@logan phil,
I'm not quite sure how to reply to 'philosophy' threads since it my first time doing so through a forum. (Should I reply to each post individually, give a general response, or maybe a response isn't what I should be aiming for at all--perhaps simply illuminating lines of thought is most helpful?) So here we go!
As
hammersklavier related, a very similar thought to "all good actions are the right actions" [1] is "all right actions are the good actions." [2] However, they are not the same claim nor do they imply the same things. A statement that contains two variables that are not the same (in this case "good" and "right") cannot necessarily have the positions of the variables switched and still contain the same ontology or supervenience. This could also be supported if one believed that moral actions could be derived from statements of fact, and thus use the fact that biconditionals are inferential by definition to conclude that there is no necessary connection between the two variables. However, irregardless of this line of thinking, one can still easily imagine examples where the two statements are not biconditional in all circumstances. For instance:
- If all true statements are true, then all Johnnys who tell true statements are telling the truth
- If all Johnnys who tell true statements are telling the truth, then all true statements are true.
Two immediate problems should be apparent. The first is that 'If' part of the second statement gives no evidence to support the 'Then' part of the same statement. The Johnnys' possible
act of truth telling seems to have no relevance to the
statement of fact. The second is that we have no insight into the type of person Johnnys are. So if Johnnys are actually liars, then there are some obvious large problems on the loom with the biconditionality/interchangeability of the two variables. We can see, with a little bit of work, that if as
hammersklavier says "Goodness is the thought, rightness is the action," then there are some immediate troubles with necessarily tying the two together.
The notion that these two statements seem so similar, yet imply completely different things is one of the reasons why I initially found the two statements interesting. When I was analyzing [2] I found that it was much easier to finding reasons as to
why a person may not be inclined to believe that our goal should not be to make all right actions into all good actions. However, I found [1] to be much more difficult in deciding why our goal should not be to make all good actions into the right actions. Much of the objections I could think of (For example, a situation where I could eliminate a variable entirely to increase the amount of goodness.) did not seem compelling enough to ever have me throwing the idea out of the window. The thought of simply working through with a negative variable rather than attempting to eliminate it entirely seemed to be quite attainable and actually supporting of other ethical theories, such as virtue ethics; because it is my belief that if personality/social traits [virtues] are to be present, then they must be cultivated in nearly all instances. In every other instance, they are initially innate in the agent.
As
Fido pointed out, how people act to achieve goodness is just as important as choosing what is good to begin with. However, it is an example of a
good goal, not a good action. The people in
Fido's example had a slogan which represented a good goal, yet were unable to acquire that goal using good actions. This is one of the reasons I specified
good actions, and not simply good in general. This narrows the scope of this [1] idea. (In truth, in my opening post I was considering also asking about how this idea could be expanded to good in general--but decided that this was enough for now
)
Regarding what
William has said about the importance of external inertias: there are surely some very difficult decisions to be made in life (and in our wonderful thought experiments), however I do not see why--through tough work--we are unable to be and act good while being under the influence of them. I think a serious question to consider under these circumstances is whether good is the highest value we can attain and live our life by?
There were a few attempts in this thread to do some metaethics, something which I am not wanting to do here. Such an undertaking deserves a much larger thread that would do it the appropriate justice anyways.
Lastly, I hope this first reply of mine on the forum was an adequate and appropriate one