@Theaetetus,
Kant's agent that ought to do certain things is the same agent that Aristotle says follows the doctrine of the mean. I see Kant's a priori principles a necessary component of the Aristotle's virtous individual.
I personally believe that they are incompatible. There are certain things Kant's agent can and cannot do, and Aristotle's agent can and cannot do. Sometimes these acts coincide but for totally different reasons.
Quote:Now virtue is concerned with passions and actions, in which excess is a form of failure, and so is defect, while the intermediate is praised and is a form of success; and being praised and being successful are both characteristics of virtue. Therefore virtue is a kind of mean, since, as we have seen, it aims at what is intermediate.
Aristotle's individual acts virtously because his actions fit a human telos [happiness yay]. Lying, for example, is a good example. Lying too much and not lying at all can be seen as excess and deficiency. Lying to everyone is akin to the Boy who cried wolf, while not lying at all is akin to the man who told the killer where to find his victim. Neither will earn praise, but for Aristotle, and for us all, I hope, the boy who tells the truth when the wolf really comes and the man who (tried to at least) diverted the killer from his target will earn praise.
That's my two cents, anyway