Here is one based on formal logic:
"There are no objective ethical truths."
The premise is logically self-refuting. This makes it necessarily false. Therefore, there are objective ethical truths.
If there are objective ethical truths, then ethics is not subjective or relative.
How many times must it be explained that the statement "There are no objective ethical truths" is not an ethical statement and therefore is not self-refuting.
It is a statement about truth. Therefore it is self-refuting.
Ethical propositions are only a subset of all propositions. Saying that ethical propositions are relatively true does not imply all propositions are relatively true.
I can say, "There are no objective ethical truths" and "It is objectively true that people make moral decisions" and not contradict myself because the first statement applies only to ethical propositions, and the second is not.
If you are going to prove this attack, you must show how "There are no objective ethical truths" is an ethical proposition.
Justice, sanity and insanity are all ideas that we have invented; they are whatever one defines them as.
Nothing is inherently right or wrong; morality is relative. Insanity is synymous with abnormality and sanity with normality. It is a matter of perspective. Your sanity is only sane for you; your brother's 'insanity' is only sane for him. there are no absolute standards by which to judge anything.
If nothing is inherently right or wrong, then morality can't be relative because there would be no right or wrong to be relative to. You have a fallacy of self-contradiction. :whip:
There is no empirical or a priori evidence to support "morality is relative." That people disagree on questions of ethics/morality doesn't prove that it is relative or subjective. It only proves disagreement. It is possible for parties to disagree and one party be right the other party be wrong.
Sanity is not judged by "normality" but by rationality.
It demonstrates logical fallacy of the ethcial subjectivist/relativist view. That is sufficient.
Can you explain this please? Pretend like I don't know what you are talking about, which I don't!
SOCRATES: When you have come to a decision in your own mind about something, and declare your opinion to me, this opinion is, according to his doctrine, true to you; let us grant that; but may not the rest of us sit in judgement on your decision, or do we always judge that your opinion is true? Do not myriads of men on each occasion oppose their opinions to yours, believing that your judgement and belief are false?
THEODORUS: Yes, by Zeus, Socrates, countless myriads in truth, as Homer says, and they give me all the trouble in the world.
SOCRATES: Well then, shall we say that in such a case your opinion is true to you but false to the myriads?
THEODORUS: That seems to be the inevitable deduction.
SOCRATES: And what of Protagoras himself? If neither he himself thought, nor people in general think, as indeed they do not, that man is the measure of all things, is it not inevitable that the "truth" which he wrote is true to no one? But if he himself thought it was true, [171a] and people in general do not agree with him, in the first place you know that it is just so much more false than true as the number of those who do not believe it is greater than the number of those who do.
THEODORUS: Necessarily, if it is to be true or false according to each individual opinion.
SOCRATES: Secondly, it involves this, which is a very pretty result; he concedes about his own opinion the truth of the opinion of those who disagree with him and think that his opinion is false, since he grants that the opinions of all men are true.
SOCRATES: Then would he not be conceding that his own opinion is false, if he grants that the opinion of those who think he is in error is true?
SOCRATES: But the others do not concede that they are in error, do they?
THEODORUS: No, they do not.
SOCRATES: And he, in turn, according to his writings, grants that this opinion also is true.
SOCRATES: Then all men, beginning with Protagoras, will dispute -- or rather, he will grant, after he once concedes that the opinion of the man who holds the opposite view is true -- even Protagoras himself, I say, [171c] will concede that neither a dog nor any casual man is a measure of anything whatsoever that he has not learned. Is not that the case?
SOCRATES: Then since the "truth" of Protagoras is disputed by all, it would be true to nobody, neither to anyone else nor to him.
Of course, I won't refute the premise of this thread. I just want to take a shot at Steerpike...
"There are no objective ethical truths" is a statement regarding what is. Ethics do not deal with what exists; they deal with what should exist or what should be done. Ergo, that statement does not express an ethic, as it makes no claims about ethical truth. Thus, it is not self-refuting. On the other hand, a statement such as, "there is no true statement" is self-refuting.
Morality is a myth, one created by a given population within a geographical area. Morality is determined by the self-interest of our common biology.
Does this mean that morality is a real myth?
To say it is a myth is not to say it has no foundation, the foundation is ones own self-interest in the welfare of the individual or that of a group of people. How else woud you understand the variations of morality across the board.
The foundation of compassion is identifing with that of another, the foundation of morality is compassion, that this is then written in stone by a given culture does not negate the nature of that mythology.
That it is a natural out come of humanity does not again negative the narrative as a mythology, if a morality singular was universally held, you then might have an argument.
I suggest if you are looking for the absolute, you pack a lunch.