Evil

@Zetherin,

Zetherin wrote:

I don't understand what you mean by "universality". I do understand, however, how you're using impartiality in regards to the justification of moral propositions (thanks for the examples). Though, I'm not convinced that a moral proposition must be impartial to be justified. A justification is simply a good reason in this case (still ambiguous, I know). Depending on what epistemological theory of justification we decide to use, we would see the necessary conditions of moral propositions being justified, change.

For instance, I believe the logical positivist view would be no moral propositions could be justified at all -- they are meaningless. Whereas, the irrationalist would deem moral propositions can be justified (though I'm not certain of the necessary conditions). With 'pure' logical deduction, one could say a moral proposition could be justified in some sense (I say "some sense", because I believe it varies when speaking of moral, aesthetic propositions and non-moral, non-aesthetic propositions).

But the point is: Yes, it is possible, depending on the theory of justification one uses, to justify a moral proposition regardless of intersubjectivity.

By universality I mean that a moral sentence should be able to apply to all relevantly similar valuers. This means that the good or bad consequences of an act or a value should apply regardless of culture, society, or personal preference.

I do believe the the verification principle of logical positivism is valid, but I think the mistake is made when someone says that a moral sentence is meaningless. A moral sentence is only meaningless if it is stated as a proposition (something that is objectively true or false). Moral sentences do not state propositions. Instead, moral sentences state rights or wrongs that have emotive and prescriptive underpinnings. With that in mind, justification for moral sentences is not the same as the epistemic justification for propositions, which are justified by logical verification or empirical verification. A moral sentence can only be justified if it is universal and impartial. If you rule out universality and impartiality, nihilism and relativism is all that you have left, and neither approach truly seeks to justify moral sentences.

@Albert Camus,

hue-man wrote:

If you rule out universality and impartiality, nihilism and relativism is all that you have left, and neither approach truly seeks to justify moral sentences.

That's a good point, but wouldn't this:

Quote:

Moral sentences do not state propositions.

depend on the view of morality one holds? A moral realist would state moral sentences are in fact propositions.

I think no matter what view one holds, one can see that a moral proposition (or sentence, if you disagree) can be justified (perhaps if only to the person making the proposition). There's syntactical meaning when someone says they believe their moral proposition to be justified, even if we hold a stance that moral propositions cannot be justified. I think the meaning is really all that matters.

@Zetherin,

Zetherin wrote:

That's a good point, but wouldn't this:

depend on the view of morality one holds? A moral realist would state moral sentences are in fact propositions.

Like anything that has its roots in philosophy, opinion or perspective can and will vary, but that doesn't mean that someone's position isn't right or wrong. That's why we have logic and epistemology to justify or verify our positions. Some people hold that moral sentences are objective while others such as myself would say that moral sentences are subjective. The problem that objective moral cognitivists make is that they fail to realize that morality and all values deal with sensations that a subject perceives to be good or bad. This means that all philosophical values are dependent on the mind for their existence. The conception of morality will cease to exist when the minds that conceive of morality cease to exist. Therefore, moral sentences cannot be considered to be objectively true or false in the way that the functions or properties of an object can be considered to be objectively true or false. Therefore, moral sentences do not state propositions.

@Albert Camus,

hue-man wrote:

The conception of morality will cease to exist when the minds that conceive of morality cease to exist.

Your conception of morality will change (based on your rationalization) but the sensations pertaining to morality will still be there, regardless how you label "Good" or "Evil". Sensations are not conceptions. When the moral objectivists state moral propositions are true and false, I don't think they are speaking entirely of the conception; they believe there are intersubjective sensations each of us feel and this is what justifies (and defines) the evaluation. These sensations (the negative and positive) are then lumped into the categories of "Good" and "Evil". The dichotomy of "Good" and "Evil" is a philosophical value, but that only follows from the feelings.

But again, what I think matters is what one means.

@Zetherin,

Zetherin wrote:

Your conception of morality will change (based on your rationalization) but the sensations pertaining to morality will still be there, regardless how you label "Good" or "Evil". Sensations are not conceptions. When the moral objectivists state moral propositions are true and false, I don't think they are speaking entirely of the conception; they believe there are intersubjective sensations each of us feel and this is what justifies (and defines) the evaluation. These sensations (the negative and positive) are then lumped into the categories of "Good" and "Evil". The dichomoty of "Good" and "Evil" is a philosophical value, but that only follows the feelings.

Once again, if the minds that conceive of morality cease to exist, then the conception of morality will follow. Sensations and perceptions are the forces behind morality, but morality itself is a conception, an idea. When the minds that sense and perceive cease to exist, then so will sensation and perception.

The only thing about morality that can be objectively known is that subjects perceive goodness or badness from their perceptions. That does not mean that the objects and events that are perceived are objectively good or bad. It all reduces to subjectivity and what is or isn't appealing to the mind of the subject. One cannot go from is to ought based on the principle alone. I believe that's circular logic.

@Albert Camus,

hue-man wrote:

Once again, if the minds that conceive of morality cease to exist, then the conception of morality will follow. Sensations and perceptions are the forces behind morality, but morality itself is a conception, an idea. When the minds that sense and perceive cease to exist, then so will sensation and perception.

Sure, but we can apply this to nearly anything (without mind, we're left with nothing - there's no value in this statement, it's self-evident). Especially if we begin to contemplate what "objective" actually dictates. When we speak of this or that being "objectively" correct, things get really messy. As far as I'm concerned, we don't "objectively" know anything -- but this is another conversation in itself.

Quote:

The only thing about morality that can be objectively known is that subjects perceive goodness or badness from their perceptions.

I think that's sufficient for most people.

@Zetherin,

Zetherin wrote:

Sure, but we can apply this to nearly anything (without mind, we're left with nothing - there's no value in this statement, it's self-evident). Especially if we begin to contemplate what "objective" actually dictates. When we speak of this or that being "objectively" correct, things get really messy. As far as I'm concerned, we don't "objectively" know anything -- but this is another conversation in itself.

Indeed that is another conversation, and I would certainly disagree with you when you say that we don't or can't objectively know anything. If no knowledge is objective then all propositions are meaningless and nothing is true or false. It's likely that your opinion is based on a common mistake that people make when trying to distinguish philosophical objectivity from philosophical subjectivity.

@hue-man,

hue-man wrote:

Indeed that is another conversation, and I would certainly disagree with you when you say that we don't or can't objectively know anything. It's likely that your opinion is based on a common mistake that people make when trying to distinguish philosophical objectivity from philosophical subjectivity. If no knowledge is objective then all propositions are meaningless and nothing is true or false.

Actually, we already had this conversation together. You, me, Aedes and a few others.

Here's the link:

http://www.philosophyforum.com/forum/philosophy-forums/branches-philosophy/philosophy-religion/3973-buddhism-four-noble-truths-suffering-8.html

The discussion, I believe, starts at page ~5 and then continues on to ~8. We can always pick up there if we decide we want to address anything further.

Thanks for the intelligent discussion,

Z

@Zetherin,

Zetherin wrote:

Actually, we already had this conversation together. You, me, Aedes and a few others.

Here's the link:

http://www.philosophyforum.com/forum/philosophy-forums/branches-philosophy/philosophy-religion/3973-buddhism-four-noble-truths-suffering-8.html

The discussion, I believe, starts at page ~5 and then continues on to ~8. We can always pick up there if we decide we want to address anything further.

Thanks for the intelligent discussion,

Z

Oh yeah, I forgot that you added your words to that discussion. Let's see if we can end this quickly right now, because I believe that the belief that we can never obtain objective knowledge is based on a miscomprehension. Also, do you believe that you know that we cannot obtain objective knowledge? Wouldn't that contradict your belief that objective knowledge is impossible?

Here is where I believe the mistake is made when trying to distinguish philosophical subjectivity from philosophical objectivity -- Some people assume that because the acquisition of knowledge is dependent upon the mind, that nothing can be objectively known. While it is true that the acquisition of knowledge is dependent on perception and the mind, that does not mean that the existence of the things that are being perceived is dependent upon the mind. What I'm saying is that the sun would still exist and be a hot ball of gas regardless of whether or not a mind could know that it is. Living organisms would still be made of lipids, amino acids, and carbohydrates regardless of whether or not someone knew about it. The problem is not that you believe that the acquisition of knowledge is dependent on the mind. The problem is that you believe that because your mind is needed in order to perceive and know, that means that the things that you perceive are dependent upon perception for their existence and properties. Once you believe that, you have taken the last step into the invalid position of idealism.

I can't also help but think that idealism is a reflection of human vanity. I call it anthropicism, the philosophical belief that everything that exists is dependent upon humanity perceiving of its existence. Not that this applies to you or my argument. I just thought that I'd add that for good measure.

@hue-man,

The concept of evil (or good) differs from person to person and from culture to culture.

It is also subjective in that for one person 'evil is everything that is opposed to his desires or interests or to his conception of good'.

Therefore one group of men may kill, bomb another group in the interests of good because the other is evil.

How many men consider everything, which does not match their definition of good, to be evil? It makes for a dangerous world.

Good and evil are considered part and parcel of morality. What is morality? How many crimes have been committed in the name of morality? It is 'ok' to kill because the other was evil or part of an evil group.

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