What am I?

@Salbris,

The point of the 'so what' question is not to dismiss it as non-important. It is to get a real feel for what it means. In fact, I think there are real consequences to the questions you are raising. It is more a matter of saying 'so if it is true, then what are the consequences'. So it wasn't meant as dismissive at all. I think it is an important enquiry.

---------- Post added 09-19-2009 at 05:22 PM ----------

because it is a geniunely philosophical question/

@Salbris,

So what, where does that get you? Please pray tell?
Thanks.

@VideCorSpoon,

I did note that as an answer to my Question 1:

jeeprs;90811 wrote:

(1) what is really involved in investigating this, given that everything you think is somehow involved in the situation or illusion which you are investigating. How can the instrument of thought ask this question about its own functioning, given that the very asking of the question presupposes the ability to think?

VideCorSpoon said:

VideCorSpoon;90892 wrote:

1. Descartes

Which is indeed a good answer, because it is quite true that Decartes was asking the same question and felt that he had arrived at an answer.

Recall that Descartes wrote:

Quote:

But I have convinced myself that there is absolutely nothing in the world, no sky, no earth, no minds, no bodies. Does it now follow that I too do not exist? No. If I convinced myself of something [or thought anything at all] then I certainly existed. But there is a deceiver of supreme power and cunning who is deliberately and constantly deceiving me. In that case I too undoubtedly exist, if he is deceiving me; and let him deceive me as much as he can, he will never bring it about that I am nothing so long as I think that I am something. So, after considering everything very thoroughly, I must finally conclude that the proposition, I am, I exist, is necessarily true whenever it is put forward by me or conceived in my mind. (AT VII 25; CSM II 16-17)

Source

However, I don't think Descartes ever convincingly analysed the 'I', the existence of which he says is impossible to dispute. "I think, therefore I am", he said. I would, however, ask the question "If I do not think, then what am I? Non cogito, ergo non sum?"

This is actually a serious question, but be careful, for whatever answer you are likely to give will itself involve thinking!

Thought itself also seems to me to be the uppermost level of a complex process of activity that must be understood to include subconscious and unconscious processes, which are far from "clear and self-evident" even it I am the one to whom they occur. It may be perfectly true tht one can be clear and certain in regards to simple and elementary ideas, but how can this then be taken as a foundation for the complex structure of thought which it to be built on it? So I am very dubious of Descartes resolution of this question.

@jeeprs,

jeeprs;91712 wrote:

However, I don't think Descartes ever convincingly analysed the 'I', the existence of which he says is impossible to dispute. "I think, therefore I am", he said. I would, however, ask the question "If I do not think, then what am I? Non cogito, ergo non sum?"

This is actually a serious question, but be careful, for whatever answer you are likely to give will itself involve thinking!

Thought itself also seems to me to be the uppermost level of a complex process of activity that must be understood to include subconscious and unconscious processes, which are far from "clear and self-evident" even it I am the one to whom they occur. It may be perfectly true tht one can be clear and certain in regards to simple and elementary ideas, but how can this then be taken as a foundation for the complex structure of thought which it to be built on it? So I am very dubious of Descartes resolution of this question.

a) Your talking about very ambiguous things: What does it mean to "think"? Most logical people will realize that it's very likely that our brain is driven by deterministic processes. We take input from our environment and use it in possibly predictable means. We have already defined a mind in obvious ways.

We are much different from trees, they do not react beyond what there DNA commands. We are beyond trees, as we can react based on perceived events and memorized events.

You cannot say we do not think simply because our mind is being fed illusionary data or that our mind is artificial. It's almost like your saying that if we create artificial minds ourself, that they would not be real minds.

@jeeprs,

jeeprs;91712 wrote:

However, I don't think Descartes ever convincingly analysed the 'I', the existence of which he says is impossible to dispute. "I think, therefore I am", he said. I would, however, ask the question "If I do not think, then what am I? Non cogito, ergo non sum?"

I would say that the answer to the question "I do not think, therefore I am not?" is yes, but obviously the question is contradictory, as you cannot make it winhout thinking, so you cannot conclude that you do not exist =)

@manored,

Jeeprs,

jeeprs;91712 wrote:

However, I don't think Descartes ever convincingly analysed the 'I', the existence of which he says is impossible to dispute. "I think, therefore I am", he said. I would, however, ask the question "If I do not think, then what am I? Non cogito, ergo non sum?"

In terms of Meditations, Descartes did somewhat adequately investigate the "I." I suppose the fact is arguable since wiki and other internet sources still mention "Cogito Ergo Sum" as the thesis of Meditations (and falselyMeditationsMeditations, namely 4). I said something to this effect in post #6, so it's not worth going over again. Suffice to say, it's a quote from different book with no context within the scope of Meditations.

As far as dubito cogito ergo sum qua cogito ergo sum, that's the substantial foundation of the Cartesian circle (not exactly in content, but in form). For example, Descartes held that he had a clear and distinct idea of God because God exists (sum. Med. 1-3) however God exists because we have a clear and distinct idea of him. Interestingly enough, Descartes cannot utilize clear and distinct ideas in order to pull out of the Cartesian circle he acknowledged, only rely on the causation of the notion, namely the principle of sufficient reason. He has the fact that he exists, that he has the idea of God (within that scope, the circle ensues). But the cause of the idea (PSR) God is the cause of the idea (in formal and objective reality) wherein the cause has as much formal as objective reality. Simply, one notion logically (or rationally LOL) trumps the other. In the case of your question, maybe it's as simple as positing that existence trumps nonexistence sine qua non (like Descartes held with the scales of reality). That's my own opinion though, and I certainly do agree with many aspects of your point.

jeeprs;91712 wrote:

This is actually a serious question, but be careful, for whatever answer you are likely to give will itself involve thinking!

I suppose that's the difficulty of a solipsistic argument. Maybe that's where the empiricists stood and said that does not make sense.

jeeprs;91712 wrote:

Thought itself also seems to me to be the uppermost level of a complex process of activity that must be understood to include subconscious and unconscious processes, which are far from "clear and self-evident" even it I am the one to whom they occur. It may be perfectly true tht one can be clear and certain in regards to simple and elementary ideas, but how can this then be taken as a foundation for the complex structure of thought which it to be built on it? So I am very dubious of Descartes resolution of this question.

I don't agree with some of this in terms of a Cartesian framework, but it is an interesting thought though. Even Descartes had difficulty categorizing the contents of thought (i.e. invented, adventitious, and innate ideas), which I don't think are as far from clear and self-evidentcy as you imply. I could only suggest in terms of the Cartesian framework a rubric on par with the reality scales (i.e. formal, eminent, and objective).

Salbris,

You make a very exceptional point that I think may drive at Descartes principle of sufficient reason. Determinism is something Descartes wrestled with in the context of Meditations (although not to the level Leibniz struggled with).

Manored,

@Salbris,

I will have one more try at this post. I have been working with the idea that 'the world' does exist in our consciousness of it, as the idealists say. But I think this idea receives support from consciousness studies, which reveal something of the way that our experience of reality is constructed on the basis of a lot of interacting levels of consciousness. This starts with the autonomic level controlling basic respiration and corresponding with the brain-stem, up through various levels of complexity, each representing a different epoch of evolutionary development, and culminating in the human forebrain, which is the most sophisticated and recent aspect. In some ways, consciousness resembles the 'networking stack' which describes the way computers interact, starting with a physical layer (actual cables) transport layer (electrical impulses) right up to the top layer which is where all the info is represented in application software. So it is kind of like 'the conciousness stack'.

One of the things that intrigues me about the consciousness stack is the degree to which its rationality reflects the actual relationships in the world. This is revealed in maths and logic. Maths and logic reveal considerably more about the nature of reality than we can obtain by simple observation. This is because, in my view, the inherent rational nature of existence has been mirrored in our intellectual abilities, giving us the ability to see deeply into the nature of the world. This is expressed in one of the fundamental tenets of Western philosophy, and one which I am sure Descartes would have agreed with: that we are a rational being in an intelligible universe. It is an acknowledgement of the traditional understanding of Man as a rational being.

The way I have been seeking to develop this idea is to show that there is a sense in which reality and existence are different:

Quote:

Reality contains everything that exists, but existence is only a subset of what is real. Nothing unreal exists, but some things which are real do not exist. Existence is of objects, while reality also covers ideas beyond objects. A number is only real, while a baseball exists. The gross national product is only real, while Antarctica exists. The probability of the sun not rising tomorrow is real, while the sun itself exists.

Source

I think this is an intuition of the 'intellectual' realm which was understood by traditional philosophers. It goes back to the idea of the Forms, which provide the blueprints for all existing things. Because of our intellectual ability - and this term actually meant something subtly different in pre-modern times - we are able to see 'the real' in addition to all the things that 'merely exist'. Mathematics provide one example of the higher meaning of 'intelligibility', an insight which was preserved in the Western tradition and played a big part in the rise of Western science. However Science has now in many ways abandoned this kind of understanding as it is 'rationalist' rather than 'empirical'. However I think rationalism has returned in the form of theoretical physics, the subject of which is only conceivable in mathematical terms.

That is it in a nutshell. Of course it is a big topic in its own right, I hope it is relevant or can spark some insight into the question you raised in the first place.

@Salbris,

You are you and I am me and that's what makes us different and that's what makes the world go round.

@Salbris,

yes and as we are on opposite sides of the globe, it balances things out and stops it from wobbling :bigsmile:

@jeeprs,

hi Salbris

Quote:

Representation is as much as we will ever perceive so it's what we refer to as real.

well i agree that is true logically speaking. Which is my point re descartes. But what an admission!

Quote:

You could get specific and signify a difference between representation and thing but as long as the viewer is receiving a perfect representation (as proper human minds do) then the difference is basically non-existent.

do you really believe that???

Quote:

Representations are not illusions, they are representations. A mirror does not hide or skew the reflection it produces it simply produces it's emission based on the laws of physics.

Even when you say a representation of reality is the same as reality? Is that not bound to be an illusion?

Quote:

Assuming our reality is real then the representation of objects is received visually thanks to photons of light. Which are emitted by the object it represents in a very specific and replicatable way. So the representation is direct related to the thing which it represents.

Thats logical thinking re the link between representation and photons. But we see things in dreams, Where are the photons??? AH says science and logic, we see brain data influenced by the photons not the photons themselves. Brain data can be created internally to give dreams. ....

Quote:

In the latter we are perceiving things as a representation of some form of complex data. Whether it be a computer program or the vibrations of crystals. Our perceptions may not directly relate to the things they represent, it's possible that they do not represent anything real them selves, but only data in a program.

Well thats why i drew the comparison with descartes. But logic already tells us we see brain data when we see reality! So like i say i return ...

It is actually asking "is your illusion an even bigger illusion than you thought it was?" But curiously it is often expressed as "do we see an illusion?"

according to science and logic we never see the thing in itself. As you honestly pointed out in the quote at the top of this post.

@pagan,

pagan;93082 wrote:

hi Salbris

well i agree that is true logically speaking. Which is my point re descartes. But what an admission!

do you really believe that???

Even when you say a representation of reality is the same as reality? Is that not bound to be an illusion?
Thats logical thinking re the link between representation and photons. But we see things in dreams, Where are the photons??? AH says science and logic, we see brain data influenced by the photons not the photons themselves. Brain data can be created internally to give dreams. ....

Well thats why i drew the comparison with descartes. But logic already tells us we see brain data when we see reality! So like i say i return ...

It is actually asking "is your illusion an even bigger illusion than you thought it was?" But curiously it is often expressed as "do we see an illusion?"

according to science and logic we never see the thing in itself. As you honestly pointed out in the quote at the top of this post.

I don't really know what brain data are. But if that means I see my brain, I deny that. I have never seen my brain. Thank Goodness!

I don't see representations. What I see are objects. And I have representations, and that is how I see objects.

@kennethamy,

kennethamy;93097 wrote:

I don't see representations.

Just to further my own understanding, is this what is meant by hypostatization (which I understand to mean regarding an abstract word as a concrete one)?

If this is correct, then the rest of your post makes sense to me. If not, then I'm confused, I guess, as I interpreted your words to mean that you do not make the mistake of confusing the idea (or representation) of a thing with the thing itself.

@pagan,

pagan;93082 wrote:

a) do you really believe that???

b) Even when you say a representation of reality is the same as reality? Is that not bound to be an illusion?

c) Thats logical thinking re the link between representation and photons. But we see things in dreams, Where are the photons??? AH says science and logic, we see brain data influenced by the photons not the photons themselves. Brain data can be created internally to give dreams. ....

d) Well thats why i drew the comparison with descartes. But logic already tells us we see brain data when we see reality! So like i say i return ...

It is actually asking "is your illusion an even bigger illusion than you thought it was?" But curiously it is often expressed as "do we see an illusion?"

according to science and logic we never see the thing in itself. As you honestly pointed out in the quote at the top of this post.

a) Of course. As I said in that post IF you assume our reality is real then photons are the best example of a perfect representation. They are emitted by objects with a very specific energy level which DIRECTLY corresponds to a colour we can see. Sciencists have studied eye cells and optical physics very intensely and the conclusion is that we all see the same photons.

b) Illusion is an ambiguous term. I could say that pain is an illusion then try to ignore it. For all we know, anything could be an "illusion". What's important is the source of a things existence. I would then consider "real" to be something of a product of some natural process. Ex. If we assume our reality is real then everything in it is real because everything was created by the natural process of the universe and it's physical laws.

Under that definition photons and our representation of our reality are not illusions as they are products of the universe and it's natural laws.

However, this is not to say everything we perceive is most definitely not an illusion, but you seem to be saying that all representations are.

c) Part of perception is the brains processes, some of which involve storing data in memory. This memory is not perfect and can be re-accessed giving an "illusionary" image or scene. Such is the case in hallucinations.

Again this is a direct representation of the visual stimuli we previously received then creating these images in our mind. To say that memory is definitely an illusion would be obviously false. Unless your definition of "illusion" is different than mine.

d) As I said the representations we see are directly related to the things they represent, the size, the shape, colour, texture, etc. of object we perceived are accurately portrayed to us.

We MIGHT be seeing illusions but that will may never be known for certain.

Which is the point of the thread.

So correct me if I'm wrong: You believe all perception is always illusion?

Also what's your definition of illusion?

@Salbris,

Salbris;93143 wrote:

a)

We MIGHT be seeing illusions but that will may never be known for certain.

Which is the point of the thread.

So correct me if I'm wrong: You believe all perception is always illusion?

Also what's your definition of illusion?

hi salbris

i certainly don't believe that all perceptions are illusion in the sense that illusion means a critical break with reality. e.g. If we recognise a representation as not the thing in itself then we are in touch with reality. The reality of a representation. But if we believe that a representation IS the thing in itself then we are prone to illusion.

With regard to descartes dilemma i was pointing out that even in his day it was possible to figure out spatially (through consideration of light) what the rational scientific narrative says re perception representation and reality. This is an old argument. But of course we always forget this perspective (if we ever learned and seriously considered it) and act as if we are in reality as perceived, even if we align ourselves with that scientific logical narrative. This is natural and so highly pragmatic with regards to living that we couldn't function if we didn't forget it.

But in modern times science has added more understanding of light through its narrative. We now know that light in that narrative is made of strange things called photons, and very importantly with finite velocity. This enables a temporal analysis which could be expressed as follows. But i hasten to add that it is out of respect for the scientific narrative that i present it. I was trained in theoretical physics.

1 If A is in a different space-time region to B, then B cannot be A as the thing in itself, scientifically speaking. At best it can be a complete copy of A but with the exception of space-time position. That difference in space-time is necessarily a difference in the things as themselves scientifically speaking.

2 According to scientific rationalism the perception of the world occurs at least in part within the brain. Thus the perception of something completely outside the brain must occur at least in part within the brain.

3 From 1 and 2 it follows, scientifically speaking, that perception of something by the brain cannot be the thing in itself, because the thing in itself is at least in part somewhere else to the process that creates the perceptual representation.

4 Science tells us that some stars are thousands of light years away. Ie that light has a finite velocity. Science also tells us that sometimes stars destruct as supernovae. Thus it follows that the perception of stars cannot scientifically be the stars in themselves because it is scientifically possible that the brain is perceiving using light that no longer even signals the existence of the star at the time of perception. Ie the star is in a radically and obvious different space-time to the perception.

All light induced perception of things outside the body incurs a delay in time, (and a difference in space), scientifically speaking. The representation of a thing can be distinguished from the thing in itself by a difference in space or time between the two, scientifically speaking.
So it follows, scientifically speaking, that the room you are now perceiving is not the room in itself, but a representation of it. The room you perceive according to science is therefore in a different time and space to the real room, because it is a representation of it. (and there are other serious logical implications to this perspective also.)

Anyone who holds dear to the belief that they do indeed perceive the room in itself, and also holds dearly to the scientific way of understanding things as complete and true, is faced with a dilemma if they accept the points made above. Where and when is the representation of a thing?

When and where is the room you are now perceiving? If the room and the representation are coincident in time and space, then you perceive the room itself and not a representation of it. If they are not coincident in time or space, then the room you perceive exists in a different time and space to the real room. If so when

@Salbris,

Schopenauer claimed that

Quote:

an observing subject can only know material objects through the mediation of the brain and its particular organization. The way that the brain knows determines the way that material objects are experienced. "Everything objective, extended, active, and hence everything material, is regarded by materialism as so solid a basis for its explanations that a reduction to this...can leave nothing to be desired. But all this is something that is given only very indirectly and conditionally, and is therefore only relatively present, for it has passed through the machinery and fabrication of the brain, and hence has entered the forms of time, space, and causality, by virtue of which it is first of all presented as extended in space and operating in time."

Source

This is also very much in keeping with Kant's analysis of the matter.

@TickTockMan,

TickTockMan;93123 wrote:

Just to further my own understanding, is this what is meant by hypostatization (which I understand to mean regarding an abstract word as a concrete one)?

If this is correct, then the rest of your post makes sense to me. If not, then I'm confused, I guess, as I interpreted your words to mean that you do not make the mistake of confusing the idea (or representation) of a thing with the thing itself.

I'm not sure what you are asking. The representative theory of perception is the theory that what we observe are not objects like chairs and tables, but "representations" of them, and infer to the existence of chairs and tables. There have been a number of arguments for this view, philosophical, and physiological. I don't think that this view of perception is right, and I don't think that whatever are called "representations" are not what we observe when we observe objects. I believe that we observe objects, not intermediaries between us and the objects which cause them.

@kennethamy,

kennethamy;94213 wrote:

I don't think that this view of perception is right, and I don't think that whatever are called "representations" are not what we observe when we observe objects. I believe that we observe objects, not intermediaries between us and the objects which cause them.

Now see, this I do not agree with. It may be possible in another reality, that there are no "representations" but it's very clear that in this reality we perceive things using other things detached from the objects we "perceive". Photons of visual for visual perception, smell molecules for smell, pressure waves for hearing, and taste molecules for taste. However, touch may be pretty close to actual perception, however there are many cases which proof representation in touch. For example, when you get a numb foot, or get numbing treatment for your mouth and teeth for surgery. Touch is then also representative.

@Salbris,

Salbris;94219 wrote:

Now see, this I do not agree with. It may be possible in another reality, that there are no "representations" but it's very clear that in this reality we perceive things using other things detached from the objects we "perceive". Photons of visual for visual perception, smell molecules for smell, pressure waves for hearing, and taste molecules for taste. However, touch may be pretty close to actual perception, however there are many cases which proof representation in touch. For example, when you get a numb foot, or get numbing treatment for your mouth and teeth for surgery. Touch is then also representative.

I think we cannot have full perception of anything, in any universe: How could you know all the atoms of a chair, and all the sub-atomic particles of it, and all the sub-sub-atomic particles, and... you get it. Everthing is made of smaller pieces, incluiding these smaller pieces thenselves =)

And if under any circunstances you cannot have "full perception", then it doesnt matters if we see the actual object or an intermediary. If we claim we see real objects, we cannot be claimed wrong, because there is no way to have a more "verificable" input. If we claim we see intermediars, we cant be claimed wrong either because what we sense cannot be proved as true.

@Salbris,

I think it is more the case that perception of truth is something to which we have to ascend. In all ancient philosophy it was understood that there was a direct link between ethic and metaphysic, and that mature knowledge of truth requires not only the exercise of reason, but also the ability to discriminate between truth and illusion on a very deep level. It is clear to me that most of us live in the matrix of attributed meanings, conventions, and assumptions about the nature of things. We are emotionally intertwined and entangled in all kinds of likes, dislikes and views. This is the way in which things are misinterpreted; because our own ego is basically a social construction, and therefore illusory. The most important realisation in all of this is indeed the depth of our ignorance, how we are actually enmeshed in a reality of which we really have no adequate idea. The truth of that really does have to penetrate your marrow first.

@kennethamy,

kennethamy;93097 wrote:

I don't see representations. What I see are objects. And I have representations, and that is how I see objects.

TickTockMan;93123 wrote:

Just to further my own understanding, is this what is meant by hypostatization (which I understand to mean regarding an abstract word as a concrete one)?

kennethamy;94213 wrote:

I'm not sure what you are asking. The representative theory of perception is the theory that what we observe are not objects like chairs and tables, but "representations" of them, and infer to the existence of chairs and tables. There have been a number of arguments for this view, philosophical, and physiological. I don't think that this view of perception is right, and I don't think that whatever are called "representations" are not what we observe when we observe objects. I believe that we observe objects, not intermediaries between us and the objects which cause them.

Thanks. This in fact does answer my question. I think any confusion may have been caused by my definition of hypostatization not being entirely correct for this particular instance.

The gist of my question was to verify that you were indeed saying you believe you see objects, rather than representations of objects. Here I was equating (perhaps incorrectly) "representations" with "ideas," and the fallacy of mistaking the idea of something for the actual thing itself.

This is what I assumed (again, perhaps incorrectly) you meant when you said you have representations, or a concept of something, that allows you to see a chair as a chair as opposed to seeing something else.

If I am incorrect in equating representations with ideas, please let me know what the correct distinction between the two should be.

Tock

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