this is why it is particularly frustrating to see so many people around me not using what I consider to be common sense. This is part of the reason, perhaps the entire reason, that I think about Ethics so often...I honestly want to make the world a better place. It seems an impossible task, but I still maintain hope.

Is there any evidence that Epicurus was presenting this as Utopian? <-- knows only what you wrote about this subject. If this were an utopian endevour it stand to reason that if everyone adopted this method of living there would be very little conflict or injustice. Conflict and deliberate injustice just cause too much stress for the aggressor. This also can very easily from my interpretation be read as an inverted but effective golden rule philosophy. Interpersonal relationships cause a lot of pain, and maximizing the cooperation maximizes the golden rule reciprocation.



OH and BTW I really enjoyed reading the paper